Privacy Concerns with Location-Aware Onion Routing
This content delves into the challenges and risks associated with Location-Aware Onion Routing, highlighting how it can inadvertently leak sensitive location information. Various issues such as website fingerprinting, traffic inspection, and deanonymization are explored, emphasizing the importance of addressing these vulnerabilities to safeguard user privacy and security in online communications.
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Presentation Transcript
Location-Aware Onion Routing Aaron Johnson U.S. Naval Research Laboratory IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy May 19, 2015
Background: Onion Routing Users Onion Routers Destinations 2
Background: Onion Routing Users Onion Routers Destinations Website fingerprinting 3
Background: Onion Routing Users Onion Routers Destinations Website fingerprinting Traffic inspection and modification 4
Background: Onion Routing Users Onion Routers Destinations Website fingerprinting Traffic inspection and modification Deanonymization by correlation 5
Location-Aware Onion Routing 1. LASTor: A Low-Latency AS-Aware Tor Client Akhoondi, Yu, and Madhyastha IEEE S&P 2012 2. AS-awareness in Tor Path Selection Edman and Syverson ACM CCS 2009 8
Problems 1. Location-awareness leaks location information 9
Problem 1: Location-awareness leaks location information 10
Problem 1: Location-awareness leaks location information 11
Problem 1: Location-awareness leaks location information 12
Problem 1: Location-awareness leaks location information 13
Problems 1. Location-awareness leaks location information 2. Internet routing maps are low quality 14
Problems 1. Location-awareness leaks location information 2. Internet routing maps are low quality Simulated AS/IXP independent path selection had 11% weekly failure rate*. *Defending Tor from Network Adversaries: A Case Study of Network Path Prediction Joshua Juen*, Aaron Johnson, Anupam Das, Nikita Borisov, and Matthew Caesar Proceedings on PETS, July 2015 (expected) 15
Problems 1. Location-awareness leaks location information 2. Internet routing maps are low quality 3. Routing is not secured 16
Problems 1. Location-awareness leaks location information 2. Internet routing maps are low quality 3. Routing is not secured * Adversaries can manipulate Internet routing via BGP hijacks (to discover the users using specific Tor guard nodes) and interceptions (to perform traffic analysis). *RAPTOR: Routing Attacks on Privacy in Tor Yixin Sun, Anne Edmundson, Laurent Vanbever, Oscar Li, Jennifer Rexford, Mung Chiang, Prateek Mittal USENIX Security 2015 (to appear) 17
Conclusion Location-aware onion routing: Aaron Johnson U.S. Naval Research Laboratory aaron.m.johnson@nrl.navy.mil 18
