Theoretical Issues in Psychology: Philosophy of Science and Mind
B&LdeJ
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T
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Philosophy of Science
and
Philosophy of Mind
for
Psychologists
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Chapter 3
Philosophy of science (1)
•
Positivism and demarcation
•
Wittgenstein and language games
•
Problems for empirism:
•
Sellars and the Myth of the Given
•
Quine and epistemological holism
•
Hanson and theory-ladenness
•
Popper and falsification
•
Kuhn and paradigms
•
Lakatos and research programmes
•
Feyerabend and methodological anarchism
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p
o
s
i
t
i
v
i
s
m
1
8
5
0
A. Comte
1920s
1960s
E. Mach
l
o
g
i
c
a
l
o
r
n
e
o
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
i
s
m
post-positivism
Wiener Kreis
P
o
s
i
t
i
v
i
s
m
and its decline
Kuhn, Feyerabend
Quine
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The Vienna Circle (Wiener Kreis) 1920s
Rudolf Carnap
Moritz Schlick
Otto Neurath
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L
o
g
i
c
a
l
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
i
s
m
:
t
h
e
‘
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
’
(
o
r
‘
r
e
c
e
i
v
e
d
’
)
v
i
e
w
o
f
s
c
i
e
n
c
e
•
Two sources for real knowledge: empirical data and logical
reasoning.
•
Science is cumulative, progressive.
•
Scientism: only science provides true knowledge.
•
Science should be free from values (objectivism).
•
Tasks of philosophy of science is
normative
.
The ‘received view’ of science.
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The ingredients for science
according to positivism
•
Empirism and realism (or: instrumentalism).
•
Explanation: deducing facts from laws (DN-model).
•
Observation statements:
foundations.
•
Verification and operationalisation.
•
Logical inferences and connections
unobservables connected to observations.
•
Justification: stress on method and norms
All this makes possible:
certainty
; and
demarcation
of science from religion, metaphysics,
ideology and nonsense.
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7
•
Elementary facts
observation statements plus
logical connections between them.
•
A neutral observation statement pictures an
elementary fact (‘
Protokolls
ätze
’
e.g. meter
readings).
•
Theory and unobservables only by virtue of
connections with observations
(theories should
be determined by data)
a
g
a
i
n
s
t
:
u
n
o
b
s
e
r
v
a
b
l
e
s
,
s
p
e
c
u
l
a
t
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o
n
s
,
m
e
t
a
p
h
y
s
i
c
s
,
a
p
r
i
o
r
i
t
h
e
o
r
y
.
Logical positivism: empiricism plus logic
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The scientific process according to
positivists
•
Observation:
data gathering (fact finding).
•
Generalization:
formulating laws (induction).
•
Verification:
finding / searching for new facts.
•
Explanation:
subsuming new facts (deduction).
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Positivism in psychology: behaviorism
•
Elementary observations:
stimuli & responses
•
Laws predict behavior.
•
Operationalization:
e.g. learning is observable
(and quantifiable) behavior (Thorndike).
•
Unobservables
(e.g. ‘drive’) as hypothetical
constructs in ‘black box’.
C
a
r
n
a
p
:
P
s
y
c
h
o
l
o
g
i
e
i
n
p
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r
S
p
r
a
c
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(
P
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o
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g
y
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n
p
h
y
s
i
c
a
l
l
a
n
g
u
a
g
e
)
(
1
9
3
2
)
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Critics of positivism
1960s and 70s
Quine
Sellars
Wittgenstein
Hanson
Kuhn
Popper
Lakatos
Feyerabend
B&LdeJ
11
The essence of early criticism
of positivism
is mainly epistemological, because
it emphasizes that ...
scientific objectivity cannot exist by
virtue of neutral observation of alleged
pure data out of the outside world;
objective observations
in this sense are not possible at all.
Post-positivist critics
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12
Sellars exposes the ‘Myth of the
Given
’
The myth implies:
•
that we receive pure sense data;
•
that each individual has direct knowledge of,
and has a priviledged access to these mental
states;
•
that this introspective knowledge is indisputable
(this is called ‘1st person’ knowledge).
