Jihadi Governance by Lake Chad: Research on ISWAP's Governing Techniques

 
 
Governing Pious Mujāhidīn: Jihadi Governance by Lake Chad
Alessio Iocchi
(Università Orientale di Napoli
& Norwegian Institute of International Affairs)
 // 
alessioi@nupi.noaiocchi@unior.it
Empirical findings
Empirically
, the research on which this presentation is based
shows the development by ISWAP of governing techniques and
devices as well as the importance of the interaction between
combatant and civilian population in ISWAP-administered areas
between 2016 and 2021
Methodological
approach
Methodologically, 
the research on which the presentation is
based draws on the actor-network theory (
Deleuze & Guattari
1980; Latour 2005)
, which stresses the primacy of nodes and
connections, thus recognizing the inherent thread-like nature of
contemporary societies.
Furthermore, the article draws equally from the the dialectic of
the “trans-local entanglement” (
Freitag & von Oppen 2010
)
which, arguing for the study of globalisation(s) from a Southern
perspective, unveils the existence of several layers of interaction
through specific nodes that go beyond nation-state logics
Theoretical
argument
Theoretically, 
the research argues two main points.
First, that ISWAP did develop, structure and enforce governing
techniques adapted to the Lake Chad context, moulded to match
the particular geographical and human context: an highly-mobile
«
roaming governance
» (Iocchi 2020; 2021).
Secondly, that ISWAP did develop such governance devices also
as a consequence of doctrinal debates, scholarly disputes and
intellectual arguments that were equally drawn from the broader
jihadi-Salafi debate and from the more Syrian-context specific
intra-IS debate on takfīr (excommunication) (Iocchi & Brigaglia
2020).
S
S
o
o
u
u
r
r
c
c
e
e
s
s
(Mostly) ethnographic fieldwork: Yobe State (Nigeria), nov. 2014; Bol et Baga Sola (Tchad), nov. 2016 -
fev. 2017; Diffa, Nguigmi (Niger), ott.-dec. 2018; Diffa (Niger), ott. 2021
Combatant-produced documents and propaganda and cultural items
US diplomatic cables
Selected interviews with key informers (Nigeria, Tchad, Niger)
Under the lenses of an 
‘aqīda 
discourse, a misplaced 
tawallī 
becomes
comparable to an act of 
širk 
(polytheist worship)
Relationship between Mamman Nur and Abubakar Shekau (2005-2018)
Issue of takfir—and specifically takfir musalsal (serial takfir)
August 2016: Nur issues and “Exposé” of Shekau audio file, invites combatants to perform Hijra, leave Shekau
Nur questions Shekau regarding the usage of ghanima (spoils of war)
The “Dawla issue” (2014-5), i.e. the gradual
repositioning of allegiances and alliances in the wake
of the declaration of the Caliphate in Syria
Episodes of tensions
Split —> emergence of ISWAP
Aḥmad b. ‘Umar al-Ḥāzimī —> 
takfir al-‘adir
(excommunication of the excuser)
Bin Ali —> 
dār al-kufr al-ṭāri’
 (lapsed abode of
unbelief) [to accomodate the position of Muslims
living in non-sharia-ruled lands)
Hazimi current within IS: 
ġuluww
 (extremists) or not?
Pendularity of the IS’ military and intellectual
leadership response
T
he decision-making processes of IS are influenced
more by the pressure of 
al-ġulāt 
than by the advice of
the scholars. The increased relevance of the
“extremists” and its disruptive potential are not
neutralized
The “Dapchi issue” (feb. 2018), i.e. the
kidnapping of 110 schoolgirls from an
all-female secondary school in Dapchi
(Yobe State), reflects the dynamic
presented in the previous slide
Decison-makers tend to follow the
advice of 
al-ġulāt 
also in local wilaya
The theological/strategic rift between
Nur and Shekau in the 
Wilāya
, reflected
the same dynamic of the rift between
“Bin‘alīs” and “Ḥāzimīs” in the
Caliphate. 
 
 
Conclusions (1)
al-Baġdādī’s Caliphate had tried to build
its legitimacy and authority within the
jihadist landscape vis- à-vis other,
theologically more accommodating
organizations like al-Qā‘ida, on an
“ultra-purist” reading of the borders
between faith (
īmān
) and unbelief
(
kufr
)
Unable to propose (or to impose) a
coherent and stable 
takfīr 
doctrine
while controlling its potentially
disruptive effects, the scholarly
leadership has been marginalized by
the rise to leadership positions of a
battleground-forged generation of
mujahidin 
 
 
Conclusions (2)
More takfir tends to produce a more
asser- tive leadership and more
motivated militants. However, it carries
with it a set of potential risks, for it can
either (1) multiply the number of
potential targets 
ad infinitum
, leading
the movement to a strategic isolation
(as has been the case with Shekau’s AS-
DJ), or (2) increase the internal
instability of the group, by exposing
every new generation of leaders to the
risk of becoming the object of a new
takfīr 
by emerging commanders (as has
been the case with IS-WAP) 
 
 
Conclusions (3)
The governing device developed by
takfir-constrained movements like
ISWAP needs to be continuously
accommodated between the material
needs of the combatant base (on issue
like ghanima) and the severe limitations
posed by the takfiri-minded political
decisions (see also Foucher 2021)
Slide Note
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Research by Alessio Iocchi explores ISWAP's development of governing techniques in Lake Chad, emphasizing the interaction with civilian populations. The study draws on actor-network theory and the dialectic of trans-local entanglement, revealing ISWAP's adaptation to the geographical and human context as well as doctrinal influences on governance devices.

