Elastic Security Virtualization with vNIDS

vNIDS: Towards Elastic Security with Safe
and Efficient Virtualization of Network
Intrusion Detection Systems
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u
2
,
Gail-Joon Ahn
3
, and Fuqiang Zhang
1
1
 
CCS 2018
Traditional NIDSes
Traditional NIDSes
 
Multi-thread
Clustered
 
Multi-thread
GPU Acceleration
 
Multi-thread
GPU Acceleration
Traditional NIDSes
Limited in flexibility
:
Fixed location
Constant capacity
Address scalability issue
:
Multi-core/thread
Cluster
Requirement 1: Virtualized Environments
Virtualized Network Zones
Zone
3
Zone
2
Zone
1
Datacenter
2
Datacenter
1
Datacenter
3
Infrastructure
 
Service
 Migration
 
Blur & Fluid Perimeters
Requirement 2: Traffic Volume Variation
Source: 
https://blog.cloudflare.com/a-winter-of-400gbps-weekend-ddos-attacks/ 
Gbps
DDoS attack on Feb. 2016
 
Significant
Variation
Time
Expensive option:
capacity 
 peak traffic load
New Trends
Virtualization Platform
 
Network Function Virtualization (NFV)
Software instances
Software-Define Networking (SDN)
Dynamic traffic steering
Elastic Security
Elastic Security
Bohatei
(USENIX Sec’15)
PSI
(NDSS’17)
VFW Controller
(NDSS’17)
Scalable 
and 
Flexible
network security functions
vNIDS enables 
safe
 and 
efficient
NIDS virtualization
Safe Virtualization: 
does not miss attacks
Efficient Virtualization: 
provisioned optimally
Ch. 1: Effective Intrusion Detection
 
Scanner Detector
Missing Malicious Activities 
Ch. 1: Effective Intrusion Detection
 
Can’t fit
Ch. 2: Non-monolithic NIDS Provisioning
Inefficient Resource Allocation
Ch. 2: Non-monolithic NIDS Provisioning
Monolithic 
NIDS Instance
Inefficient Scaling
Ch. 2: Non-monolithic NIDS Provisioning
How to decompose?
General
Fine-grained
How to enforce
detection logics?
Monolithic
Provisioning
Non-monolithic
Provisioning
 
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vNIDS Architecture Overview
 
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vNIDS Architecture Overview
 
Header-based Detection
Microservice
 
Protocol Parse
Microservice
 
Payload-based Detection
Microservice
 
3
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Scope of Detection States
 
Flow record
Essential data structure of NFs
Lifetime
Determines scope of detection states
 
Inferring the Scope of Detection States
 
Compute the
CFG
 of the
detector
Compute the
CFG
 of the
detector
Flow record is freed
here (Statement T)
Inferring the Scope of Detection States
 
Compute 
dominator
of statement T
Compute the
CFG
 of the
detector
 
Statement T
 
Entry point
Inferring the Scope of Detection States
Compute 
dominator
of statement T
Compute the
CFG
 of the
detector
Compute 
dominator
of statement T
Per-flow 
detection state
Multi-flow
detection
state
Statement T
Entry point
Dominator of T
Inferring the Scope of Detection States
Logic Structure of NIDSes
Monolithic NIDS
Network
Traffic
Network layer processing
Payload parsing
Various detection tasks
Types of Detection Logics
 
Only inspect header
Not rely on APPs
 
Inspect header & payload
Need APPs
Monolithic NIDS
Network
Traffic
Decomposing NIDSes
Detection Logic Program Partitioning
Implementation & Evaluation
 
Implementation
Xen 
hypervisor
Frama-C
 framework for program analysis
Click
 for microservices and DLPs
RAMCloud
 for detection states sharing
Evaluation
CloudLab
Real-world dataset + generated attack traffic
Effectiveness of vNIDS
Malicious Activity Detection Rate (%)
CAIDA+Attack.trace
Malicious Activity Detection Rate (%)
LBNL+Attack.trace
Malicious Activity Detection Rate (%)
Campus+Attack.trace
 
* 
Detect all malicious activity
: Bro, Share All, and vNIDS
 
* 
Miss malicious activities
: No Share
Performance Improvements by Detection
State Classification
 
Packet Processing Time (microsecond)
 
Packet Processing Time Reduced (%)
 
* 
Reduced rate
: more than 50%
 
* 
Reduced processing time
: for all six detection logics
 
> 50%
Efficiency of Microservices
Launch Time (millisec)
 
