Update on Department of Home Affairs' Progress in Implementing Lubisi Report Recommendations & Committee Oversight, March 2024

The Multi-disciplinary Task Team (MDTT) at the Department of Home Affairs has been operational since March 2023, focusing on investigating fraud, corruption, and maladministration. The MDTT's mandate includes conducting investigations, data analytics, coordinating anti-corruption initiatives, providing expert advice, and developing preventative strategies. The team is structured into operational clusters, each with specific responsibilities for effective oversight. Progress has been made in disciplinary matters, contingent liability, and data consolidation, with a strong emphasis on improving processes and addressing identified risks.

• Department of Home Affairs
• MDTT
• Lubisi Report
• Oversight
• Progress

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1. Briefing by the Department of Home Affairs on the implementation of the recommendations of the Lubisi Report and update on Committee oversight in March 2024. March 2024

2. Contents Introduction Multi-disciplinary Task Team (MDTT) Mandate MDTT Composition 25 Focus Areas For Investigation As Per Mincom Report Size Of Data Sets Obtained/Analysed Legal Opinion And Recommendations Level Profiles Of All Officials Referred For Disciplinaries (52 Files) And Criminal Level Profiles Of Officials New Disciplinaries Progress On Disciplinary Matters MDTT Progress Labour Relations Directorate Contingent Liability Development Of A Business Process And Standard Operating Procedure Labour Relations Directorate Data Consolidation And Cleaning 2

3. Introduction The MDTT is fully operational and has been functional since 01 March 2023. The MDTT is currently operating with the following operational team clusters: Disciplinary Legal Implementation Team; Data Analytics Team; Case Management Team; Disciplinary Investigative Team; Criminal Investigative Team; and Contingent Liability/SOP/Training Team. 3

4. MDTT Mandate The MDTT mandate, as per the Service Level Agreement (SLA) concluded between the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) and the MDTT, includes the following primary deliverables: Conduct investigations, data analytics, including link analysis on the issuance of visas or permits, as well as investigate/identify criminal syndicates for fraud, theft, corruption and maladministration; Co-ordinate / improve the co-ordination of anti-corruption initiatives between the DHA and law enforcement agencies; Provide expert opinions and advice including attending court cases, departmental disciplinary hearings and dispute proceedings, and testifying as expert witnesses; 4

5. MDTT Mandate continued Provide expert advice and support on the development of a comprehensive Anti-Fraud and Corruption Prevention Strategy and Risk Prevention Plan for the DHA; Analyze existing, new or developing related trends within the DHA; Provide advice and recommendations on the (re) engineering of business processes (and systems) to address identified risks / close identified gaps; Prepare / present the necessary (progress) reports required by all relevant parties / structures (e.g. Audit Committee, Risk Management Committee, Executive Management Meeting, etc.) timeously; and Provide training to identified DHA staff on the use of data analytics, link analysis software (and systems). 5

6. MDTT Composition TEAM LEVEL 13/14 3 2 LEVEL 12 LEVEL 11/12 Project Directorship Investigations and Profiling 6 2 Disciplinary 3 1 1 Data Analytics and System Experts Business Processes Project Administration CAJV ESS (Expert and Support Services) 4 2 2 2 2 4 7 TOTAL 14 15 12 6

7. 25 Focus Areas For Investigation As Per Mincom Report NO. ITEM DESCRIPTION OF MATTERS Pages 236 to 239 of the Lubisi Report All PRPs that were previously rejected and then approved after appealing; and Files sent for the appeal process with no application documents on record and have also not followed the adjudication process. All applications information which is in VAS and not reflected in VFS; All application information which is in VFS and not reflected in VAS; All applicants loaded onto VAS, but have no associated application supporting information; All applications with difference between the Passport Number captured in VFS and the Passport Number loaded in VAS; and All applications with passport number differences by the application status. Findings into the alleged security breaches and irregularities in the VAS System. TASK Responsibility What must be done Each case needs to be investigated and the reason for approval needs to be verified against the reasons for the rejection. 1 Appeals. MDTT Each case needs to be investigated by DHA IS and VFS. To avoid any manipulation of the data it would be best to have the MDTT to conduct this investigation. 2 VFS and VAS Applications. MDTT Investigation to be conducted. 3 Nexia SAB&T Forensic investigation report. Nexia SAB 7

