Methodological Individualism in Social Science
METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM
AND
SOCIAL LAWS
The Philosophy of Economics and Politics
8
th
November 2018
Lecturer: Dr. William Peden
w.j.peden@durham.ac.uk
“… [the kind of economics he is criticising]
invokes an agent from
outside
the economy…
labelled ‘government’ … tasked with selflessly
correcting market failures… the invocation of a
disembodied benign agent violates the principle
of methodological individualism.”
- Meir Kohn (2004, p. 325-326)
Many Meanings of Methodological Individualism!
Lars Udehn (2002)
Lars Udehn (2002)
Many Meanings of Methodological Individualism!
Methodological Individualism
•
Meir Kohn (2004): “… economic outcomes should be
explained
purely
in terms of individual behavior.”
(p. 308)
•
Prediction
and
explanation in social science
-
But what’s a good explanation?
•
A (partial) theory of social scientific explanation
- Specifying a
necessary
condition (a requirement)
•
Still many versions – focus on most plausible
A theory T is a satisfactory explanation of a social
phenomenon only if T is formulated using:
(a) Terms describing individual beliefs, values,
and actions
(b) Terms reducible to (a)
(c) Some mix of (a) and (b)
•
Half-way explanations
•
Sufficient explanations
•
MI explanations
≠
Rational choice explanations
- Could explain a pattern of voting
in terms of
individuals’
irrational
thinking
John Watkins
1924-1999
NOT a metaphysical claim!
NOT a claim about which theories are true!
NOT a claim about meaningfulness!
NOT a defence of individualist politics!
Max Weber
(liberal)
1864-1920
Jon Elster
(Marxist
communist)
1940-
Friedrich
Hayek
(libertarian)
1899-1992
Karl Popper
(liberal/social
democrat)
1902-1994
•
Classes
•
Hats
•
A full
understanding?
•
“Collective terms” in social science
do
denote individuals
•
But they are not always
definable
using
individual terms
•
Defensive move: we can observe collective
attitudes/behaviours e.g. “hostile crowd”
•
Offensive move: there are some sufficient
social explanations with irreducible
collective terms
Ernest Nagel
1901-1985
•
Nagel (1961): something like Keynesianism is
needed for some explanations, but has non-
reduced collective terms
- “Sticky” wages/prices
•
Reduction: inconsistent with microeconomics?
•
BUT: the New Keynesians worked hard to
develop “microfoundations” for Keynesianism
(1970s/1980s/1990s)
John Maynard
Keynes
1883-1946
Compromises?
•
Old theories of scientific explanation: focus
mostly about the
logical
features of explanations
•
Modern theories: more attention to
aims
of
explanations
- E.g. Bas Van Fraassen
•
MI as a theory of social scientists’ aims?
Revised MI:
Only explanations of social
phenomena in individual terms can be
fully
satisfying explanations
Comparative MI:
Ceteris paribus
, T
1
is preferable to T
2
as an
explanation of a social phenomenon P if
T
1
explains P in an MI way and
T
2
does not
- The New Keynesians?
Social Laws
•
Alternatives to MI explanations?
- (Law-explanations
CAN
satisfy MI)
•
Do social scientific laws actually explain
anything?
•
Interpretation of laws in social science?
•
Social scientists: making deductions of
phenomena using exceptionless laws or
confirming them with probabilistic laws
- DN/IS model
•
One (of many) problems – where are
these in social science?
- Tautologies or have exceptions (?)
Carl G. Hempel
(1905-1997)
•
Mill: social laws as
tendency laws
•
TENDENCY: what happens
ceteris paribus
•
Tendency laws are generalisations that:
(1) Can have exceptions
(2) Express tendencies of a mechanism,
including e.g. a social system
John Stuart Mill
(1806-1873)
- A more modern
philosopher of
explanation!
Properties of a tendency:
(1) A kind of causation
(2) If there is a tendency in a mechanism
then it produces an effect
if
there are no
disturbing factors
(3) Make a contribution even when there are
disturbing factors
Sébastien
Chabal
(1977-)
•
Causal tendency laws: make sense of social
scientific explanations via laws?
•
An increase in the level of currency
increases the level of prices
if
there are no
disturbing factors e.g. new regulations
raising banks’ demand for currency reserves
•
How can causal tendencies provide
informative guidance for social policy?
Nancy
Cartwright
(1944 -)
SUMMARY
•
Methodological individualism: many meanings
•
Stronger and weaker claims about our
explanatory objectives in social science
•
Tendency laws: a possible alternative to
individualist explanations of social phenomena
- Good news for Marx?
Bas Van Fraassen
The Scientific Image
(1980)
Chapter 5
Carl G. Hempel: “Studies in the Logic of
Explanation” (1948)
(with Paul Oppenheim)
Philosophy of Science
Ernest Nagel:
The Structure of Science
(1961)
Chapter 14 Section III
Friedrich Hayek:
The Counter-Revolution in
Science
(1964) Chapter 4
John Stuart Mill:
A System of Logic
(1882)
Book VI Chapter VI
(Other references in the module handbook)
Jon Elster: “Marxism, Functionalism and
Game Theory” (1982)
Theory and Society
John Watkins: “
Ideal Types and Historical
Explanation” (1952)
The British Journal for
Philosophy of Science
John Watkins:
“Historical Explanation in the
Social Sciences” (1957)
The British Journal
for Philosophy of Science
Lars Udehn: “
The Changing Face of
Methodological Individualism” (2002)
Annual Review of Sociology
Meir Kohn: “Value and Exchange” (2004)
Cato Journal
Critiques of invoking external agents in economics, the importance of individual behavior in explaining economic outcomes, and various interpretations of methodological individualism in social science are discussed. The focus is on explaining social phenomena through terms related to individual beliefs, values, and actions.
