Michela Massimi : Four Kinds of Perspectival Truth

 
Michela
Massimi
:
 Four
Kinds of
Perspectival
Truth
 
Philosophy of Science Core Seminar (HPS 2101)
September 2022
 
The Main
Thesis
 
It is possible to be realist about science, while
also taking on board the situated and perspectival
nature of our scientific knowledge claims.
 
Central Thesis of Perspectival Realism
 
States of affairs about the world are perspective-independent; whereas our
scientific knowledge claims about these states of affairs are perspective
dependent.
 
Perspectival
Truth
 
Provides the missing link between perspective-
independent states of affairs and perspective-
dependent knowledge claims.
 
Minimal
Realist
Commitment
 
A commitment that proves resilient to
challenges from the history of
science, or rival inconsistent models
in contemporary science.
Getting things right 
is at the heart of
the realist programme.
Getting things right 
is not the aim of
science, because it is not what
science should 
aspire to
. Instead, it is
what science 
ought to 
do by realist
lights.
 
Three Kinds of Perspectival Truth
 
 
The Unqualified Version
 
(P) 
Perspective-dependence. 
Knowledge claims in science are dependent on a given
historically and/or intellectually situated scientific perspective.
 
First Version
(Propositional
Contents)
 
(P
1
) 
Perspective-dependence
1
. Knowledge
claims in science are perspective-
dependent
1
 when their 
propositional
contents 
depend on the scientific
perspective in which such claims are made.
(P
1
) captures what might be called a form
of 
perspective-indexicality.
 
 
Second
Version
(Truth-
values)
 
(P
2
) 
Perspective-dependence
2
. Knowledge
claims in science are perspective-
dependent
2
 when their 
truth-values
 depend
on the scientific perspective in which such
knowledge claims are made.
(P
2
) captures a form of perspective-relativity.
 
Third Version
(Truth-
conditions)
 
(P
3
) 
Perspective-dependence
3
. Knowledge
claims in science are perspective-
dependent
3 
when their 
truth-conditions
depend on the scientific perspective in
which such claims are made.
(P3) captures a form of perspective-
sensitivity
 
Forth Version (Truth-conditions+)
 
(P4) 
Perspective-dependence
4
. Knowledge claims in science
are perspective-dependent
4 
when their 
truth-conditions
depend on the scientific perspective in which such claims
are made. 
Yet such knowledge claims must also be
assessable from the point of view of other (subsequent or
rival) scientific perspectives.
 
This switches from the context of use, to the context of
assessment.
Context of
Assessments
 
Each scientific perspective functions then both as a 
context
of use
 and as a 
context of assessments.
Knowledge claims in science that continue to be found
(from the point of view of a new scientific perspective) as
still performing adequately, can be said to be 
true across
scientific perspectives 
and regarded as 
‘getting things
right’.
 
How this can be a standard for truth when other
perspectives are not reached independently?
Does it address the issue with realism from pessimistic
meta induction?
 
Standards of
Performance-
adequacy
 
Contextual truth-conditions should be understood in
terms of 
standards of performance-adequacy 
that a
scientific knowledge claim has to satisfy.
Examples:
Accuracy
 with respect to fundamental
mathematical equations;
Empirical testability 
within the limits of well-
defined tests;
Projectibility
 and 
heuristic fruitfulness 
across a
variety of engineering practices.
 
Why testability and fruitfulness should be considered a
standard in this context?
 
Gems and Coals
 
 The thesis is interesting but how much is it
novel?
 Given the subtle nature of the distinctions
between these perspectives, overall, she manages
to remain clear.
 In many cases she mentions a new or a better
formulation of the conclusion from the past section
in the introduction of the next section!
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Michela Massimi delves into the concept of perspectival truth, discussing how scientific knowledge claims are both situated and perspective-dependent, while states of affairs are perspective-independent. She highlights the central thesis of perspectival realism and the significance of minimal realist commitment in understanding scientific perspectives.

  • Perspectival Truth
  • Philosophy of Science
  • Scientific Realism
  • Knowledge Claims
  • Michela Massimi

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  1. Michela Massimi: Four Kinds of Perspectival Truth Philosophy of Science Core Seminar (HPS 2101) September 2022

  2. The Main Thesis It is possible to be realist about science, while also taking on board the situated and perspectival nature of our scientific knowledge claims.

  3. Central Thesis of Perspectival Realism States of affairs about the world are perspective-independent; whereas our scientific knowledge claims about these states of affairs are perspective dependent.

  4. Perspectival Truth Provides the missing link between perspective- independent states of affairs and perspective- dependent knowledge claims.

  5. Minimal Realist Commitment A commitment that proves resilient to challenges from the history of science, or rival inconsistent models in contemporary science. Getting things right is at the heart of the realist programme. Getting things right is not the aim of science, because it is not what science should aspire to. Instead, it is what science ought to do by realist lights.

  6. Three Kinds of Perspectival Truth

  7. The Unqualified Version (P) Perspective-dependence. Knowledge claims in science are dependent on a given historically and/or intellectually situated scientific perspective.

  8. First Version (Propositional Contents) (P1) Perspective-dependence1. Knowledge claims in science are perspective- dependent1when their propositional contents depend on the scientific perspective in which such claims are made. (P1) captures what might be called a form of perspective-indexicality.

  9. Second Version (Truth- values) (P2) Perspective-dependence2. Knowledge claims in science are perspective- dependent2when their truth-values depend on the scientific perspective in which such knowledge claims are made. (P2) captures a form of perspective-relativity.

  10. (P3) Perspective-dependence3. Knowledge claims in science are perspective- dependent3 when their truth-conditions depend on the scientific perspective in which such claims are made. (P3) captures a form of perspective- sensitivity Third Version (Truth- conditions)

  11. Forth Version (Truth-conditions+) (P4) Perspective-dependence4. Knowledge claims in science are perspective-dependent4 when their truth-conditions depend on the scientific perspective in which such claims are made. Yet such knowledge claims must also be assessable from the point of view of other (subsequent or rival) scientific perspectives. This switches from the context of use, to the context of assessment.

  12. Each scientific perspective functions then both as a context of use and as a context of assessments. Knowledge claims in science that continue to be found (from the point of view of a new scientific perspective) as still performing adequately, can be said to be true across scientific perspectives and regarded as getting things right . Context of Assessments How this can be a standard for truth when other perspectives are not reached independently? Does it address the issue with realism from pessimistic meta induction?

  13. Contextual truth-conditions should be understood in terms of standards of performance-adequacy that a scientific knowledge claim has to satisfy. Examples: Accuracy with respect to fundamental mathematical equations; Empirical testability within the limits of well- defined tests; Projectibility and heuristic fruitfulness across a variety of engineering practices. Standards of Performance- adequacy Why testability and fruitfulness should be considered a standard in this context?

  14. Gems and Coals The thesis is interesting but how much is it novel? Given the subtle nature of the distinctions between these perspectives, overall, she manages to remain clear. In many cases she mentions a new or a better formulation of the conclusion from the past section in the introduction of the next section!

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