Indiana Requirements to Secure Election Infrastructure
Indiana
Requirements
to Secure
Election
Infrastructure
Valerie Warycha
Indiana Election Division
Republican Co-Counsel
•
2016 Arizona SVRS breached
by Russia
•
Got in with a phishing email to
a county employee with
access to SVRS
•
No impairment to SVRS or
voter registration records, but
public confidence in election
process severely damaged
Why do we do this?
All Counties must use FireEye
All counties are required
to use a cybersecurity
company designated by
the Secretary of State
per IC 3-5-4-12.
SECURITY
COMPANY
Call Dustin Renner at
the SOS office today!
durenner@sos.in.gov
or
317-233-4902
Not Using FireEye? Lock it up Today!
County Refusing to use FireEye?
Things to think about.
•
If your county is breached and SVRS is
affected
, what is your response to the
media?
•
If your county is breached, it can be costly.
According to securityintelligence.com, a
breach to a government agency costs
around $2M.
•
W
h
en t
he
city of Baltimore was breached,
it cost 18.2M. Recovery efforts took months
and services for water billing, property
taxes, parking tickets, email, phones all
disrupted.
IC 3-11-15-46
●
Each county election board may have a
security protocol to secure its voting
systems and ePBs which must contain
an audit trail to detect unauthorized
access to the systems or ePBs
●
The security protocol must be adopted
by unanimous vote of the entire board
(and must be filed with IED when
approved)
●
If CEB has not adopted a security
protocol then board must use the
methods set forth in state law
Security Policy for Voting Systems and ePBs
Statutory Security Method for Voting System & ePBs
●
CEB must place a uniquely numbered seal on each voting
system and ePB to secure the equipment and allow for post-
election auditing
○
The seal has been prescribed by IED via VSTOP memo
●
The seal must be placed on each voting system and ePB
once the canvassing of the vote on election day is complete
and must remain in place except when the CEB orders its
unsealing for one of these reasons:
○
To conduct maintenance on the system or ePB or
prepare the system for the next election in the county
○
To install certified updates to the hardware, software,
or firmware of the system or update the ePB
○
Conduct a public test or audit that is required by law
○
For the CEB to correct an error under IC 3-12-5-14 or
when ordered unsealed during a recount or contest
action
IC 3-11-15-46
Statutory Security Method for Voting System & ePBs
●
CEB must reseal the equipment immediately after
completing the reason the equipment was first unsealed
○
The equipment may remain unsealed when the device
is prepared for election day until canvass for that
election is completed
●
CEB must document each time the equipment is sealed and
unsealed including
○
Identifying the serial number of each voting system or
ePB that is sealed and unsealed
○
The date of the sealing or unsealing took place
○
The individual who sealed or unsealed the device
IC 3-11-15-46
Voting System Delivery to Polls
●
Only the following can deliver a voting system to the polls:
○
County Election Board
○
Two-person team designated by CEB with each member affiliated
with a different party of the two appointed CEB members (One D &
One R)
○
Commercial delivery entity under contract with CEB
●
Team members or commercial delivery company employees cannot be
imprisoned, subject to lawful or home detention, on probation, parole, or
placed in a community corrections program
●
Team members and commercial delivery employees must execute CEB-
1A form after delivery of voting system to polling location or vote center
and file with CEB
○
Person receiving the unit must also affix their signature
IC 3-11-3-10
Voting System Return from Polls
●
Only the following can return a voting system from the polls:
○
County Election Board
○
Two-person team designated by CEB with each member affiliated with a different party of the
two appointed CEB members (One D & One R)
○
Commercial delivery entity under contract with CEB
●
Can return from polls at any time after Election Day to secure storage facility designated by county
●
Team members or commercial delivery company employees cannot be imprisoned, subject to lawful
or home detention, on probation, parole, or placed in a community corrections program
●
Team members and commercial delivery employees must execute CEB-1C form after delivery of voting
system from polling location or vote center and file with CEB
○
Person receiving the unit must also affix their signature
IC 3-12-3-2.2 | IC 3-12-3.5-4.5
Voting System Return from Polls
●
Form CEB-1C must certify that:
○
Voting systems remained in custody of each of the two individuals during entire time
systems were being returned
○
No unauthorized person has access to any voting system during return
○
The name and signature of person who received voting system and date that system
was delivered to custody of that individual
○
Completed Form CEB-1C must be filed with county election board immediately upon
return of voting system
NOTE: All electronic pollbooks at precinct or vote center must be
immediately delivered by inspector and judge of opposite party with
other election material on election night from that location and secured
by county election board.