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Presentation Transcript
METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM AND SOCIAL LAWS The Philosophy of Economics and Politics 8thNovember 2018 Lecturer: Dr. William Peden w.j.peden@durham.ac.uk
[the kind of economics he is criticising] invokes an agent from outsidethe economy labelled government tasked with selflessly correcting market failures the invocation of a disembodied benign agent violates the principle of methodological individualism. - Meir Kohn (2004, p. 325-326)
Many Meanings of Methodological Individualism! Lars Udehn (2002)
Many Meanings of Methodological Individualism! Lars Udehn (2002)
Methodological Individualism Meir Kohn (2004): economic outcomes should be explained purely in terms of individual behavior. (p. 308) Prediction and explanation in social science But what s a good explanation? - A (partial) theory of social scientific explanation - Specifying a necessary condition (a requirement) Still many versions focus on most plausible
A theory T is a satisfactory explanation of a social phenomenon only if T is formulated using: (a) Terms describing individual beliefs, values, and actions (b) Terms reducible to (a) (c) Some mix of (a) and (b)
Half-way explanations Sufficient explanations MI explanations Rational choice explanations John Watkins 1924-1999 - Could explain a pattern of voting in terms of individuals irrational thinking
NOT a metaphysical claim! NOT a claim about which theories are true! NOT a claim about meaningfulness! NOT a defence of individualist politics!
Friedrich Hayek (libertarian) Max Weber (liberal) Karl Popper (liberal/social democrat) Jon Elster (Marxist communist) 1864-1920 1899-1992 1902-1994 1940-
Classes Hats A full understanding?
Collective terms in social science do denote individuals But they are not always definable using individual terms Defensive move: we can observe collective attitudes/behaviours e.g. hostile crowd Ernest Nagel Offensive move: there are some sufficient social explanations with irreducible collective terms 1901-1985
Nagel (1961): something like Keynesianism is needed for some explanations, but has non- reduced collective terms - Sticky wages/prices Reduction: inconsistent with microeconomics? BUT: the New Keynesians worked hard to develop microfoundations for Keynesianism (1970s/1980s/1990s) John Maynard Keynes 1883-1946
Compromises? Old theories of scientific explanation: focus mostly about the logical features of explanations Modern theories: more attention to aims of explanations - E.g. Bas Van Fraassen MI as a theory of social scientists aims?
Revised MI: Only explanations of social phenomena in individual terms can be fully satisfying explanations
Comparative MI: Ceteris paribus, T1 is preferable to T2 as an explanation of a social phenomenon P if T1 explains P in an MI way and T2 does not - The New Keynesians?
Social Laws Alternatives to MI explanations? - (Law-explanations CAN satisfy MI) Do social scientific laws actually explain anything? Interpretation of laws in social science?
Social scientists: making deductions of phenomena using exceptionless laws or confirming them with probabilistic laws - DN/IS model Carl G. Hempel One (of many) problems where are these in social science? (1905-1997) - Tautologies or have exceptions (?)
Mill: social laws as tendency laws TENDENCY: what happens ceteris paribus Tendency laws are generalisations that: John Stuart Mill (1) Can have exceptions (1806-1873) (2) Express tendencies of a mechanism, including e.g. a social system - A more modern philosopher of explanation!
Properties of a tendency: (1) A kind of causation (2) If there is a tendency in a mechanism then it produces an effect if there are no disturbing factors S bastien Chabal (1977-) (3) Make a contribution even when there are disturbing factors
Causal tendency laws: make sense of social scientific explanations via laws? An increase in the level of currency increases the level of prices if there are no disturbing factors e.g. new regulations raising banks demand for currency reserves Nancy Cartwright (1944 -) How can causal tendencies provide informative guidance for social policy?
SUMMARY Methodological individualism: many meanings Stronger and weaker claims about our explanatory objectives in social science Tendency laws: a possible alternative to individualist explanations of social phenomena - Good news for Marx?
Bas Van Fraassen The Scientific Image (1980) Chapter 5 Jon Elster: Marxism, Functionalism and Game Theory (1982) Theory and Society John Watkins: Ideal Types and Historical Explanation (1952) The British Journal for Philosophy of Science Carl G. Hempel: Studies in the Logic of Explanation (1948) (with Paul Oppenheim) Philosophy of Science John Watkins: Historical Explanation in the Social Sciences (1957) The British Journal for Philosophy of Science Ernest Nagel: The Structure of Science (1961) Chapter 14 Section III Friedrich Hayek: The Counter-Revolution in Science (1964) Chapter 4 Lars Udehn: The Changing Face of Methodological Individualism (2002) Annual Review of Sociology John Stuart Mill: A System of Logic (1882) Book VI Chapter VI Meir Kohn: Value and Exchange (2004) Cato Journal (Other references in the module handbook)
