Rational Expectations and the Efficient Market Hypothesis

undefined
R
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
E
x
p
e
c
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
E
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
 
M
a
r
k
e
t
H
y
p
o
t
h
e
s
i
s
R
o
l
e
 
o
f
 
E
x
p
e
c
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
E
x
p
e
c
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
a
r
e
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t
 
i
n
 
e
v
e
r
y
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
a
n
d
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
e
c
o
n
o
m
y
1
.
A
s
s
e
t
 
d
e
m
a
n
d
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
d
e
t
e
r
m
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
i
 2.
 
Risk and term structure of 
i
 3.
 
Asymmetric information and financial structure
 4.
 
Financial innovation
 5.
 
Bank management
 6.
 
Money supply process
 7.
 
Federal Reserve
 8.
 
Foreign exchange market
 9.
 
Demand for money
10.
 
Aggregate demand
11.
 
Aggregate supply and inflation
T
h
e
o
r
y
 
o
f
 
R
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
E
x
p
e
c
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
Expectations will be identical to optimal forecasts
using all available information
Even though a rational expectation equals the optimal
forecast using all available information, a prediction
based on it may not always be perfectly accurate
It takes too much effort to make the expectation the best
guess possible
Best guess will not be accurate because predictor is unaware
of some relevant information
F
o
r
m
a
l
 
S
t
a
t
e
m
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
T
h
e
o
r
y
I
m
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
If there is a change in the way a variable
moves, the way in which expectations
of the variable are formed will change
as well
The forecast errors of expectations will, on
average, be zero and cannot be predicted
ahead of time
E
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
 
M
a
r
k
e
t
s
A
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
R
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
E
x
p
e
c
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
E
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
 
M
a
r
k
e
t
s
 
(
c
o
n
t
d
)
E
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
 
M
a
r
k
e
t
s
Current prices in a financial market will be
set so that the optimal forecast of a security’s
return using all available information equals
the security’s equilibrium return
In an efficient market, a security’s price fully
reflects all available information
R
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
e
F
o
r
e
c
a
s
t
i
n
g
 
F
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
Stocks
Buy low sell high? Buy on the way up?
Interest Rates
They are really low they must go up?
Do financial variables return to “normal” levels? Are they
predictable?
What do you use to forecast?
Sample mean? Value of last observation? Predicting the future.
C
a
s
e
 
S
t
u
d
y
Predicting GM’s Stock Price
Technical Analysis
 
Fundamental Analysis
A
 
R
a
n
d
o
m
 
W
a
l
k
S
t
a
t
i
o
n
a
r
y
 
A
u
t
o
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
v
e
 
P
r
o
c
e
s
s
S
&
P
 
5
0
0
E
v
i
d
e
n
c
e
 
i
n
 
F
a
v
o
r
 
o
f
M
a
r
k
e
t
 
E
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
c
y
Having performed well in the past does not indicate
that an investment advisor or a mutual fund will
perform well in the future
If information is already publicly available, a positive
announcement does not, on average, cause stock
prices to rise
Stock prices follow a random walk
Technical analysis cannot successfully predict
changes in stock prices
E
v
i
d
e
n
c
e
 
A
g
a
i
n
s
t
 
M
a
r
k
e
t
E
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
c
y
Small-firm effect
January Effect
Market Overreaction
Excessive Volatility
Mean Reversion
New information is not always immediately
incorporated into stock prices
B
e
h
a
v
i
o
r
a
l
 
F
i
n
a
n
c
e
Ultimatum Game
B
e
h
a
v
i
o
r
a
l
 
F
i
n
a
n
c
e
The lack of short selling (causing
over-priced stocks) may be explained by loss
aversion
The large trading volume may be explained
by investor overconfidence
Stock market bubbles may be explained by
overconfidence and social contagion
E
v
i
d
e
n
c
e
 
o
n
 
E
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
 
M
a
r
k
e
t
s
H
y
p
o
t
h
e
s
i
s
F
a
v
o
r
a
b
l
e
 
E
v
i
d
e
n
c
e
1.
 
Investment analysts and mutual funds don’t beat the market
2.
 
Stock prices reflect publicly available information: anticipated
announcements don’t affect stock price
3.
 
Stock prices and exchange rates close to random walk
 
If predictions of 
P
 big, 
R
of
 > 
R*
 
 predictions of 
P
 small
4.
 
Technical analysis does not outperform market
U
n
f
a
v
o
r
a
b
l
e
 
E
v
i
d
e
n
c
e
1.
 
