Comparing Autocratic Attempts in Poland and Hungary
Poland and Hungary
Two autocratic attempts to
overthrow liberal democracy
C
ommon ideological frames
:
the ostensible similarity of the Polish and
Hungarian autocratic attempts (1)
their governance
is
not
defined
as changes of government, but as
changes of
regime
;
accordingly, they distance themselves from the regime change of a quarter century
ago, and interpret the history of
the peaceful, negotiated change of regimes as the
deal between elites concluded over the heads of society
;
a
nd they attempt to use
this to legitimize the necessity for the actual regime change they represent;
they mean under
nation a community of people committed to an ideology
, rather
than
a community of
autonomous citizens, by which means they seek to create a
basis of legitimacy and an argument for excluding citizens critical of their regime
from the nation, and paint them as representatives of alien interests;
etnonationalism
;
C
ommon ideological frames
:
the ostensible similarity of the Polish and
Hungarian autocratic attempts (2)
they share a particular form of
Euro-skepticism
, and continue a
“national freedom
fight
against Brussel
’
s dictatorship”
on the basis of a historicized grievance politics,
while continuing to expect the EU resources; this behavior is no less than the
realization of a rent-seeking policy on international scale, without moral qualms
;
fear and suspicion of refugees
, migrants and aliens is exceptionally high in both
countries, which
populist politics easily transforms into active xenophobia
.
(hate
campaign
fear campaign)
The similarities between these ideological frames only demonstrate
that they are equally adaptable to the
n
eeds of different types
of
autocratic regimes.
Two types of post-communist autocracies (1)
Poland’s conservative autocracy
•
motivated by
power and ideology
;
•
ideology driven
:
„fanatic”
and
„emotional”
;
•
t
he actual decision-making remains
centered within the framework of
formal institution
s
;
•
formal body of leadership
:
PiS
leadership
;
•
ruling party = centralised party
;
Hungary’s post-communist mafia state
•
motivated by
power and
personal
wealth
;
•
ideology applying
:
„cynic”
and
„rational”
;
(amoral familism);
•
political-economic
decision-making is
removed from the legally defined,
formalized organizations
and social
control
;
•
informal body of leadership
:
chief
patron’s court
;
•
„ruling party” = transmission belt party
;
Two types of post-communist autocracies (2)
Poland’s conservative autocracy Hungary’s post-communist mafia state
•
single pyramid patronal network
;
•
a centralized chain of command built on
a patron-client network of vassalage
;
•
adopted political family
;
•
mafia state
: centralizing and
monopolizing corruption;
•
the
adopted political family accumulates
wealth
through the bloodless instruments
of state coercion
:
rent-seeking and
centrally led corporate raiding;
•
criminal state (privatised form of a
parasite state)
.
•
s
tate dirigist
bureaucratic
control
;
•
but
respects the free market
competition and the freedom of
enterprise
;
•
p
arty political nepotism
;
•
favouritism
, but more or less
combatting corruption;
•
the
loyal elit
is maily
rewarded with
office
s
and not wealth
;
•
authoritarian state.