8. 25 Focus Areas For Investigation As Per Mincom Report NO. ITEM DESCRIPTION OF MATTERS TASK Responsibility Pages 236 to 239 of the Lubisi Report Matters flagged for investigation. What must be done Due to a lack of data sets to run data analysis tests, links were made through manual associations between individuals. 4 Pastors and Prophets. MDTT Each case needs to be investigated by DHA IS and VFS. To avoid any manipulation of the data it would be best to have the MDTT to conduct this investigation. 5 Track and Trace System (TnT). All applications processed in TnT since 2015 that circumvented the VFS and VAS processes. MDTT Each case needs to be investigated. To avoid any manipulation of the data it would be best to have the MDTT to conduct this investigation. All PRP applications that were approved before 5 years had expired and did comply with the continuous period of only being 90 days outside the country during this 5 year period; All PRP applications approved but had been declined previously due to false documentation having been submitted; All issued visitors visas status changed to PRP whilst in the country; and PRP with common patterns of forum shopping and brute force tactics among some foreign nationals shifting from one application to another. 6 PRPs. MDTT 8

9. 25 Focus Areas For Investigation As Per Mincom Report NO. ITEM DESCRIPTION OF MATTERS Pages 236 to 239 of the Lubisi Report All business permit approvals that were found to be skewed where analysis indicated that 1,137 were approved over the same period in the TnT system. These applications and approvals should have been processed through VFS and VAS and not TnT. All under-aged applicants for critical and exceptional skills visas and permits due to a data capture error involving gross misconduct. TASK Responsibility What must be done Each case needs to be investigated. To avoid any manipulation of the data it would be best to have the MDTT to conduct this investigation. 7 Business permits. MDTT Each case needs to be investigated. To avoid any manipulation of the data it would be best to have the MDTT to conduct this investigation. Each case needs to be investigated. To avoid any manipulation of the data it would be best to have the MDTT to conduct this investigation Each case needs to be investigated. To avoid any manipulation of the data it would be best to have the MDTT to conduct this investigation. 8 Under Age Visas. MDTT 9 Work Visa to Critical Skills Visa. All work visas approvals where applicants changed their visa from worker to a critical skills visa and back to a PRP worker. MDTT 10 Study Visa to Critical Skills Visa All study visa applications followed by critical skills visa applications. MDTT 9

10. 25 Focus Areas For Investigation As Per Mincom Report NO. ITEM DESCRIPTION OF MATTERS Pages 236 to 239 of the Lubisi Report All study visas that include multiple spelling variations of the generic terms, Learner and n/a captured in VAS. TASK Responsibility What must be done Each case needs to be investigated. To avoid any manipulation of the data it would be best to have the MDTT to conduct this investigation. 11 Study Visa. MDTT Retirement Visa. All approved retirement visas with a significant increase of applications for the period 2016- 2018; All retirement visas below the age of 55; All retirement visas where applicants have applied for another visa due to a change in status, i.e., spousal relationship or to work; and All retirement visas awarded in contravention of Section 20 of the Immigration Act regulations related to minimum amounts per month from pension or irrevocable annuity or retirement account. Irregular System Users created on MCS. Each case needs to be investigated. To avoid any manipulation of the data it would be best to have the MDTT to conduct this investigation. 12 MDTT Each case needs to be investigated By IS. To avoid any manipulation of the data it would be best to have the MDTT to conduct this investigation. DHA Info Services MDTT 13 All the MCS process transactions created by the irregular users. 10

