Optical Equipment Safety Review and Hazard Analysis
This document provides an in-depth review of the safety considerations for the ATST optical equipment, focusing on potential hazards associated with the M2 Mirror, Heat Stop Assembly, and other critical components. The Preliminary Hazard Analysis identifies various risks, causes, and recommended actions to ensure equipment and personnel safety during assembly, operation, and maintenance. Detailed insights into potential hazards such as high temperatures, equipment failures, physical impacts, and more are discussed, along with proposed safety measures. The analysis covers a wide range of scenarios, from light-weighting concerns to earthquake damage, emphasizing the importance of smart design and safe handling procedures for optical equipment in complex projects.
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Presentation Transcript
ATST Safety Review TEOA Chen Liang Senior Optical Engineer January 2011
Work Package Overview WBS Area(s): Top of OSS Responsible Engineer: Chen Liang Group Manager: Eric Hansen TEOA OSS M2 Assembly M2 Mirror M2 Positioning System M2 Fast Tip-tilt System Lyot Stop Heat Stop Assembly M1
Schedule Overview RFP release: November 9th, 2011 Proposal due date: February 25th, 2011
Area of interest M2 Mirror Light-weighted Potential for equipment hazard Heat Stop Assembly High temperature High coolant flow Potential for both equipment and personnel hazard. Thermal Absorber Occulter interface Reflector optic
Reference Design Preliminary Hazard Analysis
Preliminary Hazard Analysis Equipment Safety Preliminary Hazard Analysis Project Phase(s) IMRI Value Cat. Subsystem:Top-end optical assembly Risk Recommended Action Number System Item Hazard Causes Effects CONST IT&C OPS MAINT 1 M2 Assembly M2 hits TEOA frame Hexapod overtravel Damage to M2 2-D 9 Ser Design in hard stops One of three M2 support points breaks IT&C, OPS MAINT 2 M2 Assembly Failure of an actuator Damage to assembly 2-E 16 Med Design in hard stops Smoke detection, periodic inspection Med Design in hard stops 3-D 1-E 14 10 Med 3 4 M2 Assembly M2 Assembly Fire Solar radiation burn Electrical HexPod Overtravel Damage to the assembly Damage to TMA Deposite residue on M2 Mirror IT&C, OPS IT&C, OPS IT&C, OPS, MAINT IT&C, OPS, MAINT 4-C 20 Low Restrict operating condition 5 M2 Mirror Condensation on M2 Mirror Weather High lateral and axial accelleraton 1-B 5 High Restrain system 6 M2 Mirror Earthquake Mamage to the M2 Mirror Physical impact on M2 Mirror by foreign object FAB, IT&C, OPS, MAINT Smart design, Safe IT&C, OPS and MAINT procedures. 1-E 7 Ser 7 M2 Mirror falling objects Damage to M2 Mirror Damage to the M2 Mirror during removal or installationImproper handling Component come loose and fall off Damage to M2 Mirror and/or assembly Damage to potentially a number of systems Establish adequate procedures Proper design, periodic inspection IT&C, MAINT 1-D IT&C, OPS, MAINT 12 Med 8 M2 Mirror Improper installation, long term vibration 1-B 10 Med 9 TEOA Unexpected acceleration during removal or installation of TEOA Unexpected acceleration during transporting TEOA Improper handling, equipment failure Improper handling, equipment failure Damage to M2 Mirror and/or assembly Damage to M2 Mirror and/or assembly Establish adequate procedures Establish adequate procedures IT&C, MAINT 2-D 14 Med 10 TEOA IT&C, MAINT 2-D 14 Med 11 TEOA wear and tear, faulty components, phycial impact IT&C, OPS, MAINT 3-E 20 Low Periodic inspection 12 Lyot Stop Coolant leak Damage to M1 coating Damage to HAS and/or M1 Mirror coating 1-D 5 High Safety shutter 13 HAS Over heat Coolant interruption Leak from HAS coolant system IT&C, OPS IT&C, OPS, MAINT 3-D 18 Low 14 HAS Glycol on M2 Mirror Damage to M2 Mirror coating
Preliminary Hazard Analysis Personnel Safety Preliminary Hazard Analysis Project Phase(s) IMRI Value Cat. Subsystem:Top-end optical assembly Risk Recommended Action Number System Item Hazard Causes Effects Limit personnel presence around HAS during operation, protective gear Leak from HAS coolant system IT&C, OPS, MAINT 2-E 10 Med 15 HAS Glycol on personnel Injury to personnel Pinch hazard to personnel during transporting TEOA Handling cart out of control, bad luck Reliable handling cart design, adequate procedures 3-C 18 Low 16 TEOA Injury to personnel IT&C, MAINT Poor electrical work, Improper handling Proper wiring, adequate procedure 3-C 18 Low 17 TEOA Electrical shock Injury to personnel IT&C, MAINT Fall during removal or installation of TEOA 2-E 18 Low Install safety features 18 TEOA Bad luck Injury to personnel IT&C, MAINT
Safety Plans Design Fabrication & Test Transportation Construction Integration, Test & Commissioning Operations
Design for Safety Proposal From potential vendors: AURA Safety and Health Questionnaire for Contractors Other Relevant Safety information Preliminary Design Phase From TEOA vendor: Preliminary design document includes risk analysis and mitigations for both hardware and personnel hazard risks From AURA: Reviewing and approval of preliminary design document
Fabrication & Test Safety From TEOA vendor: Fabrication drawings and procedures. Machine shop instructions Factory Acceptance Test Plan From AURA: Review drawings, procedures, and instructions, and review and approve test plans. On site monitoring during certain procedures and tests.
Transportation Safety From TEOA vendor: Packaging and Transportation Plan From AURA: Review and approve Packaging and Transportation Plan Packaging container design/construction Transportation route (land/sea) Loading and unloading procedures
IT&C Safety Work during IT&C need to follow a multi-layered guideline Top level: OSHA safety guideline 2nd level: Site specific safety guideline 3rd level: Facility specific safety guideline 4th level: Work specific safety guideline Work procedures specific for TEOA will be completed after FDR, and will be reviewed and approved by System Engineer. Work procedures specific for TEOA will be read and understood by all individuals involved in the installation of TEOA.
Operations Safety Operation and maintenance procedures for TEOA will be finalized prior to the completion of IT&C. The procedure will be based on IT&C procedures but incorporates lessons learned during IT&C. Training on safety related issues will be provided to telescope operators and maintenance staffs.
