Crisis in Ukraine's Armed Forces: Five Years into Conflict with Russia
Ukraine's Armed Forces faced a severe crisis in combat readiness in 2014, with only a fraction of troops and equipment operational. Efforts to improve readiness included repairing air defense systems, upgrading equipment, and increasing training exercises. The development of missile programs and Special Operations Forces marked incremental qualitative advancements in Ukraine's military capabilities.
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Ukraines Armed Forces Five Ukraine s Armed Forces Five Years into Conflict with Russia Years into Conflict with Russia
Crisis of combat readiness of Ukrainian Armed Forces Crisis of combat readiness of Ukrainian Armed Forces (2014) (2014) Only 6 thousand troops of 121 thousand troops of Ukrainian Armed Forces were ready to perform orders on shot notice at the beginning of March of 2014. Level of functioning equipment 43-45%. In each brigade of Land Forces at best only one in four battalions was combat-ready. Examples of combat readiness crisis: - of 46 MiG-29 and MiG-29UB at 204thtactical aviation brigade (Belbek, Crimea) only 4 fighters were capable to fly. - 72ndmechanized brigade (Bila Tserkva) was unable to come to Kyiv due to shortage of basic equipment like batteries. As the result of Crimea occupation Ukraine lost 8 divisions of air defense system (5 divisions of S-300PS and 3 divisions of Buk M1), 7 combat ships and land-based anti- ship missile complexes.
Combat readiness crisis Combat readiness crisis solutions Repair of air-defense systems. 80% of S-300PS/TP and 40% of Buk M1 underwent necessary repair process. In general, Ukraine has 25 divisions of S-300PS/PT, 10 divisions of Buk M1 and 1 division of S-300V1. Repair of MBTs (T-64BV, T-72AB/B1, T-80BV), APCs (BTR-70, BTR-80) and IFVs (BMP-1, BMP-2) by 6 major Ukrainian Armor Vehicle Factories. Provision of necessary amount of basic functioning MBTs and armored vehicles to Land Forces, Air Assault Forces, Marine Forces. In 2018 approximately 50 planes (MiG-29, SU-27, SU-24M/MR, SU-25, L-39, An-26, Il-76) and helicopters (Mi-8, Mi-14, Mi-24) were repaired. Of them 7 MiG-29 (4 of MU1 model), 3 SU-25M1K, 15 helicopters. SU-27 are modernized to 1M model. In general level of the functioning equipment has risen to 85% in 5 years. Equipment budget in 2013 187 million of dollars, in 2018 575 million of dollars. solutions
Combat readiness crisis Combat readiness crisis solutions In 2013 there were none of brigade tactical exercises and only 8 battalion tactical exercises. In 2018 there were 30 brigade tactical exercises and 300 battalion tactical exercises. In 2013 there were none of strategic command and staff trainings, since 2015 this type of exercise is done annually. Since December 2016 at Yagorlik shooting range (Kherson region) regular exercises of air defense systems have been held to prove characteristics of repaired systems. Amount of flight hours of Air Forces crews in 2013 36, in 2018 47. Necessity to increase flight hours need to be reconciled with requirements to preserve as much as possible the soviet planes fuselages. Establishment of Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine in 2015. Training on battalion level 11 battalions of UAF are trained by US under this program and 14 thousand by UK and Canada combined. Since March 2019 trainings under JMTG-U are done on brigade level. solutions
Incremental qualitative development Incremental qualitative development Missile program since 2016 missile complex Vilkha , cruise missile Neptune . Establishment and development of Special Operations Forces are the separate branch of Armed Forces. Development of new improved modifications of MiG-29 and Su-27 fighters MiG- 29MU2 and SU-27-2M. New tactical UAVs for ISR Furia (models A-1C/A-1CM), Leleka-100 , PD-1. ATGMs of new generation Stugna-P, Korsar, Barrier. Approximately 2.5 thousand of missiles for those complexes were produced in 2018. Some elements of C4ISR system are introduced like complexes Delta, Oreanda. State program 2017-21 for new ammunitions and special chemistry production of 152/155 mm shells and shells for MRLS.
Incremental qualitative development Incremental qualitative development New systems of tactical level communications equipment Motorola, Harris Falcone, Aselsan radio stations. Till 2020 all brigades will have Aselsan and Harris Falcone radio stations. EW complexes Anclav, Nota, Bukovel, R-330UM Mandat. Approximately 50 radars of different types transferred to Air Forces among them 79K6, 36D6 and MP-18 In 2017-18 100 MBTs T-64BV were modernized to the level T-64BV Mod 2017. Modernized tanks of Mod 2017 are comparable with Russian T-72B3 MBT. New system of tactical medical assistance.
Future prospects Future prospects major dilemmas major dilemmas 1. UAF will reach its post-soviet peak of strength in the next couple of years. But it will last only till 2025-30 as sophisticated soviet equipment (SAMs, fighters) are to be retired. Process of meaningful rearmament of UAF in 2020-20 will cost at least 23-25 billion of dollars. Current level of defense spending of 3.5 billion dollars is not enough. It s barely enough for the maintenance of Soviet legacy systems and partial qualitative development. System of operational reserve (200K people with war-time experience) looks better on paper then in hypothetic all-out war scenario. Since 2014 16 new brigades were created Land Forces (10 brigades), Air-Assault Forces (3 brigades), Marine Forces (3 brigades). Not all of them have enough fire-power potential motorized infantry brigades are very light on fire-power. Also there is shortage of personal in brigades in some formations need in personnel is meet only on 50-60% rate. Problem of retaining qualified personnel. Formally 168K of 204K soldiers are all-volunteers. But in 2016 2,6K contract soldiers left army, in 2017 20,1K and in 2018 approximately 30K. 2. 3. 4. 5.
