Foreign Government Talent Recruitment Programs - Understanding the Implications

Participation in Foreign Government Talent Recruitment Programs can lead to various issues such as conflicts of interest, lack of reporting, intellectual property theft, violations of research standards, and legal concerns. This article defines these programs, explores their distinguishing features, and discusses conflicts of interest and commitment in academic-industry relationships.

• Recruitment Programs
• Foreign Government
• Conflicts of Interest
• Intellectual Property
• Research Standards

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1. Ver. 4, 1/22/21 Export Control Program Foreign Government Talent Recruitment Programs University of Wisconsin Madison Tom Demke Export Control Officer Bethany Nelson Export Control Coordinator 1

2. Why Do We Care? Ver. 4, 1/22/21 Participation in Foreign Government Talent Recruitment Programs can lead to: Use of U.S. federal funding to further technology in other countries Conflicts of interest or commitment Lack of reporting conflicts to institutions and federal agencies when proposing for grants IP theft Violations of U.S. open research standards Contract clauses may not be legal Disclosure in Other Support/Current & Pending Support documents Updates to Research Performance Progress Reports (RPPR) DOE National Labs may require reporting if the UW knows or has reason to believe that someone is part of a FGTRP 2

3. Definitions Ver. 4, 1/22/21 Definition Foreign Government Talent Recruitment Program (TRP) Per DOE Order 486.1 In general, such programs include any foreign-state-sponsored attempt to acquire U.S. scientific-funded research or technology through foreign government-run or funded recruitment programs that target scientists, engineers, academics, researchers, and entrepreneurs of all nationalities working or educated in the United States. These recruitment programs are often part of broader whole-of- government strategies to reduce costs associated with basic research while focusing investment on military development or dominance in emerging technology sectors. Distinguishing features: (1) Compensation provided by the foreign state to the targeted individual in exchange for the individual transferring their knowledge and expertise to the foreign country. (2) Recruitment in this context refers to the foreign-state-sponsor s active engagement in attracting the targeted individual to join the foreign sponsored program and transfer their knowledge and expertise to the foreign state. (3) Many, but not all, programs aim to incentivize the targeted individual to physically relocate to the foreign state. 3

4. Definitions Ver. 4, 1/22/21 Per Recommended Principles to Guide Academy-Industry Relationships from the American Association of University Professors Conflict of Interest A set of circumstances that creates a risk that professional judgment or actions regarding a primary interest will be unduly influenced by a secondary interest. Could directly or significantly affect the way an employee s performs their institutional responsibilities* Impair the employee s judgment* Might require the employee to disclose confidential or proprietary information* 4 * Reference from University of Texas-Austin policy and Fundamental Research Security (JASON)

5. Definitions Ver. 4, 1/22/21 Per Recommended Principles to Guide Academy-Industry Relationships from the American Association of University Professors Conflict of Commitment A Conflict of Commitment arises whenever a faculty member s or administrator s outside consulting and other activities have the potential to interfere with their primary duties, including teaching, research, time with students, or other service and administrative obligations to the university. Time or effort that a university employee devotes to an outside activity directly or significantly interfere with the employee s fulfillment of university responsibilities* * Reference from University of Texas-Austin policy and Fundamental Research Security (JASON) 5

6. Background Ver. 4, 1/22/21 Foreign countries have talent programs to recruit scholars in the US to work for them both here and abroad China China has over 200 TRPs Largest and most well-known program - 1000 Talents Program Others: Changjiang Scholars Program Young 1000 Talents Program Hundred Talents Program (Chinese Academy of Sciences) National High-End Foreign Expert Award Chinese Government Friendship Award Sino-US Fulbright Program Program for Overseas Talents Aggregation Inner Mongolia Steed Award A more full list can be found at: https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/ad-aspi/2020- 08/Hunting%20the%20phoenix.pdf?.hmt71Hn_3ms12y7ZTxVYuGIC8oIO8EH Russia, India, and Iran have their own programs 6

7. Background Ver. 4, 1/22/21 Purpose of Programs Acquire technology and research cheaply and quickly Targets critical technologies, such as: Core electronic devices, high end chips Large-scale IC manufacturing Next Gen broadband wireless mobile communication High end machine tools Drug development Major infectious disease prevention Oil and gas field development Water pollution and control However just because you don t work in one of these areas doesn t mean you won t be a target 7

