International Anti-Corruption Frameworks and State Compliance

undefined
 
 
WP10, ANTICORRP Project
Lead partner: ELIAMEP
Partners: EUI, Hertie, SAR, Basel Institute, and
BCE
 
EU:
 lack of an explicit competence, yet, it has adopted
soft law and hard law instruments,
-
i.e. 1997 Convention on the fight against corruption
involving officials of the European Communities or
 
officials of MS of the EU
-
- 2011 New mechanism: EU anti-corruption report
(every 2 years)
Council of Europe (
CoE) 
approach against corruption,
intrinsically linked to democratic values, the rule of law,
human rights. Most important instruments are
 
a) Twenty guiding principles for the fight against
 
corruption (1997); b) Criminal Law Convention (c)
 
Civil Law Convention
 
CoE, 
Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO)
mechanism monitoring state compliance with the CoE
conventions, through peer process evaluation;
identification of deficiencies in national anti-corruption
policies and promotion of reforms; 4 rounds of evaluation
OECD Convention 
on combating bribery of foreign public
officials in international business 
transactions (1997)
2003 
UN Convention against corruption
; calls for the
development and implementation of effective and
coordinated anti-corruption policies
2009: Establishment of a Review Mechanism overseen by
the Implementation Review Group and organised in cycles
focusing on different provisions of the 2003 Convention
 
Flourishing scholarship on state compliance with
international law, but little in regard to anti-
corruption
Also flourishing scholarship on studies on the
phenomenon of corruption across many disciplines
Single country case-studies explore how
international and European anti-corruption
standards influence domestic laws and policies
But no systematic study on whether, the extend to
which, and the conditions under which such
international standards are complied with and
implemented by states
 
 
Measure state compliance and implementation
of international anti-corruption norms in Europe;
 E
xplore 
whether international law has an
independent causal influence 
over the anti-
corruption laws, policies and practices adopted
by EU states;
 
I
dentify patterns of variation 
of state
compliance and implementation, whether cross-
national, or across sectors and issue areas; and
 
E
xplore the factors that account for significant
variation 
across sectors or states.
 
Compliance
:
 
the discrepancy between the legal
standard of an int’l convention and domestic law,
Implementation
: the efforts of, and degree to
which national authorities enforce and put
international standards into practice through the
passage of legislation, the creation of institutions
and the enforcement of rules
Effectiveness
: 
the efficacy of a given norm and its
corresponding prescriptions to tackle the social
problem that it is intended to redress, to induce
change in state behaviour and to achieve its
policy objective
 
 
A set of studies of the EU and the CoE
instruments that directly or indirectly address
issues of corruption and favoritism
Political party funding 
(GRECO, 3
rd
 round)
Organised crime: 
proceeds of corruption and
money laundering 
(GRECO, 2
nd
 round)
Conflict of interest 
(GRECO, 2
nd
 round)
Public procurement 
in EU law
:
The first 3 will do a large-N study of all EU-28
states. The last one shall explore the effects of
ECJ and national court decisions related to
public procurement on favoritism in public
contracts
 
Compliance with (and even implementation
of) international and European anti-
corruption standards may be fortuitous and
not the result of international law and
monitoring its mechanisms
May be an artefact of a legal standard grafted
onto a treaty
We need to detect and isolate the ‘goodness
of fit’ (degree of pre-existing state
compliance with international standards),
from the degree of compliance that is
achieved as a result of pressure exercised by
international monitoring bodies
 
Distinguish between 
‘goodness of fit’
 and
international norms-induced compliance
.
Set of criteria and questions in each issue area of
focus on the basis of which to code:
 
a) the pre-existing 
legal and institutional
 
frame 
that is in place in each country; and
 
b) its 
capacity to enforce the legal 
 
regulations
 
and the policy objectives 
that underpin them.
 
 
Such capacity refers to the resources with which
 
existing or newly created anti-corruption institutions
 
and bodies are endowed, their mandate and
 
independence, the coordinating potential of all
 
existing bodies, their political clout, or other.
 
 
Subsequently, we will determine the extent to
which states have pursued reforms following the
monitoring by GRECO and its recommendations,
and measure this
We will make these assessments by drawing on the
information and documentation contained in the
various evaluation and compliance reports issued
by GRECO for the EU countries
Phase 3 
of the project: engage in comparisons
across countries and issue areas
Phase 4
 of the project: policy recommendations
and briefs
Plan of a collective volume (2
nd
 phase) and a
special issue of a journal (3
rd
 phase)
 
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Scholarship on state compliance with international law and the impact of anti-corruption standards on domestic policies is growing, yet there is a lack of systematic studies on how states comply with and implement these standards. Various organizations and conventions focus on combating corruption at both national and international levels, emphasizing the need for coordinated anti-corruption efforts. This article highlights the importance of monitoring state compliance with anti-corruption conventions and encourages further research in this area.

