CNF-FSS and Its Applications: PKC 2022 March 08
Explore the Background, Applications, and Summary of CNF-FSS, focusing on Function Secret Sharing, Distributed Point Function, CNF Key-Sharing, and more. Learn about the efficiency of multiparty sharing and 1-out-of-3 CNF-FSS constructions for certain classes of functions. Discover how CNF Key-Sharing is used in various applications like Verifiable Secret Sharing, Fault Tolerance, and more.
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CNF-FSS and its Applications Paul Bunn, Eyal Kushilevitz, Rafail Ostrovsky PKC 2022 March 08, 2022
Outline o Background o Application 1: CNF-FSS More Efficient Multiparty FSS o Application 2: 1-out-of-3 CNF-FSS o Summary
Outline o Background o Application 1: CNF-FSS More Efficient Multiparty FSS o Application 2: 1-out-of-3 CNF-FSS o Summary
Background: Function Secret Sharing [GI15] Sharing a function Sharing a secret -3 7 4
Background: Function Secret Sharing o Consists of Dealer and N-Parties, and three algorithms: o Gen( , f) o Eval(kP, x) o Reconstruct({Eval(kP)}) o Known FSS constructions for certain classes of functions DPF(i, v) o Distributed Point Function (DPF) [GI14,BGI15,BGI16] v o Solved for 2-party DPF o Open for p > 2: Less communication (for Gen algorithm) o Step-Functions, Intervals i
Background: CNF Key-Sharing o Introduced in [ISN87] oAlso known as replication-based and multiple assignment secret sharing o In our work, a (t, p) CNF-sharing means: oS S denotes set of all subsets of size t o Assign a unique key to each subset T S S o For each index i, let TiS S denotes sets that do not include index i o For each party i, assign keys {kTi} o Observation: o No t parties can reconstruct o Any (t+1) parties can reconstruct
Background: CNF Key-Sharing (continued) o For this talk, we consider cases: o (t, p) = (2, 5) o (t, p) = (1, 3) o CNF Key Sharing has been used in several applications, including: o Verifiable Secret Sharing and MPC protocols o Fault tolerance/redundancy o PIR o Other generalizations (when viewed as a special case of formula-based secret sharing)
Outline o Background o Application 1: CNF-FSS More Efficient Multiparty FSS o Application 2: 1-out-of-3 CNF-FSS o Summary
Application 1: CNF-FSS More Efficient Multiparty FSS Background: o (1, p)-FSS: Solved ([GI14,BGI15,BGI16]) o (t, p)-FSS with t > 1: o Best known: O( ?) communication ([GI14,BGI15,BGI16]) o O(4?) communication for special case: p = p1 p2 ([BGI18]) o E.g. p1 = p2 = 3, t = 2: (2, 9)-FSS scheme with O(4?) communication
Application 1: CNF-FSS More Efficient Multiparty FSS Our Results: oTheorem 1(Informal): For any parameters t, p, d such that p dt + 1, there exists a (t, p)-FSS scheme with communication O(n1/2d) o Proof: Constructive o Example: t = 2, p = 5, d = 2: (2, 5)-FSS with communication O(4?) o Previous best [BGI15] for (2, 5)-FSS was communication O( ?) oTheorem 2(Informal): For any parameters t, p, d such that p dt + 1, there exists a (t, p)-FSS information-theoretically secure scheme with communication O(n1/d) o Proof: Constructive
