Ecology, Evolution, and Game Theory at IIASA: Overview & Highlights
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Living Systems
Living Systems
Anthropogenic environmental impacts
on fisheries, biodiversity, common goods, …
Early Highlights in Ecology
Early Highlights in Ecology
Early Highlights in Game Theory
Early Highlights in Game Theory
Ecology
Fishery Systems
Fishery Systems
Management of Northeast Arctic Cod
Management of Northeast Arctic Cod
•
Challenge
Challenge
Harvest-control
Harvest-control
rules are politically negotiated
rules are politically negotiated
without support from
without support from
quantitative modeling
quantitative modeling
•
Innovation
Innovation
Our integrated
Our integrated
assessment model couples
assessment model couples
biological with economic
biological with economic
processes and probes
processes and probes
alternative objectives
alternative objectives
•
Results
Results
Current rule
Current rule
maximizes profit, while
maximizes profit, while
alternative objectives lead to
alternative objectives lead to
more aggressive exploitation
more aggressive exploitation
Management of Barents Sea Capelin
Management of Barents Sea Capelin
•
Challenge
Challenge
Traditional
Traditional
assessments account for
assessments account for
quotas, yields, and a single
quotas, yields, and a single
stakeholder group
stakeholder group
•
Innovation
Innovation
Our integrated
Our integrated
assessment model accounts
assessment model accounts
for 2 regulations (quotas and
for 2 regulations (quotas and
minimum-size limits), 4
minimum-size limits), 4
benefits (yields, profits,
benefits (yields, profits,
employment, and ecological
employment, and ecological
impact), and 5 stakeholder
impact), and 5 stakeholder
groups
groups
•
Results
Results
Maximum joint
Maximum joint
satisfaction is high, and is best
satisfaction is high, and is best
achieved through minimum-
achieved through minimum-
size limits
size limits
Dankel et al., in prep.
Evolution
•
Challenge
Challenge
Stock collapsed in
Stock collapsed in
1992 and has not recovered
1992 and has not recovered
since; heavy exploitation
since; heavy exploitation
favors earlier maturation at
favors earlier maturation at
smaller size
smaller size
•
Innovation
Innovation
Pioneering
Pioneering
statistical and modeling
statistical and modeling
techniques
techniques
•
Results
Results
We have
We have
documented a 30% drop in
documented a 30% drop in
size at maturation and
size at maturation and
showed that such evolutionary
showed that such evolutionary
impacts of fishing are very
impacts of fishing are very
slow and difficult to reverse
slow and difficult to reverse
Collapse of Northern Cod
Collapse of Northern Cod
Improving Fishing Policies
Improving Fishing Policies
•
Challenge
Challenge
Evolutionary
Evolutionary
considerations are a blind spot of
considerations are a blind spot of
current fisheries management
current fisheries management
•
Innovation
Innovation
Established
Established
international expert group on
international expert group on
Fisheries-induced Evolution
Fisheries-induced Evolution
as
as
part of the scientific advice by
part of the scientific advice by
the
the
International Council for the
International Council for the
Exploration of the Sea
Exploration of the Sea
(ICES)
(ICES)
•
Results
Results
Monitoring maturation
Monitoring maturation
evolution has become a binding
evolution has become a binding
EU requirement; new tool:
EU requirement; new tool:
Evolutionary Impact
Evolutionary Impact
Assessments
Assessments
(EvoIAs)
(EvoIAs)
Fisheries-induced Evolution: Timeline
1000
1998
2016
2004
2010
Citations to articles containing
“fisheries-induced evolution” etc.