International preferences in the two autocratic schemes
(1)
In Poland
Kaczyński
•
foreign policy =
positioning Poland
;
•
has an
ambivalent
relationship with
Germany
;
•
is unflinching in his
commitment to the
Atlantic Alliance
;
•
believe
s
that
dependence on Russian
energy has a political cost
;
takes up the
cause of the independence of any
country or people fighting against
Russia (Ukraine, Chechnya, Georgia)
;
In Hungary Orbán
•
foreign policy =
positioning Orbán
;
•
is
not fighting Germany,
he is
fighting Merkel
;
(changing after leaving EPP)
•
has
ejected all politicians and diplomats
committed to the Atlantic Alliance
from his
foreign affairs team
;
•
via t
he program of
Eastern Opening
foreign
policy aims to secure socially unchecked, freely
expendable resources for the adopted political
family through its connections to Putin and
other autocrats
, and stabilizing his autocratic
power;
(„Autocrats’ International”)
International preferences in the two autocratic schemes
(2)
In Poland
Kaczyński
•
o
pposi
ng
Brussels is motivated by a
repositioning of Poland’s status within
the EU
; b
ut this does not mean
any intent
to leave
it; („let’s make Poland small
again”);
•
t
he amplification of the nationalist
ideological strain
of the
„Europe of
nations”
is not part of a larger strategy,
but a spontaneous reaction to the
criticism aimed at his government
;
•
multi-speed EU
= chance to get into the
club of the leading EU nations
;
In Hungary Orbán
•
having a
blackmailing
position
against
Brussels,
seeks allies in the framework of the
Visegrád 4
and other EU applicants of the
West-Balkan;
Slavkov Triangle
and
Three Seas Initiative
;
•
launching the
“Europe of Nations”
demand
s
for a new relationship with the EU: to
maintain the obligation for the transfer of
EU
resources
, while ensuring the autonomy
(„impunity”)
of national
a
utocracies
;
•
multi-speed EU
= danger of
marginalization
;
The constraints of autocratic attempts (1)
Poland: far from the point of no return
•
proportional electoral system
and divided
executive power
— constitutionally
preventing excessive power concentratio
n;
(„
free and fair elections
”)
•
partly
divided executive power
;
directly
elected president
relatively strong
presidential legitimacy
;
•
the
social traditions of resistance
to
authority
and
the civil movement
s
building
on these traditions
;
•
the
existence of moderate right and liberal
parties
giving the main body of the
opposition forces
;
Hungary: close to the point of no return
•
disproportional and manipulative electoral
system
that makes election fraud a real
possibility
; (these are not „free, but not
fair”, but
manipulated elections
;)
•
non-divided executive power
;
indirectly
elected president
weak presidential
legitimacy
;
•
the historical culture of
individual
s’
detached bargaining
with the regimes in
power
;
•
the
lack of a moderate right-wing or
liberal party
for any voters decamping
from Fidesz
;
The constraints of autocratic attempts (2)
Poland: far from the point of no return
•
PiS
being
pushe
d to the
right
edge
of the
political spectrum
;
•
autonomous private enterprises
; not
brought yet under the tight control of the
state/government;
•
the political diversity
and shelter for
opposition forces
offered by the
municipal governments
;
strong centers
beyond Warsawa;
•
independent
media-platforms
for the
freedom of expression
(
Polish State
Oil Company’ media acquisitions)
Hungary: close to the point of no return
•
the
Fidesz lost its
central position
in the
three-partite political field
; (as a result of
Jobbik’s attemt to move to the centrum);
•
vassal private enterprises
; incorporated into
the patron-client chains of the adopted
political family;
•
loosing
the
uniformity of the political
institutional map
of the municipalities
, the
gov. deprives them from most of their rights
and revenues; Budapest centered country;
•
the
elimination or ghettoization of spaces
for freedom of expression
;
Interpretative Framework of Post-Communist Regimes
Primary trajectories of post-communist regimes
Secondary trajectories of post-communist regimes
A
B
C
D
Modelled Trajectories of Post-Communist Regimes:
Hungary
1990-1998
1998-2002
2002-2010
2010-
Modelled Trajectories of Post-Communist Regimes:
Poland
1990-2015
2015-
Thanks for your attention!
Poland and Hungary exhibit common ideological frames in their autocratic attempts, focusing on regime change rather than government shifts. These attempts utilize ethnonationalism, Euro-skepticism, and xenophobia to justify their actions. The two countries also showcase different types of post-communist autocracies, with Poland reflecting a conservative autocracy and Hungary embodying a post-communist mafia state driven by power and personal wealth.