8. How to Identify a TRP Ver. 4, 1/22/21 They recruit persons with ties to the foreign country and scholars who have never been there Be suspicious of offers of: Large stipends Fully operational labs with staff Multiple trips to a country Extended stays in a country Compensation can take several forms, such as: Cash Research funding Honorific titles Career advancement opportunities Promised future compensation Other types of remuneration or consideration 8

9. How to Identify a TRP Ver. 4, 1/22/21 Usually require: Time in the foreign country Setting up a lab Publishing papers listing a foreign institution May require: Participant to spend a certain amount of time in the foreign country Participant to recruit others for the program Not to report the TRP participation to research sponsors Need to sign a contract Oftentimes contracts will be in a foreign language, and, if translated, may not be translated correctly Contracts may not be terminated without the foreign government s agreement Contracts may include language that violate UW policies as well as federal law 9

10. Government Actions Ver. 4, 1/22/21 Some TRPs are alleged to be connected w/ information gathering and outright spying Recent U.S. government actions NSF Does not allow employees to be participants in TRPs Does not apply to NSF-funded researchers Requires disclosure of all current and pending support (since 1978) DOE Does not allow employees to be participants in TRPs (DOE O 486.1) Thus far not a requirement of awardees These requirements are becoming more prevalent in DOD, DOE, NIH and NSF agreements/awards 10

11. Government Actions Ver. 4, 1/22/21 Aug 2019, Feng Tao, a University of Kansas researcher, was indicted for fraud for failing to disclose a COI w/ a Chinese university. Early 2019, NIH discovered an NIH-sponsored researcher was under contract to the 1000 Talents Program, had two faculty appts. at Jianghun and Wuhan Universities and rec d Chinese gov t funding. The researcher spent 6 months a year working in China. None of this was reported to NIH. Yanqing Ye (an alleged lieutenant in the People's Liberation Army) conducted research for the National University of Defense Technology while she attended Boston University (BU) between Oct 2017-Apr /2019. She was also charged with granting a Chinese military researcher access to her BU VPN so the researcher could conduct web searches from overseas without detection. She is believed to be in China. 11

12. Government Actions Ver. 4, 1/22/21 James Lewis, tenured professor in Physics at West Virginia University, pled guilty to fraud in Mar 2020 Signed a contract w/ the 1000 Talents Program in 2017 Obligated him to work full time in China for 3 years (at least 9 months a year) Scheduled to receive ~$800K in living & research subsidies & salary Was granted a leave request to care for his newborn child, but used it to work in China Charles Lieber, chair of Harvard s Dept. of Chemistry and Chemical Biology was charged with not disclosing: Involvement with 1000 Talents Program to DOD Salary of $50K/month from Wuhan Univ. of Tech. Receipt of $158K in living expenses Award of $1.74M to set up a lab in China Making false statements to NIH about his involvement with the talent program and affiliation with Wuhan Univ. of Tech. 12

13. Actions Ver. 4, 1/22/21 It is not illegal to participate in a TRP However, you have to make sure you need to address the following: Report all conflicts of interest and conflicts of commitment on your OAR (Outside Activities Report), even if no money is changing hands Report all foreign funding, sponsorships and/or positions on proposals for U.S. gov t funding, as required Make sure your department chair is aware of your situation, and accepts the commitments you have with the TRP Ramifications of withholding information Withholding information on your OAR can result in penalties from the university up to and including dismissal Not reporting foreign funding or commitments on U.S. gov t proposals can lead to loss of funding and/or federal prosecution If you ever have any doubt, please contact the COI, Legal Affairs or Export Control offices 13

14. UW Resource Ver. 4, 1/22/21 International Research Collaborations website https://rsp.wisc.edu/internationalresearchcollaborations/ Contains guidance about relationships with foreign entities Communications from government agencies FAQ: https://rsp.wisc.edu/internationalresearchcollaborations/IRCFAQs.cfm 14

15. Ver. 4, 1/22/21 Contact Information Contact Information 15

16. Ver. 4, 1/22/21 For Additional Information, Contact: Tom Demke, UW-Madison Export Control Officer tom.demke@ssec.wisc.edu 262-8659 Bethany Nelson, UW-Madison Export Control Coordinator bcnelson2@wisc.edu 261-1128 Ben Griffiths, UW Senior Legal Counsel ben.griffiths@wisc.edu 263-7400 Or e-mail: exportcontrol@grad.wisc.edu UW Export Control Website: UW Export Control Website: https://research.wisc.edu/integrity-and-other-requirements/export-control/ 16