11. 25 Focus Areas For Investigation As Per Mincom Report NO. ITEM DESCRIPTION OF MATTERS Pages 236 to 239 of the Lubisi Report All visa applications that were processed after hours, over weekends and public holidays on VAS by DHA officials. TASK Responsibility What must be done Each case needs to be investigated By IS. To avoid any manipulation of the data it would be best to have the MDTT to conduct this investigation. 14 After hours, weekends and public holiday visas processed on VAS. MDTT Each case needs to be investigated by IS. To avoid any manipulation of the data it would be best to have the MDTT to conduct this investigation. Each case needs to be investigated by IS. To avoid any manipulation of the data it would be best to have the MDTT to conduct this investigation. Need to obtain the IA report and investigate. 15 Irregular process flows of stage codes. All applications that were processed following an irregular process flow of stage codes and those that had extra fields populated. DHA Info Services MDTT 16 Identified anomalies in the dates related to approvals and the printing of visas. All cases where the printing date was before the visa approval date. MDTT 17 Missing Visa or Permit Control numbers. All internal audit findings related to missing visa and permit printed control numbers. MDTT 11

12. 25 Focus Areas For Investigation As Per Mincom Report NO. ITEM DESCRIPTION OF MATTERS Pages 236 to 239 of the Lubisi Report All passport numbers being used by multiple persons. TASK Responsibility What must be done Need to investigate each passport number. 18 Same passport number used by multiple persons. MDTT Need to investigate why applications were fast tracked. 19 Fast processing of applications. All applications that were processed and approved between 0 and 1 day and less than 0 days. MDTT Need to investigate, however visas are issued for a period way into the future, even past 2031. 20 Visa dates issued into the future. All visas that were issued into the future. MDTT Need to investigate each case to determine the anomalies. 21 NPR Anomalies found. All anomalies found during the finalisation of the NPR work. MDTT DHA and VFS need to confirm why their e- mail addresses was used in applicants file. 22 VFS/DHA email addresses associated to an application. All 760 applicants using either VFS or DHA email addresses as their contact addresses. MDTT 12

13. 25 Focus Areas For Investigation As Per Mincom Report NO. ITEM DESCRIPTION OF MATTERS Pages 236 to 239 of the Lubisi Report All 880 applications approved containing fraudulent documentation detected during adjudication process. TASK Responsibility What must be done Each case needs to be investigated. To avoid any manipulation of the data it would be best to have the MDTT to conduct this investigation. 23 Visas and Permits rejected approved with fraudulent documents detected. MDTT Each case needs to be investigated. To avoid any manipulation of the data it would be best to have the MDTT to conduct this investigation. 24 Applications rejected due to fraudulent documents submitted but new applications approved. All 4 160 applications that were rejected due to fraudulent documents submitted but applicants later applied for other visa/permit types which were approved. MDTT Investigation to be conducted by IS. Investigation concluded matters referred to DCPI. MDTT assisting the DPCI with additional information that is being requested. MDTT and IS investigating system security breach and associated internal disciplinary matters. 25 Firewall irregularities. The potential corrupt involvement of officials in companies appointed to install firewalls in the DHA s provincial offices. DHA Info Services MDTT 13

14. Size of Data Sets Obtained/Analysed The data size is as per the table below: AREA NUMBER OF RECORDS / ROWS Entity Resolution Metadata Network diagrams Temporary Staging Transformed Source Grand Total 6 967 313 142 352 002 529 751 531 1 933 610 344 2 499 658 749 11 930 685 768 DATA ANALYTICS The data utilised by MDTT to analyse foreign national applications for investigations and building profiles on officials for internal disciplinary action is voluminous as the table above demonstrates. 14