Sellars:
this knowledge is a myth;
there are no
pure observations.
B&LdeJ
13
Quine: epistemic holism
•
A single observation statement does not reflect
a single state of affairs; it is not verifiable in
isolation.
•
Observation statements are part of whole
networks of beliefs, of whole theories: hence,
they are only meaningful in the context of a
theory.
•
There is no sharp distinction between empirical
and theoretical statements.
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Wittgenstein ‘I’ (
Tractatus
,1921)
picture theory
: language
refers to reality by means
of isomorphic logical structure,
meaning is reference.
Wittgenstein ‘II’ (
Phil. Investigations,
1953):
language utterance is part of a whole
s
y
s
t
e
m
o
f
l
a
n
g
u
a
g
e
:
l
a
n
g
u
a
g
e
g
a
m
e
(‘
an activity, or form of life’
);
‘
meaning is use’
:
importance of social context.
R
e
l
a
t
i
v
i
s
m
truth depends
on user
P
r
a
g
m
a
t
i
s
m
truth is what works
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Hanson (
Patterns of Discovery,
1958):
‘theory ladenness’ of observations:
‘
to see
is: to see as’
What do you see?
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16
No separation of observation and theory:
‘seeing as’, intrepreted through theory.
Two astronomers watching the same
sunrise see different things:
Tycho Brahe (geocentric view): sun rises.
Kepler (heliocentric): earth rises.
Hanson (
Patterns of Discovery,
1958): ‘theory ladenness’ of
observations: ‘
to see
is: to see as’
Gestalt-Switch
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S
e
l
l
a
r
s
:
t
h
a
t
t
h
e
s
o
-
c
a
l
l
e
d
‘
G
i
v
e
n
’
(
t
h
e
‘
d
a
t
a
’
)
is indisputable is a myth.
Q
u
i
n
e
:
o
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
t
a
t
e
m
e
n
t
s
a
r
e
p
a
r
t
o
f
whole theories.
W
i
t
t
g
e
n
s
t
e
i
n
I
I
:
t
h
e
m
e
a
n
i
n
g
o
f
a
w
o
r
d
i
s
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
o
n
the language game of which it is a part;
therefore its meaning is shown by how it is used.
H
a
n
s
o
n
:
o
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
i
s
t
h
e
o
r
y
l
a
d
e
n
;
to see is to see
as.
The criticism once more:
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Karl Popper (1902–1994)
•
Opposed to logical positivism.
•
Opposed to Kuhn.
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L
o
g
i
c
a
l
-
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
i
s
m
:
•
induction;
•
generalisation;
•
verification.
Popper vs logical positivism
A generalisation cannot
be verified: not all cases
can be examined
(
induction problem
).
A generalisation can be
falsified: one counter-
example is enough.
Science is taking risks:
confirmation uninteresting,
no dogmatism.
P
o
p
p
e
r
’
s
conclusion:
the
criterion of
science is:
F
A
L
S
I
F
I
A
B
I
L
I
T
Y
B&LdeJ
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modus tollens:
p > q
~ q
~ p
modus ponens:
p > q
p
q
Some logic:
two modes of inferences
p > q
q
p
T> P
~ P
~ T
Popper’s
logic of
falsification:
or
B&LdeJ
21
The positivist Hans Reichenbach (1930)
‘The principle of induction is of supreme importance
for scientific method; it determines the truth of
scientific theories. To eliminate it from science would
mean nothing less than to deprive science of the
power to decide the truth or falsity of its theories.
Science would no longer have the right to distinguish
its theories from the fanciful and arbitrary creations
of the poet’s mind.’
B&LdeJ
22
Popper on the problem of induction (1959)
‘Many people believe that the truth of universal
statements is “known by experience”; yet it is clear
that an account of an experience, e.g., an
observation, can in the first place be only a
singular statement and not a universal one. And it
is far from obvious, from a logical point of view,
that we are justified in inferring universal
statements from singular ones no matter how
numerous. For any conclusion drawn in this way
may always turn out to be false.’