IC 3-11-3-10 | IC 3-11-3-11 | IC 3-12-3-2.2 | IC 3-12-3.5-4.5
Forms
THANKS!
Questions?
Learn about the necessary steps to secure election infrastructure in Indiana. Ensure public confidence in the election process. Contact Dustin Renner at the SOS office today.
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Presentation Transcript
Indiana Requirements to Secure Election Infrastructure Valerie Warycha Indiana Election Division Republican Co-Counsel
Why do we do this? 2016 Arizona SVRS breached by Russia Got in with a phishing email to a county employee with access to SVRS No impairment to SVRS or voter registration records, but public confidence in election process severely damaged
All Counties must use FireEye All counties are required to use a cybersecurity company designated by the Secretary of State per IC 3-5-4-12. SECURITY COMPANY
Not Using FireEye? Lock it up Today! Call Dustin Renner at the SOS office today! durenner@sos.in.gov or 317-233-4902
County Refusing to use FireEye? Things to think about. If your county is breached and SVRS is affected, what is your response to the media? If your county is breached, it can be costly. According to securityintelligence.com, a breach to a government agency costs around $2M. When the city of Baltimore was breached, it cost 18.2M. Recovery efforts took months and services for water billing, property taxes, parking tickets, email, phones all disrupted.
Security Policy for Voting Systems and ePBs Each county election board may have a security protocol to secure its voting systems and ePBs which must contain an audit trail to detect unauthorized access to the systems or ePBs The security protocol must be adopted by unanimous vote of the entire board (and must be filed with IED when approved) If CEB has not adopted a security protocol then board must use the methods set forth in state law IC 3-11-15-46
Statutory Security Method for Voting System & ePBs CEB must place a uniquely numbered seal on each voting system and ePB to secure the equipment and allow for post- election auditing The seal has been prescribed by IED via VSTOP memo The seal must be placed on each voting system and ePB once the canvassing of the vote on election day is complete and must remain in place except when the CEB orders its unsealing for one of these reasons: To conduct maintenance on the system or ePB or prepare the system for the next election in the county To install certified updates to the hardware, software, or firmware of the system or update the ePB Conduct a public test or audit that is required by law For the CEB to correct an error under IC 3-12-5-14 or when ordered unsealed during a recount or contest action IC 3-11-15-46
Statutory Security Method for Voting System & ePBs CEB must reseal the equipment immediately after completing the reason the equipment was first unsealed The equipment may remain unsealed when the device is prepared for election day until canvass for that election is completed CEB must document each time the equipment is sealed and unsealed including Identifying the serial number of each voting system or ePB that is sealed and unsealed The date of the sealing or unsealing took place The individual who sealed or unsealed the device IC 3-11-15-46
Voting System Delivery to Polls Only the following can deliver a voting system to the polls: County Election Board Two-person team designated by CEB with each member affiliated with a different party of the two appointed CEB members (One D & One R) Commercial delivery entity under contract with CEB Team members or commercial delivery company employees cannot be imprisoned, subject to lawful or home detention, on probation, parole, or placed in a community corrections program Team members and commercial delivery employees must execute CEB- 1A form after delivery of voting system to polling location or vote center and file with CEB Person receiving the unit must also affix their signature IC 3-11-3-10
Voting System Return from Polls Only the following can return a voting system from the polls: County Election Board Two-person team designated by CEB with each member affiliated with a different party of the two appointed CEB members (One D & One R) Commercial delivery entity under contract with CEB Can return from polls at any time after Election Day to secure storage facility designated by county Team members or commercial delivery company employees cannot be imprisoned, subject to lawful or home detention, on probation, parole, or placed in a community corrections program Team members and commercial delivery employees must execute CEB-1C form after delivery of voting system from polling location or vote center and file with CEB Person receiving the unit must also affix their signature IC 3-12-3-2.2 | IC 3-12-3.5-4.5
Voting System Return from Polls Form CEB-1C must certify that: Voting systems remained in custody of each of the two individuals during entire time systems were being returned No unauthorized person has access to any voting system during return The name and signature of person who received voting system and date that system was delivered to custody of that individual Completed Form CEB-1C must be filed with county election board immediately upon return of voting system NOTE: All electronic pollbooks at precinct or vote center must be immediately delivered by inspector and judge of opposite party with other election material on election night from that location and secured by county election board. IC 3-11-3-10 | IC 3-11-3-11 | IC 3-12-3-2.2 | IC 3-12-3.5-4.5
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