Industrial Policy: The Old and The New - Insights by Dani Rodrik

 
I
NDUSTRIAL
 P
OLICY
:
THE
 O
LD
 
AND
 
THE
 N
EW
 
Dani Rodrik
May 2019
 
Key questions and answers
 
What have learned from experience with IP?
not clear
empirical work can go only so far
How does new IP differ from old?
relaxing assumptions of hard state and omniscience
institutional design can counteract negative side effects
successful IP does not require picking winners
What should IP target?
an IP for “good jobs”
 
The strong case for industrial policy in theory
 
Few economists doubt that the market imperfections on which the
theoretical arguments for IP are based 
do
 exist, and are often
pervasive
 
(1) Learning  spillovers
R&D externalities
demonstration effects from pioneer firms in new industries
spillovers from the introduction of new products or new technologies (e.g., garments in
Bangladesh, HYVs in India…)
upstream spillovers from FDI (e.g., auto plants, retail)
dynamic scale economies and LBD (e.g., steel, semiconductors)
 
(
2) Coordination and agglomeration failures
clusters (e.g., tourism and electronics…)
upstream and downstream linkages
production and supply chains
specialized labor skills
industry-specific public goods (e.g., standards, transport/logistics)
 
More broadly, it is recognized that growth entails structural change
(from traditional, low productivity activities to new, higher
productivity activities), and that the process of structural change is
rife with market failures.
 
 
 
 
The ambiguous case for industrial policy in
practice
 
Insurmountable obstacles to the practice of IP?
 
1)
Lack of information
can governments identify the relevant firms, sectors, markets subject to those
market imperfections?
2)
Political capture
can governments withstand lobbying and rent-seeking to prevent IP from
becoming an instrument of rent transfer to connected insiders?
 
Thus, the debate on IP revolves not around its theoretical merits, but
around sharply conflicting views regarding the relative importance and
pervasiveness of these obstacles
“look at how difficult it all is…”
“but look at countries in East Asia who have done it …”
 
Does empirical work help? (1)
 
Informal evidence
comparisons of policy regimes
e.g., ISI in Latin America, national champions in Europe
case studies
plenty of “successes” (POSCO, Embraer, Chilean salmon, …)
as well as “failures” (Concorde, African white elephants, Proton, …)
suggestive at best
unclear counterfactuals
pervasive problem of selection bias
rarely subjected to explicit cost-benefit analysis
Cross-section econometrics
did subsidized industries do better?
large number of studies, going back to 1980s
Krueger and Tuncer (1982), Harrison (1994), World Bank (1993), Lee
(1996), Beason and Weinstein (1996), Lawrence and Weinstein (2001), …
has the usual econometric complications of specification, omitted
variable bias, measurement, etc.
but its problems run much, much deeper
 
Why is econometric work on the efficacy of IP
difficult? (1)
 
Consider the contending theoretical perspectives on government
behavior
the “developmentalist” view: gov’t can successfully identify and support
growth-enhancing firms/sectors
the “inefficacy” view: gov’t seeks growth, but cannot pick successfully
the “rent-seeking” view: gov’t is beholden to special interests
Can we discriminate among these perspectives by observing gov’t
behavior and consequences across firms/industries?
 
Why is econometric work on the efficacy of IP
difficult? (2)
 
Why is econometric work on the efficacy of IP
difficult? (3)
 
Why is econometric work on the efficacy of IP
difficult? (4)
 
Why is econometric work on the efficacy of IP
difficult? (5)
 
The association between intervention and economic performance is
negative under a developmental government, precisely what we would also
find under a rent-seeking government!
Why is econometric work on the efficacy of IP
difficult? (6)
 
Problem here is that government policy is not random; it 
responds
 to
economic/political pressures
What about causal identification through standard econometric
techniques, such as IV and RD?
econometric identification requires exogeneity and exclusion requirements to be
satisfied; even if there are such instruments/thresholds, results can be difficult to
interpret
we want to know the effects of 
purposeful
 IP, when it is
(a) targeted at the underlying problem,
(b) shaped by political considerations, or
(c) some combination thereof
not when it is conducted randomly (or in a manner that is orthogonal to its economic
justification and political determinants)
“randomization” cannot help when the debate is largely over whether government
can/does select appropriately
Why is econometric work on the efficacy of IP
difficult? (7)
 