Small-firm effect: small firms have abnormally high returns
2.
 
January effect: high returns in January
3.
 
Market overreaction
4.
 
Excessive volatility
5.
 
Mean reversion
6.
 
New information is not always immediately incorporated into stock prices
O
v
e
r
v
i
e
w
Reasonable starting point but not whole story
I
m
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
f
o
r
 
I
n
v
e
s
t
i
n
g
1.
 
Published reports of financial analysts not very valuable
2.
 
Should be skeptical of hot tips
3.
 
Stock prices may fall on good news
4.
 
Prescription for investor
1.
 
Shouldn’t try to outguess market
2.
 
Therefore, buy and hold
3.
 
Diversify with no-load mutual fund
E
v
i
d
e
n
c
e
 
o
n
 
R
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
E
x
p
e
c
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
i
n
 
O
t
h
e
r
 
M
a
r
k
e
t
s
1.
 
Bond markets appear efficient
2.
 
Evidence with survey data is mixed
 
Skepticism about quality of data
3.
 
Following implication is supported: change in way variable moves, way
expectations are formed changes
A
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
I
n
v
e
s
t
i
n
g
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
S
t
o
c
k
 
M
a
r
k
e
t
Recommendations from investment advisors cannot
help us outperform the market
A hot tip is probably information already contained in
the price of the stock
Stock prices respond to announcements only when
the information is new and unexpected
A “buy and hold” strategy is the most sensible
strategy for the small investor
H
a
y
e
k
:
 
T
h
e
 
F
a
t
a
l
 
C
o
n
c
e
i
t
"The curious task of economics is to
demonstrate to men how little they really
know about what they imagine they can
design."
undefined
R
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
E
x
p
e
c
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
:
I
m
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
f
o
r
 
P
o
l
i
c
y
31
31
E
c
o
n
o
m
e
t
r
i
c
 
P
o
l
i
c
y
 
C
r
i
t
i
q
u
e
Econometric models are used to forecast
and to evaluate policy
Lucas critique, based on rational expectations, argues
that policy evaluation should not be made with these
models
The way in which expectations are formed (the relationship of
expectations to past information) changes when the behavior
of forecasted variables changes
The public’s expectations about a policy will influence the
response to that policy
32
32
N
e
w
 
C
l
a
s
s
i
c
a
l
 
M
a
c
r
o
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
M
o
d
e
l
All wages and prices are completely flexible with
respect to expected change in the price level
Workers try to keep their real wages from falling
when they expect the price level to rise
Anticipated policy has no effect on aggregate output
and unemployment
Unanticipated policy does have an effect
Policy ineffectiveness proposition
33
33
34
34
35
35
36
36
I
m
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
f
o
r
 
P
o
l
i
c
y
m
a
k
e
r
s
Distinction between effects of anticipated and
unanticipated policy actions
Policymakers must know expectations to know
outcome of the policy
Nearly impossible to find out expectations
People will adjust expectations guessing what the
policymaker will do
Design policy rules so prices will remain stable
37
37
N
e
w
 
K
e
y
n
e
s
i
a
n
 
M
o
d
e
l
Objection to complete wage and
price flexibility
Labor contracts
Reluctance by firms to lower wages
Fixed-price contracts
Menu costs
Model assumes rational expectations but
wages and prices are sticky
38
38
39
39
I
m
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
f
o
r
 
P
o
l
i
c
y
m
a
k
e
r
s
There may be beneficial effects from activist
stabilization policy
Designing the policy is not easy because the
effect of anticipated and unanticipated policy
is very different
Must understand public’s expectations
40
40
41
41
42
42
43
43
44
44
S
t
a
b
i
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
 
P
o
l
i
c
y
Traditional
It is possible for an activist policy to stabilize
output fluctuations
New Classical
Activist stabilization policy aggravates output fluctuations
New Keynesian
Anticipated policy does matter to output fluctuations
More uncertainty about the outcome than Traditional
45
45
46
46
47
47
48
48
A
n
t
i
-
I
n
f
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
P
o
l
i
c
y
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
T
h
r
e
e
M
o
d
e
l
s
1.
 
Ongoing 
, so moving from 
AD
1
 to 
AD
2
, 
AS
1
 to 
AS
2
, point 1 to 2
2.
 
Anti-
 policy, 
AD
 kept at 
AD
1
T
r
a
d
i
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
M
o
d
e
l
 
(
a
)
1.
 