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Presentation Transcript
Poland and Hungary Two autocratic attempts to overthrow liberal democracy
Common ideological frames: the ostensible similarity of the Polish and Hungarian autocratic attempts (1) their governance is not defined as changes of government, but as changes of regime; accordingly, they distance themselves from the regime change of a quarter century ago, and interpret the history of the peaceful, negotiated change of regimes as the deal between elites concluded over the heads of society; and they attempt to use this to legitimize the necessity for the actual regime change they represent; they mean under nation a community of people committed to an ideology, rather than a community of autonomous citizens, by which means they seek to create a basis of legitimacy and an argument for excluding citizens critical of their regime from the nation, and paint them as representatives of alien interests; etnonationalism;
Common ideological frames: the ostensible similarity of the Polish and Hungarian autocratic attempts (2) they share a particular form of Euro-skepticism, and continue a national freedom fight against Brussel s dictatorship on the basis of a historicized grievance politics, while continuing to expect the EU resources; this behavior is no less than the realization of a rent-seeking policy on international scale, without moral qualms; fear and suspicion of refugees, migrants and aliens is exceptionally high in both countries, which populist politics easily transforms into active xenophobia. (hate campaign fear campaign) The similarities between these ideological frames only demonstrate that they are equally adaptable to the needs of different types of autocratic regimes.
Two types of post-communist autocracies (1) Poland s conservative autocracy Hungary s post-communist mafia state motivated by power and personal wealth; ideology applying: cynic and rational ; (amoral familism); political-economic decision-making is removed from the legally defined, formalized organizations and social control; informal body of leadership: chief patron s court; ruling party = transmission belt party; motivated by power and ideology; ideology driven: fanatic and emotional ; the actual decision-making remains centered within the framework of formal institutions; formal body of leadership: PiS leadership; ruling party = centralised party;
Two types of post-communist autocracies (2) Poland s conservative autocracy Hungary s post-communist mafia state state dirigist bureaucratic control; but respects the free market competition and the freedom of enterprise; party political nepotism; favouritism, but more or less combatting corruption; the loyal elit is maily rewarded with offices and not wealth; single pyramid patronal network; a centralized chain of command built on a patron-client network of vassalage; adopted political family; mafia state: centralizing and monopolizing corruption; the adopted political family accumulates wealth through the bloodless instruments of state coercion: rent-seeking and centrally led corporate raiding; criminal state (privatised form of a parasite state). authoritarian state.
International preferences in the two autocratic schemes (1) In Hungary Orb n In Poland Kaczy ski foreign policy = positioning Orb n; is not fighting Germany, he is fighting Merkel; (changing after leaving EPP) has ejected all politicians and diplomats committed to the Atlantic Alliance from his foreign affairs team; via the program of Eastern Opening foreign policy aims to secure socially unchecked, freely expendable resources for the adopted political family through its connections to Putin and other autocrats, and stabilizing his autocratic power; ( Autocrats International ) foreign policy = positioning Poland; has an ambivalent relationship with Germany; is unflinching in his commitment to the Atlantic Alliance; believes that dependence on Russian energy has a political cost; takes up the cause of the independence of any country or people fighting against Russia (Ukraine, Chechnya, Georgia);
International preferences in the two autocratic schemes (2) In Hungary Orb n In Poland Kaczy ski opposing Brussels is motivated by a repositioning of Poland s status within the EU; but this does not mean any intent to leave it; ( let s make Poland small again ); the amplification of the nationalist ideological strain of the Europe of nations is not part of a larger strategy, but a spontaneous reaction to the criticism aimed at his government; multi-speed EU = chance to get into the club of the leading EU nations; having a blackmailing position against Brussels, seeks allies in the framework of the Visegr d 4 and other EU applicants of the West-Balkan; Slavkov Triangle and Three Seas Initiative; launching the Europe of Nations demands for a new relationship with the EU: to maintain the obligation for the transfer of EU resources, while ensuring the autonomy ( impunity ) of national autocracies; multi-speed EU = danger of marginalization;