State of the art: Criscuolo, Martin, Overman, and Reenen, “Some
Causal Effects of an Industrial Policy” (
AER
 2019)
causal effects on employment (and other outcomes) of investment subsidies in UK
identification through changes in eligibility criteria for regions, set by EU
authors argue changes in (some of) these criteria were exogenous to relevant economic
conditions in UK, which is plausible
answers: “what are the effects of investment subsidies, comparing ‘randomly’ treated
regions to others?”
not: “what are the effects of investment subsidies, in regions selected by government
(through a mix of motives), compared to the counterfactual of providing these regions with
no subsidies?”
Critics (of both kinds) may remain unconvinced
positive result?
opponent of IP: “yes, but in practice IP (here, the selection of regions) will
be politically driven, and these results do not directly speak those, more
realistic cases…”
negative result?
proponent of IP: “yes, but these results do not speak directly to subsidies
appropriately targeted on regions that could make the most use of them…”
 
Where does this leave us?
 
strong theoretical justifications for policy intervention
inconclusive empirical evidence on whether policy works “on average”
just like …
education policy 
(human capital externalities)
health policy 
(moral hazard, adverse selection)
social insurance and safety nets 
(incomplete risk markets, behavioral factors)
infrastructure policy 
(natural monopoly)
stabilization policy 
(Keynesian “rigidities”)
in all these areas, it is recognized that the market-failure arguments
for intervention can be exploited by powerful insiders and
overwhelmed by informational asymmetries
and evidence on efficacy remains contested, despite rich empirical literature
but policy discussions typically focus not on 
whether
 
the government
should do it
, 
but on 
how
debate on what works and under what conditions
thinking about IP requires a similar shift
 
What kind of industrial policy?
 
How should IP be conducted?
traditional versus modern IP
Which market failure(s) should IP target?
frontier innovation?
technology spillovers?
supply chains?
fostering entry and competition?
rent-shifting (“national champions”)?
de-industrialization?
“good jobs”?
Traditional versus modern industrial policy
 
Traditional IP (the East Asian model)
top-down: a 
list
 of sectoral priorities + sectoral incentives
presumes honesty, competence, adequate implementation
presumes solutions are known
perfected in paradigmatic East Asian cases (S. Korea, Taiwan)
Modern IP
a 
process
 of institutionalized collaboration and dialog
focused on identification of constraints and opportunities
and the generation of pragmatic private-public solutions
continuous monitoring and evaluation
presumes competence and trust can be developed over time
does not presume solutions are known; merely that they can be
discovered
characteristic of many current initiatives
Institutional design for modern industrial policy
 
Four key ideas, each of which leads to a different “design principle”:
1.
The requisite knowledge about the existence and location and
magnitude of market failures and constraints are diffused widely
within society
 
=> “embeddedness”
2.
IP is subject to high dimensional uncertainty: solutions are local,
contextual, and unknown ex ante
=> iterative collaboration
3.
Businesses have strong incentives to “game” the government
 
=> carrots and sticks
4.
The intended beneficiary of IP is neither bureaucrats nor business,
but society at large
 
=> accountability
Design features for IP institutions:
embeddedness & iterative collaboration
 
Economists tend to think of policy design in top-down, principal-agent
terms
takes informational incompleteness and asymmetries as given, while
keeping the private-sector at arms’ length
This model has the advantage that it gives bureaucrats autonomy and
protection from private sector rent-seeking, but it has the
disadvantage that it severely restricts the flow of information from
below
businesses cannot communicate information about the constraints
they face other than through their actions
More appropriate model lies in between the two extremes:
high-bandwidth collaboration between the private sector and the
government with the aim of uncovering where the most significant
bottlenecks are
deliberation councils, supplier development forums, “search networks,”
investment advisory councils, sectoral round-tables, private-public venture funds,
development banks, …
Design features for IP institutions:
embeddedness & iterative collaboration
 
IP as a process of ongoing discovery rather than as a list of policy
instruments
focusing on learning where the binding constraints lie, rather than  on whether you
should use tax breaks, R&D subsidies, credit incentives, and so on
Experimentation, monitoring, and revision in policies
 
 
 
 
“Can governments pick winners?”
 