Application 1: CNF-FSS More Efficient Multiparty FSS Intuition: o Step 1: DPF(x, v); write x = (i, j) [1, ?] x [1, ?] and v = v1 v2. Use [BGI15] for (9, 10)-DPF keys {ki} for DPF(i, v1) and {Ki} for DPF(j,v2)
Application 1: CNF-FSS More Efficient Multiparty FSS Intuition: o Step 1: DPF(x, v); write x = (i, j) [1, ?] x [1, ?] and v = v1 v2. Use [BGI15] for (9, 10)-DPF keys {ki} for DPF(i, v1) and {Ki} for DPF(j,v2) 5 2 , so let {Tj} denote subsets of size 2. o Step 2: Notice 10 = Associate keys kj and Kj to each subset Tj
Application 1: CNF-FSS More Efficient Multiparty FSS Intuition: o Step 1: DPF(x, v); write x = (i, j) [1, ?] x [1, ?] and v = v1 v2. Use [BGI15] for (9, 10)-DPF keys {ki} for DPF(i, v1) and {Ki} for DPF(j,v2) 5 2 , so let {Tj} denote subsets of size 2. o Step 2: Notice 10 = Associate keys kj and Kj to each subset Tj o Step 3 (KeyGen): Deal keys to each party i [1, 5] (as per standard CNF-sharing rules) (Each party receives 6 keys from {kj} and {Kj})
Application 1: CNF-FSS More Efficient Multiparty FSS Intuition: o Step 1: DPF(x, v); write x = (i, j) [1, ?] x [1, ?] and v = v1 v2. Use [BGI15] for (9, 10)-DPF keys {ki} for DPF(i, v1) and {Ki} for DPF(j,v2) 5 2 , so let {Tj} denote subsets of size 2. o Step 2: Notice 10 = Associate keys kj and Kj to each subset Tj o Step 3 (KeyGen): Deal keys to each party i [1, 5] (as per standard CNF-sharing rules) (Each party receives 6 keys from {kj} and {Kj}) o Step 4 (Eval): Notice: f(y) = f1(y1) f2(y2) = (Eval(k1, y1) + + Eval(k10, y1)) (Eval(K1, y2) + + Eval(K10, y2))
Application 1: CNF-FSS More Efficient Multiparty FSS Intuition: o Step 1: DPF(x, v); write x = (i, j) [1, ?] x [1, ?] and v = v1 v2. Use [BGI15] for (9, 10)-DPF keys {ki} for DPF(i, v1) and {Ki} for DPF(j,v2) 5 2 , so let {Tj} denote subsets of size 2. Correctness. Cross-terms: Eval(ki, y1) Eval(Kj, y2) - 3 (out of 5) know ki - 3 (out of 5) know Kj o Step 2: Notice 10 = Associate keys kj and Kj to each subset Tj o Step 3 (KeyGen): Deal keys to each party i [1, 5] (as per standard CNF-sharing rules) (Each party receives 6 keys from {kj} and {Kj}) o Step 4 (Eval): Notice: f(y) = f1(y1) f2(y2) = (Eval(k1, y1) + + Eval(k10, y1)) (Eval(K1, y2) + + Eval(K10, y2)) (At least) one party knows both
Application 1: CNF-FSS More Efficient Multiparty FSS Intuition: o Step 1: DPF(x, v); write x = (i, j) [1, ?] x [1, ?] and v = v1 v2. Use [BGI15] for (9, 10)-DPF keys {ki} for DPF(i, v1) and {Ki} for DPF(j,v2) 5 2 , so let {Tj} denote subsets of size 2. o Step 2: Notice 10 = Associate keys kj and Kj to each subset Tj o Step 3 (KeyGen): Deal keys to each party i [1, 5] (as per standard CNF-sharing rules) (Each party receives 6 keys from {kj} and {Kj}) o Step 4 (Eval): Notice: f(y) = f1(y1) f2(y2) = (Eval(k1, y1) + + Eval(k10, y1)) (Eval(K1, y2) + + Eval(K10, y2)) Security. For any 2 Parties (i, j) the set Ti, So cross-term: Eval(kTi, j contains both indices. j, y1) Eval(KTi, j, y2)