The constraints of autocratic attempts (1) Poland: far from the point of no return Hungary: close to the point of no return proportional electoral system and divided executive power constitutionally preventing excessive power concentration; ( free and fair elections ) partly divided executive power; directly elected president relatively strong presidential legitimacy; the social traditions of resistance to authority and the civil movements building on these traditions; the existence of moderate right and liberal parties giving the main body of the opposition forces; disproportional and manipulative electoral system that makes election fraud a real possibility; (these are not free, but not fair , but manipulated elections;) non-divided executive power; indirectly elected president weak presidential legitimacy; the historical culture of individuals detached bargaining with the regimes in power; the lack of a moderate right-wing or liberal party for any voters decamping from Fidesz;
The constraints of autocratic attempts (2) Poland: far from the point of no return Hungary: close to the point of no return PiS being pushed to the right edge of the political spectrum; the Fidesz lost its central position in the three-partite political field; (as a result of Jobbik s attemt to move to the centrum); vassal private enterprises; incorporated into the patron-client chains of the adopted political family; loosing the uniformity of the political institutional map of the municipalities , the gov. deprives them from most of their rights and revenues; Budapest centered country; the elimination or ghettoization of spaces for freedom of expression; autonomous private enterprises; not brought yet under the tight control of the state/government; the political diversity and shelter for opposition forces offered by the municipal governments; strong centers beyond Warsawa; independent media-platforms for the freedom of expression ( Polish State Oil Company media acquisitions)
Interpretative Framework of Post-Communist Regimes Conservative autocracy Liberal democracy Communist dictatorship (Estonia, Czech Republic) (North Korea) Patronal democracy Market-exploiting dictatorship (Bulgaria, Romania) (China, Vietnam) Patronal autocracy (Hungary, Russia, Central-Asian Rep.)
Primary trajectories of post-communist regimes Primary trajectories from to A Regime change (e.g. Estonia, Poland, Hungary) Communist dictatorship Liberal democracy Conservative autocracy Single-pyramid bureaucratic patronal Multi-pyramid non-patronal Communist dictatorship Liberal democracy A B Regime change (e.g. Romania, Ukraine) Communist dictatorship Patronal democracy Single-pyramid bureaucratic patronal Multi-pyramid informal patronal Patronal democracy Market-exploiting dictatorship C Regime change (e.g. Kazakhstan) Communist dictatorship Patronal autocracy Single-pyramid bureaucratic patronal Single-pyramid informal patronal Patronal autocracy D Model change (e.g. China) Communist dictatorship Market-exploiting dictatorship Single-pyramid bureaucratic patronal Single-pyramid bureaucratic patronal
Secondary trajectories of post-communist regimes Secondary trajectories: democratic backsliding from to A Regime change (e.g. Poland after 2015) Liberal democracy Conservative autocracy Conservative autocracy Communist dictatorship Multi-pyramid non-patronal Single-pyramid non-patronal Liberal democracy A B Model change (e.g. Czech Republic after 2013) Liberal democracy Patronal democracy B Patronal democracy Market-exploiting dictatorship Multi-pyramid non-patronal Multi-pyramid informal patronal C D C Regime change (e.g. Hungary after 2010) Liberal democracy Patronal autocracy Patronal autocracy Multi-pyramid non-patronal Single-pyramid informal patronal D Regime change (e.g. Russia after 2003) Patronal democracy Patronal autocracy Multi-pyramid informal patronal Single-pyramid informal patronal
Modelled Trajectories of Post-Communist Regimes: Hungary Conservative autocracy Communist dictatorship Liberal democracy 1990-1998 Market-exploiting dictatorship Patronal democracy Patronal autocracy
Modelled Trajectories of Post-Communist Regimes: Poland Conservative autocracy 1990-2015 Communist dictatorship Liberal democracy 2015- Market-exploiting dictatorship Patronal democracy Patronal autocracy