This is the wrong question
Success in IP is determined not by “picking winners” but by “letting
losers go”
given uncertainty, optimal policy strategies will necessarily produce
mistakes
challenge is not to avoid mistakes altogether, but to ensure that
mistakes are recognized as such
and entail phasing out of support
a much weaker requirement than “omniscience”
governments may not be able to pick winners, but they can recognize losers
Can democracies experiment?
focus on portfolio of projects, not individual projects
Solyndra versus Tesla; Fundacion Chile; NRC study
 
 
 
 
 
Principles in application across wide range of
domains
 
U.S.: DARPA, ARPA-E
technological frontier; Azoulay et al. (2018); Goldstein and Narayanamurti
(2018); Khosla and Beaton (2017)
U.S.: manufacturing institutes
new manufacturing technologies; Block et al. (2018); Deloitte (2017)
U.S.: Project QUEST
workforce development; Rademacher et al. (2001), Roder and Elliott
(2019)
Peru: sectoral roundtables
identifying and removing sectoral bottlenecks; Ghezzi (2017)
Argentina
: modern agriculture
“intense public-private collaboration,” supported by Argentine Technology
Fund (FONTAR) and the National Institute of Agricultural Technology
(INTA) for finance, technology and legislation (Sanchez et al., 2011)
“Smart” development banks
“search engines” for cost discovery; Fernandez-Arias et al. (2018)
 
What kind of industrial policy?
 
How should IP be conducted?
traditional versus modern IP
Which market failure(s) should IP target?
frontier innovation?
technology spillovers?
supply chains?
fostering entry and competition?
rent-shifting (“national champions”)?
de-industrialization?
g
o
o
d
 
j
o
b
s
?
 
Absence of good jobs as negative externality
 
A widespread and serious problem: polarization in labor markets
Not just a matter of equity and inclusion, but also a source of gross
inefficiency
Costly externalities
social costs: broken families, drug abuse, crime
W.J. Wilson 1996, Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2018
political polarization and rise of populist parties
Autor et al. 2017, Dal Bò et al. 2018, Colantone and Stanig 2016, 2017, Guiso et
al. 2017
authoritarian values
Ballard-Rosa et al. 2018, Colantone and Stanig 2018
Aggravated by current trends in technology, globalization, de-
industrialization
Inadequacy of conventional remedies
education, UBI, redistribution, job guarantees, fiscal policy
 
Concluding words
 
A need to “normalize” IP
not “whether” but “how”?
pragmatic rather than ideological approach
A need for IP that targets “good jobs”
Critical role of the quality of government-business dialog
IP a misnomer
“productivist” policy?
 
New versus old
 
Design features for IP institutions:
carrots and sticks
 
Without rents for entrepreneurs, there is too little investment in cost
discovery and other activities that promote structural change
Schumpeter’s insight: entrepreneurship requires rents
rents as second-best mechanisms to alleviate market failures in
innovation
patents are the obvious example
But open-ended rents bottle up resources in unproductive activities
Hence the need for carrots 
and
 sticks
incentives and disciplines
conditional subsidies, sunset clauses, monitoring and evaluation,…
 
Design features for IP institutions:
accountability
 
If bureaucrats monitor businesses, who monitors the bureaucrats?
Need for mechanisms of transparency and accountability
a high-level political principal and “champion” for IP activities
someone associated with IP activities and who can be held politically
responsible
as with monetary policy (cf. CB independence)
clear statement of objectives
with monitorable targets
mechanisms of transparency
publication of requests from business
regular dissemination of activities
accounting of expenditures
processes that are open to new entrants as well as incumbents
periodic  accounting of what was done and why (cf. inflation targeting)
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Industrial policy, as presented by Dani Rodrik in May 2019, emphasizes the importance of empirical work, the differences between old and new policies, and the targets industrial policy should focus on. The theoretical arguments for industrial policy highlight market imperfections, learning spillovers, coordination failures, and structural changes that support the case for its implementation. However, the practical implementation of industrial policy faces obstacles such as lack of information and political capture. The debate surrounding industrial policy centers on conflicting views on these obstacles, with examples from countries in East Asia showcasing successful industrial policy strategies despite challenges.

