Strategy-Proof Voting: Approximations and Possibilities
Explore the concept of approximately strategy-proof voting through models and constructions, aiming to prevent manipulation while ensuring fair outcomes. Discuss the challenges and potential methods to circumvent manipulations based on Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorems. Delve into defining approximations and the possibility of achieving strategy-proof voting.
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Approximately Strategy-Proof Voting Eleanor Birrell Rafael Pass Cornell University
The Model uCharlie (A) = 1 uCharlie (B) = .9 uCharlie (C) = .2 Charlie (B) > Charlie (C) Alice = {A,B,C} Bob = {C, A, B} Charlie = {A,C,B} Zelda = {C,B,A} Charlie (A) > Charlie (B) ui(j) [0,1] f Goal: f is strategy-proof Goal: f is strategy-proof Goal: f is strategy-proof Goal: Voters honestly report their preference A B C Bad News: Only if f is dictatorial or binary. [Gibb73, Gibb77, Satt75] [Gibb73, Gibb77, Satt75] Bad News: Only if f is trivial.
Circumventing Gibbard-Satterthwaite Hard to manipulate? BTT89, FKN09, IKM10 Randomized Approximations? CS06, Gibb77, Proc10 Restricted preferences? Moul80 Relaxed Problem? - Strategy Proof: By lying, no voter can improve their utility very much - Approximations: f returns an outcome that is close to f( )
-Strategy-Proof Voting uCharlie (A) = 1 uCharlie (B) = .9 uCharlie (C) = .2 Alice Bob Charlie Zelda f Strategy Proof: By lying (mis-reporting their preference i), no voter can improve their utility ui . Strategy Proof: -Strategy Proof: By lying (mis-reporting their preference i), no voter can improve their utility ui by more than . -Strategy Proof: A B C
- Approximations Defining Approximation Defining Close f is a -approx. of f if the outcome of f is always close to that of f . Alice Bob Charlie Zelda 'Bob Zelda Distance depends on both input and output: f (x) = f(y) s.t. (x,y) < 6 5 4 4 2 2 0 A B C
Is -Strategy Proof Voting Possible? = o (1/n) = (1/n) = n No Yes Theorem 1: Theorem 2:
-Strategy Proof Voting: A Construction Deterministic Rule ( f ): Approximation ( f ): d = 1 d = 1 d = 2 d = 2 d = 3 d = 3 d = 4 d = 4 d = 5 d = 5
-Strategy Proof Voting: A Construction A {A, B, C} Proportional Probability: Pr [ f ( ) = j ] ? Note: Only works 1 {C, A, B} for 0.8 f B {A, C, B} 0.6 0.4 /3 0.2 C 0 {C, B, A} 1 0 2 3 Distance: df( f( ), j) A C B 1
How Good is This? Every voting rule has a .05-strategy-proof 650-approx. And a . 01-strategy-proof 3,250-approx. And a .005-strategy-proof 6,500-approx. And a .001-strategy-proof 32,500-approx. And a .0005-strategy-proof 65,000-approx. Candidate Votes Obama 69,498,215 McCain 59,948,240 Nader 738,720 Baldwin 199,437 McKinney 161,680 Candidate Carpenter Fishpaw Cole Sweeney Carlson Votes 6,582 5,865 4,500 1,988 1,837
This is Asymptotically Optimal 0-strategy proof prob. dist. over trivial rules. [Gibb77] -strategy proof prob. dist. over trivial rules ( = o(1/n)). = o(1/n) no good -strategy proof approx of Plurality. h( ):= trival no good approx. Reduction: -SP to 0-SP Punish Deviating Return g( ) i=1 i=n Select player i: p p j=1 j=k Select rank j: j=1 j=k 1 - n k (k-j) j 1 - np k (k-1) k (k-k) k (k-1) k (k-k) Prob: 0-strategy proof trivial trivial
Summary = o (1/n) = (1/n) No Yes = n A new technique for circumventing Gibbard-Satterthwaite Extensions Small elections? Uncertainty in inputs? Thank you!
