User Identity and Access Tokens in Windows Security

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GOPAS: info@gopas,cz 
|
 www.gopas.cz
 |
 www.facebook.com/P.S.GOPAS
 
Ing. 
Ondřej Ševeček 
| GOPAS a.s. |
MCM:Directory | MVP:Enterprise Security | CEH: Certified Ethical Hacker |
CHFI: Computer Hacking Forensic Investigator
ondrej@sevecek.com | www.sevecek.com |
 
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www.gopas.cz
GOC175 - Advanced Windows Security
GOC171 - Active Directory Internals and
Troubleshooting
GOC172 - Kerberos Troubleshooting
GOC173 - Enterprise PKI Deployment
GOC169 - ISO 2700x in Windows Environment
CHFI - 
Computer Hacking Forensic Investigator
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Advanced Windows Security
 
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Everything runs as a process
some code runs in Kernel mode, but mostly under identity of
the calling process
interrupts, DPCs and file cache are executing without user
context
Every process runs under a user identity
SYSTEM, Network Service, Local Service, local user,
domain user
Access permissions are always checked
there is no root superuser as in unix
 
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User identity is represented as a SID
NT Authority\SYSTEM = S-1-5-18
NT Authority\Local Service = S-1-5-19
NT Authority\Network Service = S-1-5-20
BUILTIN\Administrators = S-1-5-32-544
BUILTIN\Users = S-1-5-32-545
local user = S-1-5-21-LocalSID-RID
domain user = S-1-5-21-DomainSID-RID
Every process gets its own copy of an Access Token
list of user’s SID and SIDs of his groups
created by LSASS.exe (Local Security Authority)
 
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Memory structure that contains user SID and the
SIDs of his groups
identified by its Logon Session ID
Inherited by child processes
Cached after a successful interactive logon in registry
HKLM\Security\Cache
Policy: Number of Previous Logons to Cache
Limitted to 1025 SIDs
 
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WHOAMI /ALL
built into Vista/2008 and newer
member of Support Tools for 2003/xp and older
PROCEXP
Process Explorer
download from 
http://live.sysinternals.com
PSEXEC
download from 
http://live.sysinternals.com
ADUC Attribute Editor
Active Directory Users and Computers console
Select View – Advanced Features
Can show user and group SIDs in AD
 
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Some SIDs are added automatically
INTERACTIVE, NETWORK, BATCH, REMOTE
INTERACTIVE LOGON
Everyone, Authenticated Users, This Organization,
NTLM Authentication
 
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Windows 2000-
Everyone = Authenticated Users + Anonymous Logon
Windows XP+
Everyone = Authenticated Users
can be changed back in security policy
Let Everyone permissions apply to Anonymous Users
 
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GOPAS: info@gopas,cz 
|
 www.gopas.cz
 |
 www.facebook.com/P.S.GOPAS
 
Ing. 
Ondřej Ševeček 
| GOPAS a.s. |
MCM:Directory | MVP:Enterprise Security | CEH: Certified Ethical Hacker |
CHFI: Computer Hacking Forensic Investigator
ondrej@sevecek.com | www.sevecek.com |
 
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š
k
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G
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P
A
S
 
http
://
www.gopas.cz
GOC175 - Advanced Windows Security
GOC171 - Active Directory Internals and
Troubleshooting
GOC172 - Kerberos Troubleshooting
GOC173 - Enterprise PKI Deployment
GOC169 - ISO 2700x in Windows Environment
CHFI - 
Computer Hacking Forensic Investigator
Slide Note

Modul se zabývá principy reprezentace identity uživatelských účtů na platformě Windows. Probírají se detaily vzniku paměťové struktury access token, ve které jsou uloženy SID (security ID) uživatelského účtu i všech jeho skupina (i vnořených) a další systémový SIDy. Access token slouží jako identita procesů skrz které uživatel komunikuje se systémem a přistupuje k jeho prostředkům, jako jsou soubory a registrové klíče, nebo SQL databáze. Porovnává se zde běh procesů pod účtem lokálních i doménových uživatelů a pod účty systémovými (NT AUTHORITY), jako jsou SYSTEM, Network Server a Local Service. Vysvětluje se, jak se identita procesů dědí z procesu rodičovského do procesů, které z rodiče vznikají. Přesně se definují rozdíly mezi systémovými SIDy jako je Authenticated Users a Everyone.