A New Understanding of Biodiversity
A New Understanding of Biodiversity
•
Challenge
Challenge
Factors
Factors
maintaining biodiversity
maintaining biodiversity
are poorly understood
are poorly understood
•
Innovation
Innovation
New model
New model
accounting for spatial
accounting for spatial
structure and partner
structure and partner
choice
choice
•
Results
Results
Correction of a
Correction of a
textbook error and
textbook error and
refocusing of debate:
refocusing of debate:
biodiversity can be
biodiversity can be
maintained without
maintained without
ecological differentiation
ecological differentiation
Nature
484:506 (2012)
•
Challenge
Challenge
Causal
Causal
processes underlying
processes underlying
biodiversity patterns need to
biodiversity patterns need to
be understood
be understood
•
Innovation
Innovation
New process-
New process-
based and empirically
based and empirically
calibrated model of
calibrated model of
biodiversity in stream
biodiversity in stream
ecosystems
ecosystems
•
Results
Results
Patterns observed
Patterns observed
in unpolluted rivers are
in unpolluted rivers are
recovered; responses to
recovered; responses to
pollution can be predicted
pollution can be predicted
Game Theory
Indirect Reciprocity: Agenda Setting
5000
1998
2016
2004
2010
A new field of study with more than 5000 citations per year
A new field of study with more than 5000 citations per year
Citations to articles containing
“indirect reciprocity”
Social Dilemmas & Common Goods
•
Challenge
Challenge
Many common
Many common
goods are under the
goods are under the
threat of selfish actors
threat of selfish actors
(such as individuals,
(such as individuals,
companies, governments)
companies, governments)
•
Innovations
Innovations
IIASA’s work
IIASA’s work
is overcoming key
is overcoming key
limitations of current
limitations of current
cooperation models
cooperation models
•
Two examples
Two examples
Wealth inequality
Wealth inequality
Incentive design
Incentive design
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•
Challenge
Challenge
Until recently, game-
Until recently, game-
theoretical studies of cooperation
theoretical studies of cooperation
have almost universally ignored
have almost universally ignored
agent heterogeneity
agent heterogeneity
•
Innovation
Innovation
We show how
We show how
qualitatively new insights emerge
qualitatively new insights emerge
when wealth inequality is taken into
when wealth inequality is taken into
account
account
•
Results
Results
A small level of wealth
A small level of wealth
inequality suffices to jump-start
inequality suffices to jump-start
cooperation under adverse
cooperation under adverse
conditions
conditions
•
Challenge
Challenge
Game-theoretical
Game-theoretical
analyses of incentives have
analyses of incentives have
focused on peer-to-peer
focused on peer-to-peer
sanctions; positive and
sanctions; positive and
negative incentives are mostly
negative incentives are mostly
studied in separation
studied in separation
•
Innovation
Innovation
We show how
We show how
institutional positive and
institutional positive and
negative incentives are best
negative incentives are best
combined
combined
•
Results
Results
“First carrot, then
“First carrot, then
stick” incentive policy is not
stick” incentive policy is not
only most effective, but also
only most effective, but also
most efficient (cost saving)
most efficient (cost saving)
12:20140935 (2014)
Interdisciplinary Bridges
Interdisciplinary Bridges
Anthropogenic environmental impacts
on fisheries, biodiversity, common goods, …
The program at IIASA focuses on understanding the impact of anthropogenic environmental factors on living systems, including fisheries, biodiversity, and common goods. Highlights in ecology cover pest management models, adaptive management, and resilience dynamics. In game theory, the focus is on decision analysis, replicator dynamics, and adaptive strategies like win-stay, lose-shift. The management of Northeast Arctic Cod and Barents Sea Capelin presents challenges addressed through innovative integrated assessment models, with a focus on achieving diverse objectives such as profitability and sustainability.
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Ecology, Evolution, and Game Theory at IIASA: Overview & Highlights Ulf Dieckmann Program Director Evolution and Ecology Program dieckmann@iiasa.ac.at
Living Systems Socio- economics Ecology Evolution Anthropogenic environmental impacts on fisheries, biodiversity, common goods,
Early Highlights in Ecology Pest management models Adaptive management Resilience dynamics
Early Highlights in Game Theory Game theory, decision analysis Indirect reciprocity Other methodological innovations Replicator dynamics Win-stay, lose-shift Adaptive dynamics
Fishery Systems Management system Fishery policy and planning Management measures Service values Fishery management Fishery development Fishery research Socio-economic system Fishers Ecosystem services Supporting services Processors and retailers Regulating services Consumers Provisioning services Socio-economic environment Cultural services Natural system Target stock Non-target species Fishing pressure Ecosystem status Ecosystem embedding Physical environment
Management of Northeast Arctic Cod Challenge Harvest-control rules are politically negotiated without support from quantitative modeling Innovation Our integrated assessment model couples biological with economic processes and probes alternative objectives Results Current rule maximizes profit, while alternative objectives lead to more aggressive exploitation Yield-maximizing HCR (Johannesburg World Summit 2002) Welfare-maximizing HCR Current HCR Profit-maximizing HCR Adult biomass (1000 tonnes) Marine Policy 39:172 (2013)
Management of Barents Sea Capelin Challenge Traditional assessments account for quotas, yields, and a single stakeholder group Innovation Our integrated assessment model accounts for 2 regulations (quotas and minimum-size limits), 4 benefits (yields, profits, employment, and ecological impact), and 5 stakeholder groups Results Maximum joint satisfaction is high, and is best achieved through minimum- size limits 5 10 15 20 80% Minimum-size limit (cm) Status quo 0 20 40 60 80 100 Annual harvest proportion of unprotected stock (%) Dankel et al., in prep.