B&LdeJ
23
Popper: on
falsifiability, testability
‘What characterises the empirical method is its
manner of exposing to falsification, in every
conceivable way, the system to be tested. Its aim
is not to save the lives of untenable systems but,
on the contrary, to select the one which is by
comparison the fittest, by exposing them all to
the fiercest struggle for survival’
B&LdeJ
24
Kuhn:
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
(1962)
don’t prescribe
,
but describe scientific development
•
Normal science:
working in the traditional way, under the
umbrella of the actual paradigm.
•
Paradigm is theory as well as methods & techniques as well
as social organisation.
•
Anomalies
–
crisis
–
scientific revolution
–
paradigm-shift
(
Gestalt switch
).
•
Paradigms are
incommensurable.
paradigm
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25
Gestalt switch
B&LdeJ
26
•
An evaluative order of paradigms is not possible
because there are no ahistorical criteria.
•
No rational justification outside paradigm.
•
No
‘
foundationalism’.
•
No cumulation of truth.
•
No progress in science.
•
Relativism not realism.
Kuhn: incommensurability
B&LdeJ
27
Pre-paradigm (just collection of data, no framework):
Pre-paradigm (just collection of data, no framework):
Paradigm (normal science between revolutions: puzzle
Paradigm (normal science between revolutions: puzzle
solving):
solving):
Crisis (anomalie
Crisis (anomalie
s
s
):
):
Revolution (paradigm loses grip, promise of new
Revolution (paradigm loses grip, promise of new
methods, criteria, institutions):
methods, criteria, institutions):
New paradigm (normal science):
New paradigm (normal science):
Next crisis.
Next crisis.
•
Within paradigm: puzzle solving, filling in the details,
Within paradigm: puzzle solving, filling in the details,
dogmatism, indispensable for progress.
dogmatism, indispensable for progress.
•
Between paradigms revolution, indispensable for
Between paradigms revolution, indispensable for
renewal (cf Popper).
renewal (cf Popper).
Kuhn: paradigms and revolutions
B&LdeJ
28
Kuhn’s philosophy of science
•
Not normative: no
pre
scription;
•
but descriptive: describing what scientists really do
therefore:
c
o
n
t
e
x
t
o
f
d
i
s
c
o
v
e
r
y
c
o
n
t
e
x
t
o
f
j
u
s
t
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
B&LdeJ
29
Once more
Popper’s position:
against
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
i
s
m
:
not verification,
but falsification
against
K
u
h
n
’
s
relativism:
falsification,
rational rejection
possible
no dogmatism
or conservatism
B&LdeJ
30
I
m
r
e
L
a
k
a
t
o
s
(
1
9
2
2
–
1
9
7
4
)
Combines elements of Kuhn’s paradigm
(dogmatism/conservatism)
and Popper’s falsificationalism (competion/progress):
rational reconstruction
of scientific progress is possible
and relativism can be avoided
research programme:
hard-core of
theoretical
statements
protective
belt of auxilliary
hypotheses
B&LdeJ
31
I
m
r
e
L
a
k
a
t
o
s
(
1
9
2
2
–
1
9
7
4
)
Dogmatism/conservatism
within
research programs
and progress and
rational choice between programs:
relativism can be avoided:
•
Degenerating research program: just more and
Degenerating research program: just more and
more ad-hoc hypotheses;
more ad-hoc hypotheses;
•
Progressive research programs: ad-hoc
Progressive research programs: ad-hoc
hypotheses lead to new predictions, data,
hypotheses lead to new predictions, data,
applications;
applications;
•
Competition: rational choice, not just mob
Competition: rational choice, not just mob
psychology (contra Kuhn);
psychology (contra Kuhn);
•
Post-hoc, no
Post-hoc, no
a priori
a priori
demarcation (contra
demarcation (contra
falsificationism).
falsificationism).
B&LdeJ
32
Paul Feyerabend (1924–1994)
•
No context-free rationality and
foundations.