  • Anti-corruption
  • International law
  • State compliance
  • Conventions
  • Domestic policies

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  1. WP10, ANTICORRP Project Lead partner: ELIAMEP Partners: EUI, Hertie, SAR, Basel Institute, and BCE

  2. EU: soft law and hard law instruments, - i.e. 1997 Convention on the fight against corruption involving officials of the European Communities or officials of MS of the EU - - 2011 New mechanism: EU anti-corruption report (every 2 years) Council of Europe ( intrinsically linked to democratic values, the rule of law, human rights. Most important instruments are a) Twenty guiding principles for the fight against corruption (1997); b) Criminal Law Convention (c) Civil Law Convention EU: lack of an explicit competence, yet, it has adopted Council of Europe (CoE CoE) ) approach against corruption,

  3. CoE, Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) mechanism monitoring state compliance with the CoE conventions, through peer process evaluation; identification of deficiencies in national anti-corruption policies and promotion of reforms; 4 rounds of evaluation OECD Convention officials in international business 2003 UN Convention against corruption development and implementation of effective and coordinated anti-corruption policies 2009: Establishment of a Review Mechanism overseen by the Implementation Review Group and organised in cycles focusing on different provisions of the 2003 Convention Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) OECD Convention on combating bribery of foreign public officials in international business transactions (1997) UN Convention against corruption; calls for the on combating bribery of foreign public

  4. Flourishing scholarship on state compliance with international law, but little in regard to anti- corruption Also flourishing scholarship on studies on the phenomenon of corruption across many disciplines Single country case-studies explore how international and European anti-corruption standards influence domestic laws and policies But no systematic study on whether, the extend to which, and the conditions under which such international standards are complied with and implemented by states But no systematic study on whether, the extend to which, and the conditions under which such international standards are complied with and implemented by states

  5. Measure state compliance and implementation of international anti-corruption norms in Europe; Explore whether international law has an independent causal influence corruption laws, policies and practices adopted by EU states; I Identify patterns of variation compliance and implementation, whether cross- national, or across sectors and issue areas; and E Explore the factors that account for significant variation Measure state compliance and implementation whether international law has an independent causal influence over the anti- dentify patterns of variation of state xplore the factors that account for significant variation across sectors or states.

  6. Compliance standard of an int l convention and domestic law, Implementation which national authorities enforce and put international standards into practice through the passage of legislation, the creation of institutions and the enforcement of rules Effectiveness corresponding prescriptions to tackle the social problem that it is intended to redress, to induce change in state behaviour and to achieve its policy objective Compliance: the discrepancy between the legal Implementation: the efforts of, and degree to Effectiveness: the efficacy of a given norm and its

  7. A set of studies of the EU and the CoE instruments that directly or indirectly address issues of corruption and favoritism Political party funding Organised crime: proceeds of corruption and money laundering Conflict of interest Public procurement The first 3 will do a large-N study of all EU-28 states. The last one shall explore the effects of ECJ and national court decisions related to public procurement on favoritism in public contracts Political party funding (GRECO, 3rdround) proceeds of corruption and money laundering (GRECO, 2ndround) Conflict of interest (GRECO, 2ndround) Public procurement in EU law:

  8. Compliance with (and even implementation of) international and European anti- corruption standards may be fortuitous and not the result of international law and monitoring its mechanisms May be an artefact of a legal standard grafted onto a treaty We need to detect and isolate the goodness of fit (degree of pre-existing state compliance with international standards), from the degree of compliance that is achieved as a result of pressure exercised by international monitoring bodies

  9. Distinguish between goodness of fit and international norms-induced compliance. Set of criteria and questions in each issue area of focus on the basis of which to code: a) the pre-existing legal and institutional frame b) its capacity to enforce the legal and the policy objectives Such capacity refers to the resources with which existing or newly created anti-corruption institutions and bodies are endowed, their mandate and independence, the coordinating potential of all existing bodies, their political clout, or other. legal and institutional frame that is in place in each country; and capacity to enforce the legal regulations and the policy objectives that underpin them. regulations

  10. Subsequently, we will determine the extent to which states have pursued reforms following the monitoring by GRECO and its recommendations, and measure this We will make these assessments by drawing on the information and documentation contained in the various evaluation and compliance reports issued by GRECO for the EU countries Phase 3 of the project: engage in comparisons across countries and issue areas Phase 4 of the project: policy recommendations and briefs Plan of a collective volume (2ndphase) and a special issue of a journal (3rdphase)

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