Rise of Inequality in UK and Western Europe
Debt, Real Estate, and the Rise of
Inequality in the UK and Western
Europe from 1970
Avner Offer
University of Oxford
GLOBAL DEBT DYNAMICS INITIATIVE
University of Sussex, 26 May 2016
Piketty model of inequality: r>g
•
If not for last forty years, he would be wrong all the time
•
What happened in last forty years?
Piketty wrong 70 percent of the time
Alvarez et al. 2013
Two Stories: Money and Housing
(1) THE MONEY STORY
•
Up to 1970s, credit repression.
•
Fixed exchange rates: Bretton Woods, Gold Standard
•
1970s: floating exchange rates.
•
Justified by faith in markets.
•
Credit de-regulated.
•
Where does money come from? Not from depositors.
•
Originated by commercial banks. Does not require
‘intermediation’ or prior deposits.
Endogenous money
theory
.
•
Evidence: Bank balance sheets (assets, loans)
grow tenfold as
percentage of GDP.
In UK, from 0.5 of GDP to five times GDP.
•
No other plausible source of liquidity for such an increase in
deposits.
•
Banks create money by lending it.
(2) THE HOUSING STORY
•
But money not easy to lend.
•
De-industrialisation: shortage of productive investments.
•
International trade imbalances add pressure to lend.
•
Housing - ideal asset: built-in collateral. Demand insatiable: rises with
income. Subsistence and status good. Largest consumer expenditure.
•
House prices driven by credit. Credit used for price-bidding
competition. Competition cannot be avoided.
•
Pays off. Wealth grows faster than debt. Also of paid-off housing.
Housing windfall economy. Everyone seems to benefit.
•
Two-thirds of population. Social and political support from wealthy.
•
Tax relief:
Imputed rental not taxed, mortgage interest deductions, no
capital gains tax, regressive local taxation, low/no inheritance tax.
•
Releases income for more borrowing and higher house prices.
•
WINDFALL NEEDS CREDIT TO CONTINUE.
Household debt rises much faster than income
Isaksen et al., 2011
Housing wealth grows faster than debt
Isaksen et al., 2011
Top category is balancing item, not truly household wealth
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Loose credit drives inequality and instability
•
Debt service takes rising share of labour income. Falling labour share
of GDP.
•
Young and low-earners unable to buy. Housing shortage and inequality.
Housing/social crisis. ‘Lost generation’ of renters.
•
Intermediaries (FIRE) take a big cut. Sector 14-35% of GDP in UK.
•
Debt service withdrawn from consumption of goods and services
•
Transfers from spenders to hoarders.
•
From public goods (taxation) to rentiers/lenders.
•
Depresses demand, economic activity, and public services.
•
Prices labour out of international competition.
•
Borrowers unable to service loans. Financial crisis.
•
Collapse of wealth effects, and of construction outlays and
employment as well.
•
Creditors bailed out by taxpayers paid by means of austerity.
•
Quantitative Easing inflates asset values. Increase debt overhang.
•
Economic stagnation, slow/no recovery.
Debt Service Ratios percent of GDP and Crisis Dates
Drehmann & Juselius, 2012
Global Stock of debt outstanding, 2000-2014
$ trillion, constant 2013 exchange rates
McKinsey, 2015
Debt as percent of
2000 2007 2014
GDP 246% 269% 286%
What to do?
•
Just now Piketty is right: Since 1980s r>g (financial return
higher than economic growth).
•
Unstable equilibrium drives rising inequality. Heading for a
crash.
•
Thirty years of life-cycle spent paying for housing.
•
Privatisation of education, health, pensions/care extends rent
extraction further over the life-cycle.
•
Policy Principle: Regulate private credit. Quantitative controls.
•
Restrict credit growth to productive economy. Both efficient
and equitable.
•
Won’t solve existing debt overhang. What to do about that?
•
Drastic proposals: inflation, write-offs, sovereign money.
•
The choice: drastic action now or a drastic crisis later?
•
Current policy preference is for a drastic crisis later.
References
•
Alvaredo et al., ‘
The Top 1 Percent in International and
•
Historical Perspective’,
J. Econ. Lit.
27, 3 (2013), 3-20.
•
M. Drehmann and M. Juselius, ‘Do Debt Service Costs affect
Macroeconomic and Financial Stability?’,
BIS Quarterly Review
,
Sept. 2012, 21-35.
•
J. Isaksen et al., ‘Household Balance Sheets and Debt – an
International Country Study’,
Danmarks Nationalbank Monetary
Review
4/1 (2011), 47-58.
•
McKinsey Global Institute, ‘Debt and (not too much) Deleveraging’
(February 2015).