•
Against method
(1975): methodological
anarchism: methodological
law-and-
order
hampers science.
•
Therefore: ‘
Anything goes’; no
demarcation.
•
Radicalises Kuhn’s relativism.
•
Science blooms by wild ideas and is not
different from ideology and myth.
•
Science in a Free Society
(1978).
B&LdeJ
33
‘Arguments from methodology do not establish the
excellence of science.
There is no “scientific method”. Every project, every theory,
every procedure has to be judged on its own merits and by
standards adapted to the processes with which it deals. The
idea of a universal and stable
method
that is an unchanging
measure of adequacy and even the idea of a universal and
stable measuring instrument that measures any magnitude,
no matter what the circumstances.
[T]here is not a single rule, however plausible and however
firmly grounded in logic and general philosophy that is not
violated at some time or other.’
(
Science in a Free Society
1978: p. 98)
Feyerabend: historicity of rationality
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34
‘Philosophical relativism is the doctrine that all traditions,
theories, ideas are equally true or equally false or, in an even
more radical formulation, that any distribution of truth values
over traditions is acceptable. This form of relativism is
nowhere defended in the present book. It is not asserted, for
example, that Aristotle is as good as Einstein; it is asserted
and argued that “Aristotle is true” is a judgement that
presupposes a certain tradition; it is a relational judgement
that may change when the underlying tradition is changed.
There are standards, but they come from the research process
itself, not from abstract views of rationality.’
(Science in a Free Society
1978: p. 83 en 99)
Feyerabend: relativism?
B&LdeJ
35
Conclusion:
demarcation and rationality?
•
Logical positivism: yes, by verification.
•
Popper: yes, by falsification.
•
Kuhn: no, because relativism.
•
Lakatos: yes in retrospect (rational reconstruction).
•
Feyerabend: no, no context-free rationality.
Exploring the philosophy of science in psychology, this content delves into key concepts such as positivism, logical positivism, the Vienna Circle, and the scientific process according to positivists. It discusses influential thinkers like Wittgenstein, Popper, Kuhn, and Feyerabend, shedding light on the evolution of positivism and its decline from the 1920s to the 1960s.
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Presentation Transcript
Theoretical Issues in Psychology Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of Mind for Psychologists B&LdeJ 1
Chapter 3 Philosophy of science (1) Positivism and demarcation Wittgenstein and language games Problems for empirism: Sellars and the Myth of the Given Quine and epistemological holism Hanson and theory-ladenness Popper and falsification Kuhn and paradigms Lakatos and research programmes Feyerabend and methodological anarchism B&LdeJ 2
Positivism and its decline 1920s 1850 1960s B&LdeJ 3
The Vienna Circle (Wiener Kreis) 1920s Moritz Schlick Rudolf Carnap Otto Neurath B&LdeJ 4
Logical positivism: the standard (or received ) view of science Two sources for real knowledge: empirical data and logical reasoning. Science is cumulative, progressive. Scientism: only science provides true knowledge. Science should be free from values (objectivism). Tasks of philosophy of science is normative. norms demarcation justification The received view of science. B&LdeJ 5
The ingredients for science according to positivism Empirism and realism (or: instrumentalism). Explanation: deducing facts from laws (DN-model). Observation statements: foundations. Verification and operationalisation. Logical inferences and connections unobservables connected to observations. Justification: stress on method and norms All this makes possible: certainty; and demarcation of science from religion, metaphysics, ideology and nonsense. B&LdeJ 6
Logical positivism: empiricism plus logic Elementary facts observation statements plus logical connections between them. A neutral observation statement pictures an elementary fact ( Protokolls tze e.g. meter readings). Theory and unobservables only by virtue of connections with observations (theories should be determined by data) against: unobservables, speculations, metaphysics, a priori theory. B&LdeJ 7
The scientific process according to positivists Observation: data gathering (fact finding). Generalization: formulating laws (induction). Verification: finding / searching for new facts. Explanation: subsuming new facts (deduction). B&LdeJ 8