* 
Monolithic NIDS
: launch slower
 
* 
Microservice
: scale faster
Flexibility of vNIDS
Flexibility of vNIDS
 
Virtualized NIDS
Instances
Flexibility of vNIDS
 
Virtualized NIDS
Instance-A
 
Virtualized NIDS
Instance-B
Flexibility of vNIDS
Reduce by 
99.9%
 in the 
best case
Reduce by 
58.3%
 in the 
worst case
Flexibility of vNIDS
Runtime throughput of vNIDS and Bro Cluster
Conclusion and Future Work
 
Make a further step towards elastic security
Safe and efficient NIDS virtualization
Effective intrusion detection
Non-monolithic NIDS provisioning
Implementation and Evaluation
3 microservices & 6 detection logic programs
Extensive Evaluation of vNIDS
Future work
More fine-grained microservices
Generalize our approach for other security and non-
security NFs
Q & A
 
hongdal@clemson.edu
Clemson University
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Explore the concept of Elastic Security through Safe and Efficient Virtualization of Network Intrusion Detection Systems using vNIDS. This study delves into the challenges of traditional NIDSes, the requirements for virtualized environments, traffic volume variations, new trends in network function virtualization, and the benefits of Elastic Security NIDS virtualization. Discover the importance of flexible location and capacity for scalable and flexible network security functions.

  • Elastic Security
  • Virtualization
  • Network Intrusion Detection
  • vNIDS
  • Network Function Virtualization

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  1. vNIDS: Towards Elastic Security with Safe and Efficient Virtualization of Network Intrusion Detection Systems Hongda Li1, Hongxin Hu1, Guofei Gu2, Gail-Joon Ahn3, and Fuqiang Zhang1 3 3 2 1 CCS 2018

  2. Traditional NIDSes

  3. Traditional NIDSes Multi-thread Clustered Multi-thread GPU Acceleration Multi-thread GPU Acceleration

  4. Traditional NIDSes Multi-thread Clustered Address scalability issue: Multi-core/thread Cluster Multi-thread GPU Acceleration Limited in flexibility: Fixed location Constant capacity Multi-thread GPU Acceleration

  5. Requirement 1: Virtualized Environments Virtualized Network Zones Blur & Fluid Perimeters Zone1 Zone2 Zone3 Service Migration Datacenter2 Datacenter1 Datacenter3 Infrastructure

  6. Requirement 2: Traffic Volume Variation Expensive option: DDoS attack on Feb. 2016 capacity peak traffic load Gbps 400 320 240 Significant Variation 160 80 0 2/19 2/22 2/25 Time Source: https://blog.cloudflare.com/a-winter-of-400gbps-weekend-ddos-attacks/

  7. New Trends Network Function Virtualization (NFV) Software instances Software-Define Networking (SDN) Dynamic traffic steering Virtualization Platform SDN Switch Elastic Security NFV SDN

  8. Elastic Security NIDS Virtualization: flexible location & capacity Scalable and Flexible network security functions Existing Work VFW Controller (NDSS 17) Bohatei (USENIX Sec 15) PSI (NDSS 17)

  9. vNIDS enables safe and efficient NIDS virtualization Safe Virtualization: does not miss attacks Efficient Virtualization: provisioned optimally

  10. Ch. 1: Effective Intrusion Detection Missing Malicious Activities Instance2 Instance1 SIP=10.1.1.1 SIP=10.1.1.1 SIP=10.1.1.1 SDN Switch Scanner Detector

  11. Ch. 1: Effective Intrusion Detection Multi-flow State Per-flow State Shared Data Store Instance2 Instance1 How to distinguish per-flow and multi-flow states?

  12. Ch. 2: Non-monolithic NIDS Provisioning Inefficient Resource Allocation Can t fit 3 2 Monolithic NIDS Instance Virtualized NIDSes: Allocate and deallocate more frequently Cloud

  13. Ch. 2: Non-monolithic NIDS Provisioning Inefficient Scaling Detector2 Detector1 Overloaded NIDS Engine Detector2 Detector1 Over-provisioned Scale slow Monolithic NIDS Instance NIDS Engine Detector2 Detector1 Virtualized NIDSes: NIDS Engine Scale more frequently

  14. Ch. 2: Non-monolithic NIDS Provisioning Non-monolithic Provisioning Monolithic Provisioning General How to decompose? Fine-grained How to enforce detection logics?