•
A. Offer, ‘Narrow Banking, Real Estate, and Financial Stability in the
UK, c. 1870-2010’, in Nicholas Dimsdale and Anthony Hotson, (eds.)
British Financial Crises since 1825
(Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2014), 158-173.
This discusses the correlation between debt, real estate, and inequality in the UK and Western Europe since 1970. It highlights the impact of housing wealth, credit dynamics, and economic policies on social and political structures.
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Presentation Transcript
Debt, Real Estate, and the Rise of Inequality in the UK and Western Europe from 1970 Avner Offer University of Oxford GLOBAL DEBT DYNAMICS INITIATIVE University of Sussex, 26 May 2016
Piketty model of inequality: r>g Piketty wrong 70 percent of the time Alvarez et al. 2013 If not for last forty years, he would be wrong all the time What happened in last forty years?
Two Stories: Money and Housing (1) THE MONEY STORY Up to 1970s, credit repression. Fixed exchange rates: Bretton Woods, Gold Standard 1970s: floating exchange rates. Justified by faith in markets. Credit de-regulated. Where does money come from? Not from depositors. Originated by commercial banks. Does not require intermediation or prior deposits. Endogenous money theory. Evidence: Bank balance sheets (assets, loans) grow tenfold as percentage of GDP. In UK, from 0.5 of GDP to five times GDP. No other plausible source of liquidity for such an increase in deposits. Banks create money by lending it.
(2) THE HOUSING STORY But money not easy to lend. De-industrialisation: shortage of productive investments. International trade imbalances add pressure to lend. Housing - ideal asset: built-in collateral. Demand insatiable: rises with income. Subsistence and status good. Largest consumer expenditure. House prices driven by credit. Credit used for price-bidding competition. Competition cannot be avoided. Pays off. Wealth grows faster than debt. Also of paid-off housing. Housing windfall economy. Everyone seems to benefit. Two-thirds of population. Social and political support from wealthy. Tax relief: Imputed rental not taxed, mortgage interest deductions, no capital gains tax, regressive local taxation, low/no inheritance tax. Releases income for more borrowing and higher house prices. WINDFALL NEEDS CREDIT TO CONTINUE.
Household debt rises much faster than income Isaksen et al., 2011
Housing wealth grows faster than debt Isaksen et al., 2011 Top category is balancing item, not truly household wealth
Loose credit drives inequality and instability Debt service takes rising share of labour income. Falling labour share of GDP. Young and low-earners unable to buy. Housing shortage and inequality. Housing/social crisis. Lost generation of renters. Intermediaries (FIRE) take a big cut. Sector 14-35% of GDP in UK. Debt service withdrawn from consumption of goods and services Transfers from spenders to hoarders. From public goods (taxation) to rentiers/lenders. Depresses demand, economic activity, and public services. Prices labour out of international competition. Borrowers unable to service loans. Financial crisis. Collapse of wealth effects, and of construction outlays and employment as well. Creditors bailed out by taxpayers paid by means of austerity. Quantitative Easing inflates asset values. Increase debt overhang. Economic stagnation, slow/no recovery.
Debt Service Ratios percent of GDP and Crisis Dates Drehmann & Juselius, 2012
Global Stock of debt outstanding, 2000-2014 $ trillion, constant 2013 exchange rates Debt as percent of 2000 2007 2014 GDP 246% 269% 286% McKinsey, 2015
What to do? Just now Piketty is right: Since 1980s r>g (financial return higher than economic growth). Unstable equilibrium drives rising inequality. Heading for a crash. Thirty years of life-cycle spent paying for housing. Privatisation of education, health, pensions/care extends rent extraction further over the life-cycle. Policy Principle: Regulate private credit. Quantitative controls. Restrict credit growth to productive economy. Both efficient and equitable. Won t solve existing debt overhang. What to do about that? Drastic proposals: inflation, write-offs, sovereign money. The choice: drastic action now or a drastic crisis later? Current policy preference is for a drastic crisis later.
References Alvaredo et al., The Top 1 Percent in International and Historical Perspective , J. Econ. Lit. 27, 3 (2013), 3-20. M. Drehmann and M. Juselius, Do Debt Service Costs affect Macroeconomic and Financial Stability? , BIS Quarterly Review, Sept. 2012, 21-35. J. Isaksen et al., Household Balance Sheets and Debt an International Country Study , Danmarks Nationalbank Monetary Review 4/1 (2011), 47-58. McKinsey Global Institute, Debt and (not too much) Deleveraging (February 2015). A. Offer, Narrow Banking, Real Estate, and Financial Stability in the UK, c. 1870-2010 , in Nicholas Dimsdale and Anthony Hotson, (eds.) British Financial Crises since 1825 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 158-173.