  • Jihadi Governance
  • Lake Chad
  • ISWAP
  • Research
  • Civilian Population

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  1. Governing Pious Mujhidn: Jihadi Governance by Lake Chad Alessio Iocchi (Universit Orientale di Napoli & Norwegian Institute of International Affairs) aiocchi@unior.it // alessioi@nupi.no

  2. Empirically, the research on which this presentation is based shows the development by ISWAP of governing techniques and devices as well as the importance of the interaction between combatant and civilian population in ISWAP-administered areas between 2016 and 2021 Empirical findings

  3. Methodologically, the research on which the presentation is based draws on the actor-network theory (Deleuze & Guattari 1980; Latour 2005), which stresses the primacy of nodes and connections, thus recognizing the inherent thread-like nature of contemporary societies. Methodological approach Furthermore, the article draws equally from the the dialectic of the trans-local entanglement (Freitag & von Oppen 2010) which, arguing for the study of globalisation(s) from a Southern perspective, unveils the existence of several layers of interaction through specific nodes that go beyond nation-state logics

  4. Theoretically, the research argues two main points. First, that ISWAP did develop, structure and enforce governing techniques adapted to the Lake Chad context, moulded to match the particular geographical and human context: an highly-mobile roaming governance (Iocchi 2020; 2021). Theoretical argument Secondly, that ISWAP did develop such governance devices also as a consequence of doctrinal debates, scholarly disputes and intellectual arguments that were equally drawn from the broader jihadi-Salafi debate and from the more Syrian-context specific intra-IS debate on takf r (excommunication) (Iocchi & Brigaglia 2020).

  5. Sources (Mostly) ethnographic fieldwork: Yobe State (Nigeria), nov. 2014; Bol et Baga Sola (Tchad), nov. 2016 - fev. 2017; Diffa, Nguigmi (Niger), ott.-dec. 2018; Diffa (Niger), ott. 2021 Combatant-produced documents and propaganda and cultural items US diplomatic cables Selected interviews with key informers (Nigeria, Tchad, Niger)

  6. Relationship between Mamman Nur and Abubakar Shekau (2005-2018) Issue of takfir and specifically takfir musalsal (serial takfir) August 2016: Nur issues and Expos of Shekau audio file, invites combatants to perform Hijra, leave Shekau Nur questions Shekau regarding the usage of ghanima (spoils of war) Under the lenses of an aqi da discourse, a misplaced tawalli becomes comparable to an act of irk (polytheist worship)

  7. The Dawla issue (2014-5), i.e. the gradual repositioning of allegiances and alliances in the wake of the declaration of the Caliphate in Syria Episodes of tensions Split > emergence of ISWAP Ah mad b. Umar al-H zim > takfir al- adir (excommunication of the excuser) Bin Ali > da r al-kufr al-t a ri (lapsed abode of unbelief) [to accomodate the position of Muslims living in non-sharia-ruled lands) Hazimi current within IS: g uluww (extremists) or not? Pendularity of the IS military and intellectual leadership response The decision-making processes of IS are influenced more by the pressure of al-g ula t than by the advice of the scholars. The increased relevance of the extremists and its disruptive potential are not neutralized

  8. The Dapchi issue (feb. 2018), i.e. the kidnapping of 110 schoolgirls from an all-female secondary school in Dapchi (Yobe State), reflects the dynamic presented in the previous slide Decison-makers tend to follow the advice of al-g ula t also in local wilaya The theological/strategic rift between Nur and Shekau in the Wila ya, reflected the same dynamic of the rift between Bin al s and H zim s Caliphate. in the

  9. Conclusions (1) al-Bag d d s Caliphate had tried to build its legitimacy and authority within the jihadist landscape vis- -vis other, theologically more accommodating organizations like al-Q ida, on an ultra-purist reading of the borders between faith (i ma n) and unbelief (kufr) Unable to propose (or to impose) a coherent and stable takfi r doctrine while controlling its potentially disruptive effects, the scholarly leadership has been marginalized by the rise to leadership positions of a battleground-forged generation of mujahidin

  10. Conclusions (2) More takfir tends to produce a more asser- tive leadership and more motivated militants. However, it carries with it a set of potential risks, for it can either (1) multiply the number of potential targets ad infinitum, leading the movement to a strategic isolation (as has been the case with Shekau s AS- DJ), or (2) increase the internal instability of the group, by exposing every new generation of leaders to the risk of becoming the object of a new takfi r by emerging commanders (as has been the case with IS-WAP)

  11. Conclusions (3) The governing device developed by takfir-constrained movements like ISWAP needs to be continuously accommodated between the material needs of the combatant base (on issue like ghanima) and the severe limitations posed by the takfiri-minded political decisions (see also Foucher 2021)

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