Collapse of Northern Cod Challenge Stock collapsed in 1992 and has not recovered since; heavy exploitation favors earlier maturation at smaller size Innovation Pioneering statistical and modeling techniques Results We have documented a 30% drop in size at maturation and showed that such evolutionary impacts of fishing are very slow and difficult to reverse Size at 50% maturation probability at age 5 (cm) 80 70 Moratorium 60 50 40 30 1975 1992 2004 Nature 428:932 (2004)
Improving Fishing Policies Challenge Evolutionary considerations are a blind spot of current fisheries management Innovation Established international expert group on Fisheries-induced Evolution as part of the scientific advice by the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) Results Monitoring maturation evolution has become a binding EU requirement; new tool: Evolutionary Impact Assessments (EvoIAs) Science 318:1247 (2007) Science 320:48 (2008)
Fisheries-induced Evolution: Timeline 1st IIASA study Case study in Nature New statistical method Science Policy Forum Economic 1000 repercussions in PNAS New New modeling framework fisheries-induced evolution etc. calibration method Citations to articles containing Inclusion in EU Marine Strategy FrameworkDirective 1998 2004 2010 2016
A New Understanding of Biodiversity Challenge Factors maintaining biodiversity are poorly understood Innovation New model accounting for spatial structure and partner choice Results Correction of a textbook error and refocusing of debate: biodiversity can be maintained without ecological differentiation Nature 484:506 (2012)
Calibrated Stream Ecosystem Models Challenge Causal processes underlying biodiversity patterns need to be understood Innovation New process- based and empirically calibrated model of biodiversity in stream ecosystems Results Patterns observed in unpolluted rivers are recovered; responses to pollution can be predicted Unpolluted rivers 1 10-1 Log relative abundance 10-2 10-3 Polluted rivers 1 10-1 10-2 10-3 1 10 20 30 Species rank
Indirect Reciprocity: Agenda Setting 1st IIASA study 5000 Citations to articles containing indirect reciprocity A new field of study with more than 5000 citations per year 1998 2004 2010 2016
Social Dilemmas & Common Goods Challenge Many common goods are under the threat of selfish actors (such as individuals, companies, governments) Innovations IIASA s work is overcoming key limitations of current cooperation models Two examples Wealth inequality Incentive design http://www.futuretimeline.net/21stcentury/images/global-warming-2100-timeline-future.jpg http://img.docstoccdn.com/thumb/orig/22128102.png Global climate Demography http://americancity.org/images/daily/slum1.jpg http://s1.jrnl.ie/media/2011/11/social-welfare-queue-2-390x285.jpg Urbanization Social security http://land-affairs.typepad.com/.a/6a0120a8186781970b0147e1701fd2970b-320wi http://www.greenpeace.org/international/ReSizes/OriginalWatermarked/Global/international/planet-2/image/2008/7/the-pirate-fishing-vessel-lun.jpg Land use Living resources http://images.nationalgeographic.com/wpf/media-live/photos/000/001/cache/green-house-factor_177_600x450.jpg http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-kPTTj5CrAPk/UPynFQJ8m1I/AAAAAAAAIz0/4kC2Wuc-JkQ/s1600/internete.jpg Internet Clean air
Wealth Inequality Challenge Until recently, game- theoretical studies of cooperation have almost universally ignored agent heterogeneity Innovation We show how qualitatively new insights emerge when wealth inequality is taken into account Results A small level of wealth inequality suffices to jump-start cooperation under adverse conditions Without wealth inequality With wealth inequality Blue: cooperators Red: defectors Bright: rich sites Dark: poor sites 4:2453 (2013)
Incentive Design Challenge Game-theoretical analyses of incentives have focused on peer-to-peer sanctions; positive and negative incentives are mostly studied in separation Innovation We show how institutional positive and negative incentives are best combined Results First carrot, then stick incentive policy is not only most effective, but also most efficient (cost saving) 12:20140935 (2014)
Interdisciplinary Bridges Cross-cutting projects on systemic risk, equitable governance, and vegetation modeling Socio- economics Ecology Evolution Anthropogenic environmental impacts on fisheries, biodiversity, common goods,
