Garbled RAM and Secure Computation

 
Black-Box Garbled RAM
 
Sanjam Garg
UC Berkeley
Based on join works with
Steve Lu, Rafail Ostrovsky and Alessandra Scafuro
 
Two-party Secure Computation…
 
Yao’s garbled circuits
RAM analogue of Garbled circuits
User
Server
More Ambitious: Garbled RAM
[LO13,GHLORW14]
User
Server
 
 
 
Garbled circuits lead to a solution where the
communication and computational cost per
program grows with database size.
More Ambitious: Garbled RAM
[LO13,GHLORW14]
User
Server
 
 
Garbled circuits lead to a solution where the
communication and computational cost per
program grows with database size.
Full-security: Server learns nothing but the output
Unprotected Memory Access (UMA): Server learns
access pattern.
 
ORAM [Goldreich-Ostrovsky]
Landscape: Garbled RAM
 
Known results make non-black box use of OWFs
[LO13, GHLORS14, 
G
LOS15]
OWF can’t be modeled as a random oracle
 
Focus of this talk: do it using only black-box use of
OWFs?
Qualitatively better efficiency [
G
LO15]
 
Not talk about succinct constructions based on iO
[CHJV14, B
G
T14, LP14, KLW15, CH15, CCCLLZ15...]
 
Outline of the rest of the talk
 
RAM model
LO13 approach ([GHLORW13, 
G
LOS15] are similar)
Technical bottleneck in realizing black-box
construction
High level idea of black-box construction [
G
LO15]
RAM Model
CPU
 step 1
CPU
 step 2
CPU
  step 3
LO13 approach
CPU
 step 1
CPU
 step 2
CPU
  step 3
 
Use garbled circuits!
LO13 approach
CPU
 step 1
CPU
 step 2
CPU
  step 3
Translate
 what is in the memory
1) garbling memory
2) translate table
LO13 approach
CPU
 step 1
CPU
 step 2
CPU
  step 3
S
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LO13 approach
CPU
 step 1
CPU
 step 2
CPU
  step 3
S
T
E
P
 
2
:
 
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r
a
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l
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k
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g
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K
K
K
 
Technical Bottleneck
 
The data needs to be encrypted so that the server
doesn’t learn it!
 
CPU step garbled circuits 
need to decrypt the read
values internally
Need of black-box use of cryptography seems
inherent
 
 
G
LO15 high level idea
 
Garbled memory comprises of a collection of
garbled circuits with data values hardwired 
in them
 
Read implemented by a
 
sub-routine
 call
Control flow is passed to memory circuits
G
LO15 – for one read only
 
………
G
LO15 – for one read only
………
Memory no
longer useful!
………
………
………
………
………
………
How many
backups? How
do we connect
them?
Assume uniform
memory accesses.
How to connect backups?
………
………
How to connect backups?
………
………
How to connect backups?
………
………
Our Fix: Moving window
Our Fix: Moving window
G
LO15 – for unbounded reads
 
………
 
………
 
………
 
………
 
………
 
………
Add more
garbled circuits
to each queue!
This process
can be
amortized!
 
Security proof - other issues
 
Circularity issue
Input labels of one garbled circuit are hardcoded
in quite a few other garbled circuits
We 
remove this issue 
in our final solution
 
Input labels of one garbled circuit are
provided by different sources at different
times
Conclusion
 
Cryptography for RAM computation
 
Secure RAM computation
Typically 
large round complexity
Barrier to efficiency – 
non-black box 
use
Remove this barrier
 
 Expect consequences in efficient constructions
with weaker security…
 
Thanks!
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Garbled RAM, a concept based on garbled circuits, allows for secure two-party computation with implications for communication and computational complexities. The progression from basic to more ambitious scenarios in Garbled RAM models and the landscape of utilizing OWFs in a black-box manner for improved efficiency are discussed. Technical bottlenecks and high-level construction ideas are explored, shedding light on the RAM model's execution steps.

  • Garbled RAM
  • Secure Computation
  • Communication Complexity
  • Computational Complexity
  • OWFs

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  1. Black-Box Garbled RAM Sanjam Garg UC Berkeley Based on join works with Steve Lu, Rafail Ostrovsky and Alessandra Scafuro

  2. Two-party Secure Computation Yao s garbled circuits

  3. RAM analogue of Garbled circuits Server User ?,? ?,? ?(?) If the running time of the program ? is ? then the corresponding circuit is of size ?3. Communication complexity and computational complexity of both parties grows with ?3.