AS
 to 
AS
2
 whether policy anticipated or not; go to 2', 
Y
 
, 
 
N
e
w
 
C
l
a
s
s
i
c
a
l
 
M
o
d
e
l
 
(
b
)
1.
 
Unanticipated: 
AS
 to 
AS
2
; go to 2', 
Y
 
, 
 
2.
 
Anticipated: 
AS
 stays at 
AS
1
; stay at 1, 
Y
 unchanged, 
 
 to zero
N
e
w
 
K
e
y
n
e
s
i
a
n
 
M
o
d
e
l
 
(
c
)
1.
 
Unanticipated: 
AS
 to 
AS
2
; go to 2', 
Y
 
, 
 
2.
 
Anticipated: 
AS
 to 
AS
2''
; go to 2'', 
Y
 
 by less, 
 
 by more
49
49
C
r
e
d
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
R
e
a
g
a
n
D
e
f
i
c
i
t
s
 
Reagan deficits may have made 1981–82 recession worse after Fed
anti-
 policy
A
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
1.
 
Anti-
 policy kept 
AD
 at 
AD
1
2.
 
Fed’s anti-
 policy less credible, so 
AS
 kept rising to 
AS
2
3.
 
Go to 2' in panels (b) and (c); 
Y
 
 by more than if anti-
 policy credible
I
m
p
a
c
t
 
o
f
 
R
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
E
x
p
e
c
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
R
e
v
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
1.
 
More aware of importance of expectations and credibility
2.
 
Lucas critique has caused most economists to doubt use of
conventional econometric models for policy evaluation
3.
 
Since effect of policy depends on expectations, economists less activist
4.
 
Policy effectiveness proposition not widely accepted, most economists
take intermediate position that activist policy could be beneficial but is
tough to design
50
50
C
r
e
d
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
i
n
 
F
i
g
h
t
i
n
g
 
I
n
f
l
a
t
i
o
n
Public must expect the policy will be
implemented
New Classical
Cold turkey
New Keynesian
More gradual approach
Actions speak louder than words
51
51
I
m
p
a
c
t
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
R
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
E
x
p
e
c
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
R
e
v
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
Expectations formation will change when the
behavior of forecasted variables changes
Effect of a policy depends critically on the public’s
expectations about that policy
Empirical evidence on policy ineffectiveness
proposition is mixed
Credibility is essential to the success of anti-inflation
policies
Less fine-tuning and more stability
Slide Note
Embed
Share

The importance of expectations in various sectors and markets of the economy, including asset demand, risk and term structure of interest rates, asymmetric information and financial structure, financial innovation, bank management, money supply process, Federal Reserve, foreign exchange market, demand for money, aggregate demand, aggregate supply, and inflation.


Uploaded on Dec 08, 2023 | 6 Views


Download Presentation

Please find below an Image/Link to download the presentation.

The content on the website is provided AS IS for your information and personal use only. It may not be sold, licensed, or shared on other websites without obtaining consent from the author. Download presentation by click this link. If you encounter any issues during the download, it is possible that the publisher has removed the file from their server.

E N D

Presentation Transcript


  1. Rational Expectations and the Efficient Market Hypothesis

  2. Role of Expectations Expectations are important in every sector and market in the economy 1. Asset demand and the determination of i 2. Risk and term structure of i 3. Asymmetric information and financial structure 4. Financial innovation 5. Bank management 6. Money supply process 7. Federal Reserve 8. Foreign exchange market 9. Demand for money 10. Aggregate demand 11. Aggregate supply and inflation

  3. Theory of Rational Expectations Expectations will be identical to optimal forecasts using all available information Even though a rational expectation equals the optimal forecast using all available information, a prediction based on it may not always be perfectly accurate It takes too much effort to make the expectation the best guess possible Best guess will not be accurate because predictor is unaware of some relevant information

  4. Formal Statement of the Theory = e of X X = e expectation of the variable that is being forecast = optimal forecast using all available information X X of

  5. Implications If there is a change in the way a variable moves, the way in which expectations of the variable are formed will change as well The forecast errors of expectations will, on average, be zero and cannot be predicted ahead of time

  6. Efficient Markets Application of Rational Expectations Recall The rate of return from holding a security equals the sum of the capital gain on the security, plus any cash payments divided by the initial purchase price of the security. P R = + + P C 1 t t P t = the r ate of return on the security t t or dividend) made during the holding period R = price of the security at time + 1, the end of the holding period = price of the security at time , the beginning of the holding period = cash payment (coupon P P + 1 t t C