15. LEGAL OPINION AND RECOMMENDATIONS A legal opinion was provided to the Office of the DG on the 09th November 2023 providing recommendations in respect of remedial action to be taken by the DHA in respect of certain categories of applicants. The recommendation by CAJV is as follows: To ensure adherence to due process and err on the side of caution, it is imperative that all affected parties, implicated in holding fraudulent visas or Permanent Residence Permits (PRPs), receive due notice. In instances where these individuals cannot be located for service, an application for substitution of service must be filed to guarantee that proper notification is provided to them. Once adequate notice has been given in terms of the Acts, the applicants found with fraudulent visas or PRPs should be added to the V-list and deported in accordance with sections 32 and 34 of the Immigration Act. This includes individuals already declared prohibited persons and subsequently V-listed. In cases where applicants possess visas obtained through fraudulent means, these visas must be annulled as per sections 10(9) and 10(10) of the Immigration Act, ensuring procedural fairness throughout the process. Upon the annulment of their visas, these individuals should be deported. Similarly, applicants with PRPs acquired fraudulently must have these permits revoked by the Director-General under Regulation 23 of the Immigration Regulations, in conjunction with Form 18, with a steadfast commitment to procedural fairness. Following the revocation of their PRPs, these individuals should face deportation. For applicants who have deceitfully obtained naturalization, the Minister must strip them of their naturalization rights as outlined in section 8 of the Citizenship Act, with procedural fairness being a priority. After such deprivation by the Minister, the process of deportation should be initiated. 15

16. Level Profiles Of All Officials Referred For Disciplinaries (52 files) and Criminal To date, the level profiles of the officials identified in the disciplinary referrals fall within the following salary levels: SALARY LEVEL NUMBER OF OFFICIALS 59 1 1 Nil Nil 1 to 12 13 14 15 16 *60 Officials in total have been referred to the MDTT. Two matters have since been referred for criminal investigation by the DPCI. 16

17. Level Profiles Of Officials New Disciplinaries New disciplinaries in respect of matters referred or in the process of being referred to the DPCI 21267 7083 306 77 49 33 Linked Applications Additional Applicants Applications Applicants Decision-makers Referrals 17

18. Level Profiles Of Officials New Disciplinaries New disciplinaries in respect of matters referred or in the process of being referred to the DPCI Matter 115 officials linked to 16 applicants with 63 applications (16 criminal referrals). We have identified a further 3 525 applicants that have similar criteria. Matter 231 officials linked to 187 applicants with 371 applications (number of criminal referrals to be determined once additional information is assessed). Matter 313 officials linked to 12 applicants with 43 applications (11 criminal referrals) Matter 415 officials linked to 33 applicants with 140 applications (up to 30 criminal referrals being prepared). We have identified a further 355 applicants that are projected to have approximately 1100 applications. Matter 56 officials linked to 12 applicants with 43 applications (6 criminal referrals) 18

19. Progress on Disciplinary Matters Twenty-seven (27) charge sheets have been finalised and submitted to the DHA Five (5) disciplinary hearings have commenced and are proceeding Ten (10) disciplinary matters have proposed set down dates Twelve (12) disciplinary matters have been concluded Nine (9) officials have been dismissed One (1) official s dismissal is the subject of an appeal Two (2) officials have resigned 19

20. MDTT Progress The MDTT is currently focusing, in the short term, on the following impactful areas requiring urgent attention: Matters aligned to the Focus Areas as identified in the Ministerial Committee Report and aligned to the mandate of MDTT as aforementioned, e.g., specific high-profile matters; Matters referred to the respective law enforcement agencies, but requiring additional unlocking activities for such matters to gain traction; Urgent matters referred by the Director- General (DG), including disciplinary matters; Referred disciplinary matters, requiring review and unblocking activities to ensure timeous resolution of such matters; and, Minimization of potential fruitless and wasteful expenditure. A sound working relationship has been fostered between the MDTT, departmental Counter Corruption Unit, Labour Relations Unit and ICT in progressing the investigations. 20

21. MDTT Progress continued INVESTIGATIONS The Criminal Investigation Team prioritised : Investigated and prepared twenty-eight (28) matters (relating to 28 individuals) referred by the DG to the DPCI; Investigated and is currently in the process of preparing a further ninety-four (94) matters (relating to 94 individuals) to be considered for referral to the DPCI, by the DG; Identified up to, as many as three hundred and seven thousand, one hundred and seventy-eight (307 178) instances of potentially implicated individuals in unlawful and/or irregular activities relating to the processing of visas/permits; 21