  4. More Ambitious: Garbled RAM [LO13,GHLORW14] Server User ??,?? ??(??) ??,?? Garbled circuits lead to a solution where the communication and computational cost per program grows with database size. Size of garbled database is ? ? Communication and computation cost grows in ? ??

  5. More Ambitious: Garbled RAM [LO13,GHLORW14] Server User ??,?? ??(??) ??,?? ORAM [Goldreich-Ostrovsky] Full-security: Server learns nothing but the output Unprotected Memory Access (UMA): Server learns Garbled circuits lead to a solution where the communication and computational cost per program grows with database size. access pattern.

  6. Landscape: Garbled RAM Known results make non-black box use of OWFs [LO13, GHLORS14, GLOS15] OWF can t be modeled as a random oracle Focus of this talk: do it using only black-box use of OWFs? Qualitatively better efficiency [GLO15] Not talk about succinct constructions based on iO [CHJV14, BGT14, LP14, KLW15, CH15, CCCLLZ15...]

  7. Outline of the rest of the talk RAM model LO13 approach ([GHLORW13, GLOS15] are similar) Technical bottleneck in realizing black-box construction High level idea of black-box construction [GLO15]

  8. RAM Model next index next index next index read 2 read 1 read 3 CPU step 2 CPU step 1 CPU step 3 Writes require additional work but let s ignore that!

  9. LO13 approach next index next index next index read 2 read 1 read 3 CPU step 2 CPU step 1 CPU step 3 Use garbled circuits!

  10. LO13 approach next index next index next index read 2 read 1 read 3 CPU step 2 CPU step 1 CPU step 3 Translate what is in the memory How do reads work? Access pattern is revealed! 1) garbling memory 2) translate table

  11. LO13 approach STEP 1: garbling of the memory ?? ? ????(?,??) next index next index next index read 2 read 1 read 3 CPU step 2 CPU step 1 CPU step 3 PRF key K to garble

  12. LO13 approach STEP 2: translate table ?? ? ????(?,??) ? next index next index next index read 2 ?0,?1 read 1 read 3 CPU step 2 K CPU step 1 CPU step 3 K K ???(?????,0 ,?0) PRF key K to garble ???(?????,1 ,?1)

  13. Technical Bottleneck The data needs to be encrypted so that the server doesn t learn it! CPU step garbled circuits need to decrypt the read values internally Need of black-box use of cryptography seems inherent

  14. GLO15 high level idea Garbled memory comprises of a collection of garbled circuits with data values hardwired in them Read implemented by a sub-routine call Control flow is passed to memory circuits

  15. GLO15 for one read only ?,?0,?1 ?1 ?2

  16. GLO15 for one read only Say ? = 2 ?,?0,?1 Memory no longer useful! ?1 ?2 Outputs ??2

  17. GLO15 for ? reads only Say ? = 2 ?,?0,?1 How many backups? How do we connect them? Assume uniform memory accesses. ?1 ?2 Outputs ??2

  18. How to connect backups?

  19. How to connect backups?

  20. How to connect backups? Problem: Number of keys hardcoded in each circuit needs to keep grow. But not all, because of uniform memory access ? reads can cause an imbalance of ?

  21. Our Fix: Moving window

  22. Our Fix: Moving window Ensure that next unused children remain in window: Have 1 + ? times the garbled circuits needed and perform artificial consumption if lagging from window. Over-consumption beyond this does not happen

  23. GLO15 for unbounded reads Replenish memory in an oblivious way After ? reads have been performed, memory has been replenished to support ? more reads Add more garbled circuits to each queue! This process can be amortized! ?1 ?2

  24. Security proof - other issues Circularity issue Input labels of one garbled circuit are hardcoded in quite a few other garbled circuits We remove this issue in our final solution Input labels of one garbled circuit are provided by different sources at different times

  25. Conclusion Cryptography for RAM computation Secure RAM computation Typically large round complexity Barrier to efficiency non-black box use Remove this barrier Expect consequences in efficient constructions with weaker security

  26. Thanks!

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