  • Industrial Policy
  • Dani Rodrik
  • Theory vs Practice
  • Market Imperfections
  • Economic Development

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  1. INDUSTRIAL POLICY: THE OLD AND THE NEW Dani Rodrik May 2019

  2. Key questions and answers What have learned from experience with IP? not clear empirical work can go only so far How does new IP differ from old? relaxing assumptions of hard state and omniscience institutional design can counteract negative side effects successful IP does not require picking winners What should IP target? an IP for good jobs

  3. The strong case for industrial policy in theory Few economists doubt that the market imperfections on which the theoretical arguments for IP are based do exist, and are often pervasive (1) Learning spillovers R&D externalities demonstration effects from pioneer firms in new industries spillovers from the introduction of new products or new technologies (e.g., garments in Bangladesh, HYVs in India ) upstream spillovers from FDI (e.g., auto plants, retail) dynamic scale economies and LBD (e.g., steel, semiconductors) (2) Coordination and agglomeration failures clusters (e.g., tourism and electronics ) upstream and downstream linkages production and supply chains specialized labor skills industry-specific public goods (e.g., standards, transport/logistics) More broadly, it is recognized that growth entails structural change (from traditional, low productivity activities to new, higher productivity activities), and that the process of structural change is rife with market failures.

  4. The ambiguous case for industrial policy in practice Insurmountable obstacles to the practice of IP? Lack of information can governments identify the relevant firms, sectors, markets subject to those market imperfections? Political capture can governments withstand lobbying and rent-seeking to prevent IP from becoming an instrument of rent transfer to connected insiders? 1) 2) Thus, the debate on IP revolves not around its theoretical merits, but around sharply conflicting views regarding the relative importance and pervasiveness of these obstacles look at how difficult it all is but look at countries in East Asia who have done it

  5. Does empirical work help? (1) Informal evidence comparisons of policy regimes e.g., ISI in Latin America, national champions in Europe case studies plenty of successes (POSCO, Embraer, Chilean salmon, ) as well as failures (Concorde, African white elephants, Proton, ) suggestive at best unclear counterfactuals pervasive problem of selection bias rarely subjected to explicit cost-benefit analysis Cross-section econometrics did subsidized industries do better? large number of studies, going back to 1980s Krueger and Tuncer (1982), Harrison (1994), World Bank (1993), Lee (1996), Beason and Weinstein (1996), Lawrence and Weinstein (2001), has the usual econometric complications of specification, omitted variable bias, measurement, etc. but its problems run much, much deeper

  6. Why is econometric work on the efficacy of IP difficult? (1) Consider the contending theoretical perspectives on government behavior the developmentalist view: gov t can successfully identify and support growth-enhancing firms/sectors the inefficacy view: gov t seeks growth, but cannot pick successfully the rent-seeking view: gov t is beholden to special interests Can we discriminate among these perspectives by observing gov t behavior and consequences across firms/industries?

  7. Why is econometric work on the efficacy of IP difficult? (2)

  8. Why is econometric work on the efficacy of IP difficult? (3)

  9. Why is econometric work on the efficacy of IP difficult? (4)

  10. Why is econometric work on the efficacy of IP difficult? (5) The association between intervention and economic performance is negative under a developmental government, precisely what we would also find under a rent-seeking government!