  7. Efficient Markets (contd) At the beginning of the holding period, we know is unknown and we must form an expectation of it. The expected return then is P R = and . P C t P + 1 t e ++ + P C e 1 t t P t Expectations of future prices are equal to opti all currently available information so P + mal forecasts using = = e of + e of P R R 1 1 t t * e Supply & demand analysis states will equal the equilibrium return R = so R R R * of

  8. Efficient Markets Current prices in a financial market will be set so that the optimal forecast of a security s return using all available information equals the security s equilibrium return In an efficient market, a security s price fully reflects all available information

  9. Rationale Rof R* Pt Rof Rof R* Pt Rof until Rof= R* In an efficient market, all unexploited profit opportunities will be eliminated

  10. Forecasting Financial Variables Stocks Buy low sell high? Buy on the way up? Interest Rates They are really low they must go up? Do financial variables return to normal levels? Are they predictable? What do you use to forecast? Sample mean? Value of last observation? Predicting the future.

  11. Case Study Predicting GM s Stock Price Technical Analysis Fundamental Analysis

  12. A Random Walk Random walk y_t=y_t-1+e_t 4 2 0 -2 -4 -6 -8 -10 -12 1 5 9 13 17 21 25 29 33 37 41 45 49 53 57 61 65 69 73 77 81 85 89 93 97 101 Time

  13. Forecast y_t=y_t-1+e_t True mean=0, sample mean=-4.39 4 2 0 -2 -4 Forecast -6 -8 -10 -12 1 5 9 13 17 21 25 29 33 37 41 45 49 53 57 61 65 69 73 77 81 85 89 93 97 101 105 109 113 Time

  14. Forecast y_t=y_t-1+e_t True mean=0, sample mean=-4.39 4 2 0 -2 -4 y = -0.0043x - 4.0645 Forecast -6 y = -0.058x -8 -10 -12 1 5 9 13 17 21 25 29 33 37 41 45 49 53 57 61 65 69 73 77 81 85 89 93 97 101 105 109 113 Time

  15. Stationary Autoregressive Process y_t=.9y_t-1+e_t True mean=0, sample mean=-0.72 6 4 2 0 -2 -4 -6 -8 1 5 9 13 17 21 25 29 33 37 41 45 49 53 57 61 65 69 73 77 81 85 89 93 97 101 Time

  16. y_t=.5y_t-1+e_t True mean=0, sample mean=-0.07 4 3 2 1 0 -1 -2 -3 -4 1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49 52 55 58 61 64 67 70 73 76 79 82 85 88 91 94 97 100 Time

  17. y_t=y_t-1+.01trend+e_t 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49 52 55 58 61 64 67 70 73 76 79 82 85 88 91 94 97 100 -10

  18. y_t=.9y_t-1+.01trend+e_t 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49 52 55 58 61 64 67 70 73 76 79 82 85 88 91 94 97 100 -2 -4 -6 -8

  19. y_t=.01trend+e_t 4 3 2 1 0 1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40 43 46 49 52 55 58 61 64 67 70 73 76 79 82 85 88 91 94 97 100 -1 y = 0.0099x -2 -3

  20. S&P 500

  21. Evidence in Favor of Market Efficiency Having performed well in the past does not indicate that an investment advisor or a mutual fund will perform well in the future If information is already publicly available, a positive announcement does not, on average, cause stock prices to rise Stock prices follow a random walk Technical analysis cannot successfully predict changes in stock prices

  22. Evidence Against Market Efficiency Small-firm effect January Effect Market Overreaction Excessive Volatility Mean Reversion New information is not always immediately incorporated into stock prices

  23. Behavioral Finance Ultimatum Game

  24. Behavioral Finance The lack of short selling (causing over-priced stocks) may be explained by loss aversion The large trading volume may be explained by investor overconfidence Stock market bubbles may be explained by overconfidence and social contagion

  25. Evidence on Efficient Markets Hypothesis Favorable Evidence 1. Investment analysts and mutual funds don t beat the market 2. Stock prices reflect publicly available information: anticipated announcements don t affect stock price 3. Stock prices and exchange rates close to random walk If predictions of P big, Rof> R* predictions of P small 4. Technical analysis does not outperform market Unfavorable Evidence 1. Small-firm effect: small firms have abnormally high returns 2. January effect: high returns in January 3. Market overreaction 4. Excessive volatility 5. Mean reversion 6. New information is not always immediately incorporated into stock prices Overview Reasonable starting point but not whole story