Application 1: CNF-FSS More Efficient Multiparty FSS Intuition: o Step 1: DPF(x, v); write x = (i, j) [1, ?] x [1, ?] and v = v1 v2. Use [BGI15] for (9, 10)-DPF keys {ki} for DPF(i, v1) and {Ki} for DPF(j,v2) 5 2 , so let {Tj} denote subsets of size 2. o Step 2: Notice 10 = Associate keys kj and Kj to each subset Tj o Step 3 (KeyGen): Deal keys to each party i [1, 5] (as per standard CNF-sharing rules) (Each party receives 6 keys from {kj} and {Kj}) o Step 4 (Eval): Notice: f(y) = f1(y1) f2(y2) = (Eval(k1, y1) + + Eval(k10, y1)) (Eval(K1, y2) + + Eval(K10, y2)) o f1 and f2 have domain size ?, so keys {ki} and {Ki} are O(4?) Cost. Communication is O(4?) : o Each party gets 6 keys {ki} and 6 keys {Ki}
Outline o Background o Application 1: CNF-FSS More Efficient Multiparty FSS o Application 2: 1-out-of-3 CNF-FSS o Summary
Application 2: 1-out-of 3 CNF-FSS Background: o 1-out-of-2 solved in [GI14,BGI15,BGI16] (O(log n)) o Implies O(log n) for 1-out-of-3
Application 2: 1-out-of 3 CNF-FSS Background: o 1-out-of-2 solved in [GI14,BGI15,BGI16] (O(log n)) o Implies O(log n) for 1-out-of-3 o 2-out-of-3: O( ?) ([GI14,BGI15,BGI16,BKKO20]) o Gap remains: lower-bound O(log n); upper-bound O( ?)
Application 2: 1-out-of 3 CNF-FSS Background: o 1-out-of-2 solved in [GI14,BGI15,BGI16] (O(log n)) o Implies O(log n) for 1-out-of-3 o 2-out-of-3: O( ?) ([GI14,BGI15,BGI16,BKKO20]) o Gap remains: lower-bound O(log n); upper-bound O( ?) o 1-out-of-3 CNF-FSS lies between 1-out-of-3 and 2-out-of-3: o 1-out-of-3 CNF-FSS: 3 keys total, each party receives two of them o 2-out-of-3 FSS: 3 keys total, knowledge of any two of them reveals nothing o2-out-of-3 FSS 1-out-of-3 CNF-FSS
Application 2: 1-out-of 3 CNF-FSS Background: o 1-out-of-2 solved in [GI14,BGI15,BGI16] (O(log n)) o Implies O(log n) for 1-out-of-3 o 2-out-of-3: O( ?) ([GI14,BGI15,BGI16,BKKO20]) o Gap remains: lower-bound O(log n); upper-bound O( ?) o 1-out-of-3 CNF-FSS lies between 1-out-of-3 and 2-out-of-3: o 1-out-of-3 CNF-FSS: 3 keys total, each party receives two of them o 2-out-of-3 FSS: 3 keys total, knowledge of any two of them reveals nothing o2-out-of-3 FSS 1-out-of-3 CNF-FSS o 1-out-of-3 CNF-FSS sufficient in some settings o For example DORAM ([BKKO20])
Application 2: 1-out-of 3 CNF-FSS Background: o 1-out-of-2 solved in [GI14,BGI15,BGI16] (O(log n)) o Implies O(log n) for 1-out-of-3 o 2-out-of-3: O( ?) ([GI14,BGI15,BGI16,BKKO20]) o Gap remains: lower-bound O(log n); upper-bound O( ?) o 1-out-of-3 CNF-FSS lies between 1-out-of-3 and 2-out-of-3: o 1-out-of-3 CNF-FSS: 3 keys total, each party receives two of them o 2-out-of-3 FSS: 3 keys total, knowledge of any two of them reveals nothing o2-out-of-3 FSS 1-out-of-3 CNF-FSS o 1-out-of-3 CNF-FSS sufficient in some settings o For example DORAM ([BKKO20]) o So: 1-out-of-2: O(log n) 1-out-of-3 CNF-FSS 2-out-of-3: O( ?) . but where?