  15. vNIDS Architecture Overview Detection Logic Programs 1. program analysis vNIDS Controller Effective Intrusion Detection Detection State Classification State Management vNIDS Microservice Instances 2. detection state sharing Shared Data Store Shared Data Store Shared Data Store

  16. vNIDS Architecture Overview Detection Logic Programs 4. program slicing vNIDS Controller Effective Intrusion Detection Non-Monolithic NIDS Provisioning Detection State Classification Detection Logic Program Partitioning State Management Provision Control 3. microservices vNIDS Microservice Instances Payload-based Detection Instances Header-based Detection Instances Protocol Parse Instances Shared Data Store Shared Data Store Shared Data Store Header-based Detection Microservice Payload-based Detection Microservice Protocol Parse Microservice

  17. Scope of Detection States Flow record Essential data structure of NFs Lifetime Determines scope of detection states Always freed before a flow record is freed Dedicated to a certain flow Not always freed before a flow record is freed Must be freed by other flows

  18. Inferring the Scope of Detection States Compute the CFG of the detector

  19. Inferring the Scope of Detection States Compute the CFG of the detector Compute dominator of statement T Flow record is freed here (Statement T)

  20. Inferring the Scope of Detection States Entry point Compute the CFG of the detector Compute dominator of statement T Dominator of T Statement T

  21. Inferring the Scope of Detection States Entry point Compute the CFG of the detector Compute dominator of statement T Multi-flow detection state Dominator of T Statement T Per-flow detection state

  22. Logic Structure of NIDSes Various detection tasks Detection Logics Application Protocol Parsers Payload parsing Network Traffic Network Protocol Stack Network layer processing Monolithic NIDS

  23. Types of Detection Logics Only inspect header Not rely on APPs Type-II Detection Logics Type-I Application Protocol Parsers Network Traffic Inspect header & payload Need APPs Network Protocol Stack Monolithic NIDS

  24. Decomposing NIDSes Monolithic NIDS Type-II Detection Logics Type-I Application Protocol Parsers NIDS Decomposed as Microservices Network Protocol Stack Type-II Type-I Application Protocol Parsers Detection Logics Detection Logics Network Protocol Stack Network Protocol Stack Network Protocol Stack Payload-based Detection Microservice Header-based Detection Microservice Protocol Parse Microservice

  25. Detection Logic Program Partitioning 1 Detection Logic Program 2 4 3 Partitioned DLPs

  26. Implementation & Evaluation Implementation Xen hypervisor Frama-C framework for program analysis Click for microservices and DLPs RAMCloud for detection states sharing Evaluation CloudLab Real-world dataset + generated attack traffic

  27. Effectiveness of vNIDS Bro vNIDS Share All No Share Bro vNIDS Share All No Share Bro vNIDS Share All No Share Malicious Activity Detection Rate (%) Malicious Activity Detection Rate (%) Malicious Activity Detection Rate (%) 1.2 1.2 1.2 1 1 1 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 0 0 0 CAIDA+Attack.trace LBNL+Attack.trace Campus+Attack.trace * Detect all malicious activity: Bro, Share All, and vNIDS * Miss malicious activities: No Share

  28. Performance Improvements by Detection State Classification Processing Time saved by vNIDS (%) No Sharing vNIDS Share All Packet Processing Time (microsecond) Packet Processing Time Reduced (%) 120 800 700 100 > 50% 600 80 500 60 400 300 40 200 20 100 0 0 * Reduced processing time: for all six detection logics * Reduced rate: more than 50%

  29. Efficiency of Microservices 700 Launch Time (millisec) Header-based Detection 600 500 400 Protocol Analysis 300 200 Payload-based Detection 100 0 Monolithic * Monolithic NIDS: launch slower * Microservice: scale faster

  30. Flexibility of vNIDS Traditional NIDS Instances Internet Rerouted Traffic Site-2 (Wisconsin) Site-1 (Clemson) AAA BBB BBB

  31. Flexibility of vNIDS Virtualized NIDS Instances Internet Rerouted Traffic Site-2 (Wisconsin) Site-1 (Clemson) AAA BBB

  32. Flexibility of vNIDS Virtualized NIDS Instance-B Virtualized NIDS Instance-A Internet Communication Traffic Site-2 (Wisconsin) Site-1 (Clemson) AAA BBB

  33. Flexibility of vNIDS Reduce by 99.9% in the best case Reduce by 58.3% in the worst case

  34. Flexibility of vNIDS Runtime throughput of vNIDS and Bro Cluster Adjustable Resource Consumption Number of instances of vNIDS and Bro Cluster

  35. Conclusion and Future Work Make a further step towards elastic security Safe and efficient NIDS virtualization Effective intrusion detection Non-monolithic NIDS provisioning Implementation and Evaluation 3 microservices & 6 detection logic programs Extensive Evaluation of vNIDS Future work More fine-grained microservices Generalize our approach for other security and non- security NFs

  36. Q & A hongdal@clemson.edu Clemson University

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