  11. Why is econometric work on the efficacy of IP difficult? (6) Problem here is that government policy is not random; it responds to economic/political pressures What about causal identification through standard econometric techniques, such as IV and RD? econometric identification requires exogeneity and exclusion requirements to be satisfied; even if there are such instruments/thresholds, results can be difficult to interpret we want to know the effects of purposeful IP, when it is (a) targeted at the underlying problem, (b) shaped by political considerations, or (c) some combination thereof not when it is conducted randomly (or in a manner that is orthogonal to its economic justification and political determinants) randomization cannot help when the debate is largely over whether government can/does select appropriately

  12. Why is econometric work on the efficacy of IP difficult? (7) State of the art: Criscuolo, Martin, Overman, and Reenen, Some Causal Effects of an Industrial Policy (AER 2019) causal effects on employment (and other outcomes) of investment subsidies in UK identification through changes in eligibility criteria for regions, set by EU authors argue changes in (some of) these criteria were exogenous to relevant economic conditions in UK, which is plausible answers: what are the effects of investment subsidies, comparing randomly treated regions to others? not: what are the effects of investment subsidies, in regions selected by government (through a mix of motives), compared to the counterfactual of providing these regions with no subsidies? Critics (of both kinds) may remain unconvinced positive result? opponent of IP: yes, but in practice IP (here, the selection of regions) will be politically driven, and these results do not directly speak those, more realistic cases negative result? proponent of IP: yes, but these results do not speak directly to subsidies appropriately targeted on regions that could make the most use of them

  13. Where does this leave us? strong theoretical justifications for policy intervention inconclusive empirical evidence on whether policy works on average just like education policy (human capital externalities) health policy (moral hazard, adverse selection) social insurance and safety nets (incomplete risk markets, behavioral factors) infrastructure policy (natural monopoly) stabilization policy (Keynesian rigidities ) in all these areas, it is recognized that the market-failure arguments for intervention can be exploited by powerful insiders and overwhelmed by informational asymmetries and evidence on efficacy remains contested, despite rich empirical literature but policy discussions typically focus not on whetherthe government should do it, but on how debate on what works and under what conditions thinking about IP requires a similar shift

  14. What kind of industrial policy? How should IP be conducted? traditional versus modern IP Which market failure(s) should IP target? frontier innovation? technology spillovers? supply chains? fostering entry and competition? rent-shifting ( national champions )? de-industrialization? good jobs ?

  15. Traditional versus modern industrial policy Traditional IP (the East Asian model) top-down: a list of sectoral priorities + sectoral incentives presumes honesty, competence, adequate implementation presumes solutions are known perfected in paradigmatic East Asian cases (S. Korea, Taiwan) Modern IP a process of institutionalized collaboration and dialog focused on identification of constraints and opportunities and the generation of pragmatic private-public solutions continuous monitoring and evaluation presumes competence and trust can be developed over time does not presume solutions are known; merely that they can be discovered characteristic of many current initiatives

  16. Institutional design for modern industrial policy Four key ideas, each of which leads to a different design principle : 1. The requisite knowledge about the existence and location and magnitude of market failures and constraints are diffused widely within society => embeddedness 2. IP is subject to high dimensional uncertainty: solutions are local, contextual, and unknown ex ante => iterative collaboration 3. Businesses have strong incentives to game the government => carrots and sticks 4. The intended beneficiary of IP is neither bureaucrats nor business, but society at large => accountability

  17. Design features for IP institutions: embeddedness & iterative collaboration Economists tend to think of policy design in top-down, principal-agent terms takes informational incompleteness and asymmetries as given, while keeping the private-sector at arms length This model has the advantage that it gives bureaucrats autonomy and protection from private sector rent-seeking, but it has the disadvantage that it severely restricts the flow of information from below businesses cannot communicate information about the constraints they face other than through their actions More appropriate model lies in between the two extremes: high-bandwidth collaboration between the private sector and the government with the aim of uncovering where the most significant bottlenecks are deliberation councils, supplier development forums, search networks, investment advisory councils, sectoral round-tables, private-public venture funds, development banks,