Application 2: 1-out-of 3 CNF-FSS Our Results: oTheorem 3 (Informal): There exists a (1, 3)-CNF-DPF scheme with communication O(log2n) oProof: Constructive
Application 2: 1-out-of 3 CNF-FSS (x0, y0) Intuition: (x1, y1) (z1, z1) o 1-out-of-2: O(log n) (z2, z2) (x2, y2) . .. (xi, yi) (xi+1, yi+1) (zi+1, zi+1) . ..
Application 2: 1-out-of 3 CNF-FSS (x0, y0) Intuition: (x1, y1) (z1, z1) o 1-out-of-2: O(log n) (z2, z2) (x2, y2) Deal information on each level to maintain variant: On-Path Seeds Distinct Off-Path Seeds Match . .. (xi, yi) (xi+1, yi+1) (zi+1, zi+1) . ..
Application 2: 1-out-of 3 CNF-FSS Intuition: P1: (ai, di) P2: (bi, di) P3: (ci, di) P1: (a P2: (b P3: (c ?, b ?, c ?, a ?) ?) ?) P1: (a1, b1) P2: (b1, c1) P3: (c1, a1) o 1-out-of-2: O(log n) . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ... o 2-out-of-3: O( ?) i ? ? ?
Application 2: 1-out-of 3 CNF-FSS Intuition: P1: (ai, di) P2: (bi, di) P3: (ci, di) P1: (a P2: (b P3: (c ?, b ?, c ?, a ?) ?) ?) P1: (a1, b1) P2: (b1, c1) P3: (c1, a1) o 1-out-of-2: O(log n) . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ... o 2-out-of-3: O( ?) i ? ? ? o ? PRG seeds satisfy invariant: Off-Path ( j i ) keys overlap P1: (aj, bj) P1: (ai, di) P2: (bj, cj) P3: (cj, aj) On-Path ( j = i ) keys don t overlap P2: (bi, di) P3: (ci, di)
Application 2: 1-out-of 3 CNF-FSS P1: (a0, d0, b0) P2: (b0, d0, c0) P3: (c0, d0, a0) Intuition: o 1-out-of-2: O(log n) P1: (a1, d1, b1) P2: (b1, d1, c1) P3: (c1, d1, a1) P1: (a1, b1, c1) P2: (b1, c1, a1) P3: (c1, a1, b1) o 2-out-of-3: O( ?) o Combine these approaches . .. . ..
Application 2: 1-out-of 3 CNF-FSS P1: (a0, d0, b0) P2: (b0, d0, c0) P3: (c0, d0, a0) Intuition: o 1-out-of-2: O(log n) P1: (a1, d1, b1) P2: (b1, d1, c1) P3: (c1, d1, a1) P1: (a1, b1, c1) P2: (b1, c1, a1) P3: (c1, a1, b1) o 2-out-of-3: O( ?) o Combine these approaches . .. Deal information on each level to maintain variant: On-Path: 4 Distinct seeds: 1 common to all, each pair has 1 overlapping Off-Path: 3 Distinct seeds: Each pair has all three . ..
Outline o Background o Application 1: CNF-FSS More Efficient Multiparty FSS o Application 2: 1-out-of-3 CNF-FSS o Summary
Summary o Our Results: o Defined CNF FSS o Demonstrated utility of CNF-FSS for making better (standard) t-out-of-p FSS o Construction of (1, 3) CNF-FSS, with near-optimal communication (and superior to (standard) 2-out-of-3 FSS) o Applications: o More efficient (t, p)-FSS protocols o DORAM [BKKO20] o Fault tolerance/redundancy o Open Problems: o (2, 3)-FSS in o( ? ) communication o More efficient (t, p)-FSS protocols (close remaining gap) o Other applications of CNF-FSS?
Questions? Thank You!