  26. Implications for Investing 1. Published reports of financial analysts not very valuable 2. Should be skeptical of hot tips 3. Stock prices may fall on good news 4. Prescription for investor 1. Shouldn t try to outguess market 2. Therefore, buy and hold 3. Diversify with no-load mutual fund Evidence on Rational Expectations in Other Markets 1. Bond markets appear efficient 2. Evidence with survey data is mixed Skepticism about quality of data 3. Following implication is supported: change in way variable moves, way expectations are formed changes

  27. Application Investing in the Stock Market Recommendations from investment advisors cannot help us outperform the market A hot tip is probably information already contained in the price of the stock Stock prices respond to announcements only when the information is new and unexpected A buy and hold strategy is the most sensible strategy for the small investor

  28. Hayek: The Fatal Conceit "The curious task of economics is to demonstrate to men how little they really know about what they imagine they can design."

  29. Rational Expectations: Implications for Policy

  30. Econometric Policy Critique Econometric models are used to forecast and to evaluate policy Lucas critique, based on rational expectations, argues that policy evaluation should not be made with these models The way in which expectations are formed (the relationship of expectations to past information) changes when the behavior of forecasted variables changes The public s expectations about a policy will influence the response to that policy 31

  31. New Classical Macroeconomic Model All wages and prices are completely flexible with respect to expected change in the price level Workers try to keep their real wages from falling when they expect the price level to rise Anticipated policy has no effect on aggregate output and unemployment Unanticipated policy does have an effect Policy ineffectiveness proposition 32

  32. 33

  33. 34

  34. 35

  35. Implications for Policymakers Distinction between effects of anticipated and unanticipated policy actions Policymakers must know expectations to know outcome of the policy Nearly impossible to find out expectations People will adjust expectations guessing what the policymaker will do Design policy rules so prices will remain stable 36

  36. New Keynesian Model Objection to complete wage and price flexibility Labor contracts Reluctance by firms to lower wages Fixed-price contracts Menu costs Model assumes rational expectations but wages and prices are sticky 37

  37. 38

  38. Implications for Policymakers There may be beneficial effects from activist stabilization policy Designing the policy is not easy because the effect of anticipated and unanticipated policy is very different Must understand public s expectations 39

  39. 40

  40. 41

  41. 42

  42. 43

  43. Stabilization Policy Traditional It is possible for an activist policy to stabilize output fluctuations New Classical Activist stabilization policy aggravates output fluctuations New Keynesian Anticipated policy does matter to output fluctuations More uncertainty about the outcome than Traditional 44

  44. 45

  45. 46

  46. 47

  47. Anti-Inflation Policy in the Three Models 1. Ongoing , so moving from AD1to AD2, AS1to AS2, point 1 to 2 2. Anti- policy, AD kept at AD1 Traditional Model (a) 1. AS to AS2whether policy anticipated or not; go to 2', Y , New Classical Model (b) 1. Unanticipated: AS to AS2; go to 2', Y , 2. Anticipated: AS stays at AS1; stay at 1, Y unchanged, to zero New Keynesian Model (c) 1. Unanticipated: AS to AS2; go to 2', Y , 2. Anticipated: AS to AS2''; go to 2'', Y by less, by more 48

  48. Credibility and the Reagan Deficits Reagan deficits may have made 1981 82 recession worse after Fed anti- policy Analysis 1. Anti- policy kept AD at AD1 2. Fed s anti- policy less credible, so AS kept rising to AS2 3. Go to 2' in panels (b) and (c); Y by more than if anti- policy credible Impact of Rational Expectations Revolution 1. More aware of importance of expectations and credibility 2. Lucas critique has caused most economists to doubt use of conventional econometric models for policy evaluation 3. Since effect of policy depends on expectations, economists less activist 4. Policy effectiveness proposition not widely accepted, most economists take intermediate position that activist policy could be beneficial but is tough to design 49

  49. Credibility in Fighting Inflation Public must expect the policy will be implemented New Classical Cold turkey New Keynesian More gradual approach Actions speak louder than words 50

More Related Content

giItT1WQy@!-/#giItT1WQy@!-/#giItT1WQy@!-/#giItT1WQy@!-/#giItT1WQy@!-/#giItT1WQy@!-/#