Positivism in psychology: behaviorism Elementary observations: stimuli & responses Laws predict behavior. Operationalization: e.g. learning is observable (and quantifiable) behavior (Thorndike). Unobservables (e.g. drive ) as hypothetical constructs in black box . Carnap: Psychologie in physikalischer Sprache (Psychology in physical language) (1932) B&LdeJ 9
Critics of positivism 1960s and 70s Quine Sellars Wittgenstein Hanson Kuhn Popper Lakatos Feyerabend B&LdeJ 10
Post-positivist critics The essence of early criticism of positivism is mainly epistemological, because it emphasizes that ... scientific objectivity cannot exist by virtue of neutral observation of alleged pure data out of the outside world; objective observations in this sense are not possible at all. B&LdeJ 11
Sellars exposes the Myth of the Given The myth implies: that we receive pure sense data; that each individual has direct knowledge of, and has a priviledged access to these mental states; that this introspective knowledge is indisputable (this is called 1st person knowledge). Sellars: this knowledge is a myth; there are no pure observations. B&LdeJ 12
Quine: epistemic holism A single observation statement does not reflect a single state of affairs; it is not verifiable in isolation. Observation statements are part of whole networks of beliefs, of whole theories: hence, they are only meaningful in the context of a theory. There is no sharp distinction between empirical and theoretical statements. B&LdeJ 13
Wittgenstein I ( Tractatus,1921) picture theory: language refers to reality by means of isomorphic logical structure, meaning is reference. Wittgenstein II (Phil. Investigations, 1953): language utterance is part of a whole system of language: language game ( an activity, or form of life ); meaning is use : importance of social context. Relativism truth depends on user Pragmatism truth is what works B&LdeJ 14
Hanson (Patterns of Discovery, 1958): theory ladenness of observations: to see is: to see as What do you see? B&LdeJ 15
Hanson (Patterns of Discovery, 1958): theory ladenness of observations: to see is: to see as No separation of observation and theory: seeing as , intrepreted through theory. Two astronomers watching the same sunrise see different things: Tycho Brahe (geocentric view): sun rises. Kepler (heliocentric): earth rises. Gestalt-Switch B&LdeJ 16
The criticism once more: Sellars: that the so-called Given (the data ) is indisputable is a myth. Quine: observation statements are part of whole theories. Wittgenstein II: the meaning of a word is dependent on the language game of which it is a part; therefore its meaning is shown by how it is used. Hanson: observation is theory laden; to see is to see as. B&LdeJ 17
Karl Popper (19021994) Opposed to logical positivism. Opposed to Kuhn. B&LdeJ 18
Popper vs logical positivism A generalisation cannot be verified: not all cases can be examined (induction problem). Logical-positivism: induction; generalisation; verification. Popper s conclusion: the criterion of science is: FALSIFIABILITY A generalisation can be falsified: one counter- example is enough. Science is taking risks: confirmation uninteresting, no dogmatism. B&LdeJ 19
Some logic: two modes of inferences modus ponens: p > q p q p > q q p Popper s logic of falsification: modus tollens: p > q ~ q ~ p T> P ~ P ~ T or B&LdeJ 20
The positivist Hans Reichenbach (1930) The principle of induction is of supreme importance for scientific method; it determines the truth of scientific theories. To eliminate it from science would mean nothing less than to deprive science of the power to decide the truth or falsity of its theories. Science would no longer have the right to distinguish its theories from the fanciful and arbitrary creations of the poet s mind. B&LdeJ 21
Popper on the problem of induction (1959) Many people believe that the truth of universal statements is known by experience ; yet it is clear that an account of an experience, e.g., an observation, can in the first place be only a singular statement and not a universal one. And it is far from obvious, from a logical point of view, that we are justified statements from singular ones no matter how numerous. For any conclusion drawn in this way may always turn out to be false. in inferring universal B&LdeJ 22
Popper: on falsifiability, testability What characterises the empirical method is its manner of exposing to falsification, in every conceivable way, the system to be tested. Its aim is not to save the lives of untenable systems but, on the contrary, to select the one which is by comparison the fittest, by exposing them all to the fiercest struggle for survival B&LdeJ 23