  18. Design features for IP institutions: embeddedness & iterative collaboration IP as a process of ongoing discovery rather than as a list of policy instruments focusing on learning where the binding constraints lie, rather than on whether you should use tax breaks, R&D subsidies, credit incentives, and so on Experimentation, monitoring, and revision in policies

  19. Can governments pick winners? This is the wrong question Success in IP is determined not by picking winners but by letting losers go given uncertainty, optimal policy strategies will necessarily produce mistakes challenge is not to avoid mistakes altogether, but to ensure that mistakes are recognized as such and entail phasing out of support a much weaker requirement than omniscience governments may not be able to pick winners, but they can recognize losers Can democracies experiment? focus on portfolio of projects, not individual projects Solyndra versus Tesla; Fundacion Chile; NRC study

  20. Principles in application across wide range of domains U.S.: DARPA, ARPA-E technological frontier; Azoulay et al. (2018); Goldstein and Narayanamurti (2018); Khosla and Beaton (2017) U.S.: manufacturing institutes new manufacturing technologies; Block et al. (2018); Deloitte (2017) U.S.: Project QUEST workforce development; Rademacher et al. (2001), Roder and Elliott (2019) Peru: sectoral roundtables identifying and removing sectoral bottlenecks; Ghezzi (2017) Argentina: modern agriculture intense public-private collaboration, supported by Argentine Technology Fund (FONTAR) and the National Institute of Agricultural Technology (INTA) for finance, technology and legislation (Sanchez et al., 2011) Smart development banks search engines for cost discovery; Fernandez-Arias et al. (2018)

  21. What kind of industrial policy? How should IP be conducted? traditional versus modern IP Which market failure(s) should IP target? frontier innovation? technology spillovers? supply chains? fostering entry and competition? rent-shifting ( national champions )? de-industrialization? good jobs ?

  22. Absence of good jobs as negative externality A widespread and serious problem: polarization in labor markets Not just a matter of equity and inclusion, but also a source of gross inefficiency Costly externalities social costs: broken families, drug abuse, crime W.J. Wilson 1996, Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2018 political polarization and rise of populist parties Autor et al. 2017, Dal B et al. 2018, Colantone and Stanig 2016, 2017, Guiso et al. 2017 authoritarian values Ballard-Rosa et al. 2018, Colantone and Stanig 2018 Aggravated by current trends in technology, globalization, de- industrialization Inadequacy of conventional remedies education, UBI, redistribution, job guarantees, fiscal policy

  23. Concluding words A need to normalize IP not whether but how ? pragmatic rather than ideological approach A need for IP that targets good jobs Critical role of the quality of government-business dialog IP a misnomer productivist policy?

  24. New versus old type of IP assumptions practice theory policy dimensionality evidence Traditional governments know market failures but prone to capture ex ante selection of policy instruments and priority sectors (e.g., S. Korea) externalities + principal-agent low cross-industry, cross-firm econometrics, augmented by IV, RD and natural experiments Modern market-failures unobservable ex-ante; requisite information widely dispersed; state capacity endogenous identification of objectives & constraints through strategic collaboration with firms (e.g. Peru) collaborative learning, cost- discovery, error- detection, PDIA high informal, contextual, portfolio evaluation against ex ante benchmarks

  25. Design features for IP institutions: carrots and sticks Without rents for entrepreneurs, there is too little investment in cost discovery and other activities that promote structural change Schumpeter s insight: entrepreneurship requires rents rents as second-best mechanisms to alleviate market failures in innovation patents are the obvious example But open-ended rents bottle up resources in unproductive activities Hence the need for carrots and sticks incentives and disciplines conditional subsidies, sunset clauses, monitoring and evaluation,

  26. Design features for IP institutions: accountability If bureaucrats monitor businesses, who monitors the bureaucrats? Need for mechanisms of transparency and accountability a high-level political principal and champion for IP activities someone associated with IP activities and who can be held politically responsible as with monetary policy (cf. CB independence) clear statement of objectives with monitorable targets mechanisms of transparency publication of requests from business regular dissemination of activities accounting of expenditures processes that are open to new entrants as well as incumbents periodic accounting of what was done and why (cf. inflation targeting)

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