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Delve into the intricate world of user identity and access tokens in Windows security. Explore how user identities are represented, the structure of access tokens, and the significance of processes running under different user contexts. Gain insights into advanced Windows security principles and learn about tools for security enhancements.

  • Windows Security
  • User Identity
  • Access Tokens
  • Advanced Security
  • Process Execution

Uploaded on Sep 20, 2024 | 2 Views


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  1. Bezpenost Windows pro pokro il : identita u ivatele Ing. Ond ej eve ek | GOPAS a.s. | MCM:Directory | MVP:Enterprise Security | CEH: Certified Ethical Hacker | CHFI: Computer Hacking Forensic Investigator ondrej@sevecek.com | www.sevecek.com | GOPAS: info@gopas,cz| www.gopas.cz| www.facebook.com/P.S.GOPAS

  2. Kurzy v potaov kole GOPAS http://www.gopas.cz GOC175 - Advanced Windows Security GOC171 - Active Directory Internals and Troubleshooting GOC172 - Kerberos Troubleshooting GOC173 - Enterprise PKI Deployment GOC169 - ISO 2700x in Windows Environment CHFI - Computer Hacking Forensic Investigator

  3. User identity, SID and access token Advanced Windows Security

  4. Windows Processes Everything runs as a process some code runs in Kernel mode, but mostly under identity of the calling process interrupts, DPCs and file cache are executing without user context Every process runs under a user identity SYSTEM, Network Service, Local Service, local user, domain user Access permissions are always checked there is no root superuser as in unix

  5. User Identity User identity is represented as a SID NT Authority\SYSTEM = S-1-5-18 NT Authority\Local Service = S-1-5-19 NT Authority\Network Service = S-1-5-20 BUILTIN\Administrators = S-1-5-32-544 BUILTIN\Users = S-1-5-32-545 local user = S-1-5-21-LocalSID-RID domain user = S-1-5-21-DomainSID-RID Every process gets its own copy of an Access Token list of user s SID and SIDs of his groups created by LSASS.exe (Local Security Authority)

  6. Access Token Memory structure that contains user SID and the SIDs of his groups identified by its Logon Session ID Inherited by child processes Cached after a successful interactive logon in registry HKLM\Security\Cache Policy: Number of Previous Logons to Cache Limitted to 1025 SIDs

  7. Access Token Cache Limit

  8. Tools for Access Token WHOAMI /ALL built into Vista/2008 and newer member of Support Tools for 2003/xp and older PROCEXP Process Explorer download from http://live.sysinternals.com PSEXEC download from http://live.sysinternals.com ADUC Attribute Editor Active Directory Users and Computers console Select View Advanced Features Can show user and group SIDs in AD

  9. System SIDs Some SIDs are added automatically INTERACTIVE, NETWORK, BATCH, REMOTE INTERACTIVE LOGON Everyone, Authenticated Users, This Organization, NTLM Authentication

  10. Everyone vs. Authenticated Users Windows 2000- Everyone = Authenticated Users + Anonymous Logon Windows XP+ Everyone = Authenticated Users can be changed back in security policy Let Everyone permissions apply to Anonymous Users

  11. Everyone vs. Authenticated Users

  12. Dkuji za pozornost Ing. Ond ej eve ek | GOPAS a.s. | MCM:Directory | MVP:Enterprise Security | CEH: Certified Ethical Hacker | CHFI: Computer Hacking Forensic Investigator ondrej@sevecek.com | www.sevecek.com | GOPAS: info@gopas,cz| www.gopas.cz| www.facebook.com/P.S.GOPAS

  13. Kurzy v potaov kole GOPAS http://www.gopas.cz GOC175 - Advanced Windows Security GOC171 - Active Directory Internals and Troubleshooting GOC172 - Kerberos Troubleshooting GOC173 - Enterprise PKI Deployment GOC169 - ISO 2700x in Windows Environment CHFI - Computer Hacking Forensic Investigator

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