22. MDTT Progress continued INVESTIGATIONS Identified one hundred and fifteen (115) instances of officials implicated in potentially unlawful and/or irregular activities; Identified seventy-eight (78) instances of questionable medical reports submitted; Identified seventy-six (76) instances of questionable radiological reports submitted, have been identified; In respect of up to, as many as an identified three hundred and three thousand eight hundred and thirty-two (303 832) potentially unlawful and/or irregular MCS movements processed by officials of the DHA, 34 officials and associated numbers of movements authorised by each, were identified and is being investigated; 22

23. MDTT Progress continued INVESTIGATIONS Relating to retirement visas and permits, initial investigation focus was primarily on three thousand five hundred and thirty (3 530) Retired Person Visa applications/Visas issued that allegedly used similar documentation in retirement person visa applications and where on the face of it, such individuals appear too young to be retiring. Preliminary findings to date have identified a number of officials involved, with three (3) DHA officials appearing to have processed the bulk thereof; Assisted with the drafting of twenty-three (23) affidavits in support of referrals made to the DPCI; and, A dedicated Task Team has had several meetings with the DPCI to focus on matters referred by the MDTT to ensure prioritization and traction of these matters. 23

24. MDTT Progress continued INVESTIGATIONS From a data analysis conducted in respect of three (3) identified applicants, the following was identified: Linkages with at least eight (8) DHA officials; Linkages with one hundred and fifteen (115) other foreign nationals; Linkages with seventeen (17) South African nationals; and, Linkages with thirty-four (34) Businesses. Due to the extensive networks related to these three (3) identified applicants, both intra and extra the DHA, a high likelihood exists that syndication related to irregular and/or unlawful activities may be uncovered as investigations related thereto progress. 24

25. MDTT Progress continued INVESTIGATIONS Chinese Foreign Nationals A preliminary analysis of available evidence relating to the identified Chinese Nationals, led to the identification of an address as a nodal point referred to in at least three thousand one hundred and ninety-three (3 193) applications for various visas or permits by Chinese Foreign Nationals; Two DHA officials, who were stationed at the Beijing Mission in China, have each been linked to one hundred and forty-two (142) and forty-five (45) of the above- mentioned applicants, respectively. The MDTT performed further data analysis and uncovered a further one hundred and eight seven (187) applicants, warranting immediate further investigation as this number is rapidly escalating as further investigations are undertaken by the MDTT; Relating to the broad identified address, certain specific addresses utilized: four hundred and seventy-seven (477), appear to relate to vacant erven whilst in respect of other addresses, seventy-five (75), appear to be non-existent. Further investigation is ongoing. In certain instances, the same address was utilised by up to four hundred and eighty-eight (488) applicants, being highly unusual. 25

26. LABOUR RELATIONS DIRECTORATE CONTINGENT LIABILITY DEVELOPMENT OF A BUSINESS PROCESS AND STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE In the 2021/22 Financial Year the Auditor-General found that the Labour Relations/Human Resources Directorate (LR) lacked sufficient business processes to support their Contingent Liability reporting. Pursuant to this, the Director-General instructed the MDTT to assist the LR to develop a business process (BP) and standard operating procedures (SOP) for the management and reporting of Contingent Liability. This intervention has been undertaken by CAJV under the auspices and direct management of our CEO and head of legal. CAJV received and analysed various datasheets and information from LR, and developed a draft BP and SOP, which was presented to the Directorate on 5 April 2023, and accepted and approved by the Directorate. 26

27. LABOUR RELATIONS DIRECTORATE DATA CONSOLIDATION AND CLEANING On 8 September 2023, LR provided the MDTT with various datasheets, and instructed the MDTT to consolidate these datasheets into a single database containing all misconduct and non-misconduct matters, including their Contingent Liability effects. The MDTT consolidated all the data provided by LR and undertook extensive cleaning of the data. We also undertook various exploratory data analysis and time series analysis of the data, and collated our findings in a preliminary report, which was presented to the DDG of LR on 13 October 2023. The report contained four (4) findings in respect of the management of the combined datasheet going forward, and eight (8) operational recommendations based on the insights gained from the analysis. 27

28. Thank You 28