Kuhn: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) don t prescribe, but describe scientific development paradigm Normal science: working in the traditional way, under the umbrella of the actual paradigm. Paradigm is theory as well as methods & techniques as well as social organisation. Anomalies crisis scientific revolution paradigm-shift (Gestalt switch). Paradigms are incommensurable. B&LdeJ 24
Gestalt switch B&LdeJ 25
Kuhn: incommensurability An evaluative order of paradigms is not possible because there are no ahistorical criteria. No rational justification outside paradigm. No foundationalism . No cumulation of truth. No progress in science. Relativism not realism. B&LdeJ 26
Kuhn: paradigms and revolutions Pre-paradigm (just collection of data, no framework): Paradigm (normal science between revolutions: puzzle solving): Crisis (anomalies): Revolution (paradigm loses grip, promise of new methods, criteria, institutions): New paradigm (normal science): Next crisis. Within paradigm: puzzle solving, filling in the details, dogmatism, indispensable for progress. Between paradigms revolution, indispensable for renewal (cf Popper). B&LdeJ 27
Kuhns philosophy of science Not normative: no prescription; but descriptive: describing what scientists really do therefore: context of discovery context of justification B&LdeJ 28
Once more Popper s position: against Kuhn s relativism: falsification, rational rejection possible against positivism: not verification, but falsification no dogmatism or conservatism B&LdeJ 29
Imre Lakatos (19221974) Combines elements of Kuhn s paradigm (dogmatism/conservatism) and Popper s falsificationalism (competion/progress): rational reconstruction of scientific progress is possible and relativism can be avoided research programme: hard-core of theoretical statements protective belt of auxilliary hypotheses B&LdeJ 30
Imre Lakatos (19221974) Dogmatism/conservatism within research programs and progress and rational choice between programs: relativism can be avoided: Degenerating research program: just more and more ad-hoc hypotheses; Progressive research programs: ad-hoc hypotheses lead to new predictions, data, applications; Competition: rational choice, not just mob psychology (contra Kuhn); Post-hoc, no a priori demarcation (contra falsificationism). B&LdeJ 31
Paul Feyerabend (19241994) No context-free rationality and foundations. Against method (1975): methodological anarchism: methodological law-and- order hampers science. Therefore: Anything goes ; no demarcation. Radicalises Kuhn s relativism. Science blooms by wild ideas and is not different from ideology and myth. Science in a Free Society (1978). B&LdeJ 32
Feyerabend: historicity of rationality from methodology do not establish the Arguments excellence of science. There is no scientific method . Every project, every theory, every procedure has to be judged on its own merits and by standards adapted to the processes with which it deals. The idea of a universal and stable method that is an unchanging measure of adequacy and even the idea of a universal and stable measuring instrument that measures any magnitude, no matter what the circumstances. [T]here is not a single rule, however plausible and however firmly grounded in logic and general philosophy that is not violated at some time or other. (Science in a Free Society 1978: p. 98) B&LdeJ 33
Feyerabend: relativism? Philosophical relativism is the doctrine that all traditions, theories, ideas are equally true or equally false or, in an even more radical formulation, that any distribution of truth values over traditions is acceptable. This form of relativism is nowhere defended in the present book. It is not asserted, for example, that Aristotle is as good as Einstein; it is asserted and argued that Aristotle is true is a judgement that presupposes a certain tradition; it is a relational judgement that may change when the underlying tradition is changed. There are standards, but they come from the research process itself, not from abstract views of rationality. (Science in a Free Society 1978: p. 83 en 99) B&LdeJ 34
Conclusion: demarcation and rationality? Logical positivism: yes, by verification. Popper: yes, by falsification. Kuhn: no, because relativism. Lakatos: yes in retrospect (rational reconstruction). Feyerabend: no, no context-free rationality. B&LdeJ 35
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