Deception in Risk Analysis and Military Scenarios
Deception plays a crucial role in risk analysis, particularly in military scenarios where adversaries employ strategies to mislead and confuse. This involves reasoning under uncertainty, employing tactics like feint attacks, counter-recce activities, dummy airfields, and more. Understanding the use of deception is essential in effectively assessing and responding to risks posed by intelligent adversaries.
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Adversarial Risk Analysis and Deception Ken McNaught K.R.McNaught@cranfield.ac.uk Centre for Simulation and Analytics Cranfield University Defence Academy of the UK
Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) vs Adversarial Risk Analysis (ARA) Much work in terrorism risk research has employed PRA, e.g. CREATE studies This has been criticised on several grounds: Intelligent adversaries can adapt their behaviour
PRA vs ARA Another distinction between PRA and ARA which matters is the use of deception
PRA versus ARA Nature never deceives us; it is we who deceive ourselves. Jean Jacques Rousseau All war is based on deception. Sun Tzu
Deception fundamentally involves reasoning under uncertainty We consider a military scenario involving a Red adversary with four possible courses of action available M (Main Attack) A (Advance) D (Defend) W (Withdraw) A scenario was scripted, consistent with Withdrawal and including a deception plan to indicate a Main Attack Bayesian networks and ACH are employed to reason about the scenario as it unfolds over time
Time Step Actions Taken by the Red Side and Indicators Detected by the Blue Side 1 Blue establishes air and ground recce. 2 Red deploys air and ground recce as deception; Red increases counter-recce activities as deception; Red establishes dummy airfields as deception. 3 Red establishes demolition on bridges; Blue sub-unit reports sighting of Red recce (S3MA1); Blue ground recce reports Red counter-recce activities (S2MAD4); Blue air recce reports sighting of Red aux airfields (S1MA3). 4 Red conducts feint attacks; Blue ground recce report sighting of Red aux airfield (S2MA3) and demolition on bridges (S2DW15); Blue sub-unit reports local attacks (S3M8). 5 Red evacuates non-essential services; Blue sub-unit reports sighting of demolition on bridges (S3DW15). 6 Red employs smoke and jamming and a defensive frontage; Blue ground recce reports sighting of Red evacuation of non-essential services (S2W19) and Red s use of smoke (S2MW10); Blue sub-unit reports Red s use of smoke (S3MW10) and jamming (S3MW11); Blue Signals report Red s jamming (S4MW11); Blue sub-unit reports Red s defensive frontage (S3W18). 7 Red begins systematic destruction of bridges and commences withdrawal; Blue air and ground recce report sightings of Red destruction of bridges (S1W20 and S2W20).
Bayesian Networks Efficient method of representing and manipulating a joint probability distribution over a domain of interest. A DAG describes the probabilistic dependencies within the domain Tables of conditional probabilities quantify the relationships.
Partial BN of Scenario Enemy Intent Main Att Adv Def Wdrw 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 Establishment of Red aux airfields True False Counter-recce activities True False 37.5 37.5 62.5 62.5 Counter-recce observed by Blue GR True False 57.5 42.5 Red aux airfields observed by Blue GR True False 42.5 57.5 Counter-recce observed by Blue AR True False Red aux airfields observed by Blue AR True False 57.5 42.5 45.0 55.0
Enemy Intent Main Att Adv Def Wdrw Fwd Mvt of Logistics True False 47.5 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 52.5 Establishment of en airfields True False Inc En Air & Gnd Recce True False 42.5 Counter-recce activities True False 37.5 Fwd Mvt of Missiles True False 63.7 Conc towards flanks True False 50.0 Radio Silence True False 20.0 Demos and feints True False 42.5 False Fwd units on narrow front and depth Smoke Ops 60.0 40.0 Jamming 65.0 35.0 37.5 62.5 57.5 62.5 36.3 50.0 80.0 57.5 True True False 50.0 50.0 True False Change in Command Net True False 57.5 Airborne Activity True False 57.5 Erecting Barbed Wire True False 55.0 Obstacles, minefields, etc True False Inc AT assets with fwd units True False 47.5 Frontage on defensive True False Evacuation of non-essential services True False 57.5 Destruction of various facilities True False Prepn of dummy posns True False 42.5 45.0 60.0 40.0 45.0 55.0 42.5 35.0 65.0 35.0 65.0 52.5 42.5 S1MA3 42.5 57.5 S3MA1 53.0 47.0 S2MAD4 57.5 42.5 True False True False True False S2MA3 45.0 55.0 S2DW15 60.0 40.0 S3M8 53.0 47.0 True False True False True False S4MD7 72.0 28.0 S2D14 52.5 47.5 S3DW15 56.0 44.0 True False True False True False S1MD5 41.8 58.2 S2MD5 44.5 55.5 S2W19 47.5 52.5 Withdraw Remover True False 25.0 True False True False True False 75.0 S2MW10 66.0 34.0 S3MW10 62.0 38.0 S3MW11 59.5 40.5 S4MW11 59.0 41.0 True False True False True False True False S3W18 51.2 48.7 S1MA2 51.5 48.5 S1MA6 50.0 50.0 S2MA6 50.0 50.0 True False True False True False True False S1W20 47.5 52.5 S2W20 44.0 56.0 S2MD9 50.0 50.0 S3MD9 50.0 50.0 True False True False True False True False S3MA12 57.0 43.0 S4A13 45.5 54.5 S2DW16 56.3 43.7 True False True False True False S3D17 47.0 53.0 True False
Inferred Probability of Enemy Intent vs Time Vignette 2 - Withdrawal Under Deception 0.6 Variable M A W 0.5 D W M P(Enemy Intent) 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 A D 0.0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Time Step Probability Distribution of Enemy Intent vs Time
Inferred Probability of Enemy Intent vs Time Vignette 2 - Withdrawal Under Deception - inc. false evidence 1.0 Variable M A W D W 0.8 P(Enemy Intent) 0.6 M 0.4 A 0.2 D 0.0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Time Step Probability Distribution of Enemy Intent vs Time with Negative Evidence Included
Withdraw Remover True False 0 100 Enemy Intent Main Att Adv Def Wdrw Fwd Mvt of Logistics True False 24.4 82.9 10.3 6.82 0 75.6 Establishment of en airfi... True False Inc En Air & Gnd Recce True False 12.3 Counter-recce activities True False 6.27 Fwd Mvt of Missiles True False 27.9 Conc towards flanks True False 24.1 Radio Silence True False 12.1 Demos and feints True False 13.2 Fwd units on narrow fron... True False Smoke Ops 96.8 3.20 Jamming 95.7 4.32 92.3 7.67 87.7 93.7 72.1 75.9 87.9 86.8 80.4 19.6 True False True False Change in Command Net True False 64.8 Airborne Activity True False 25.8 Erecting Barbed Wire True False 65.9 Obstacles, minefields, etc True False 16.8 Inc AT assets with fwd u... True False 66.6 Frontage on defensive True False 46.7 Evacuation of non-essent... True False Destruction of various fa... True False Prepn of dummy posns True False 35.2 34.1 83.2 34.1 65.9 53.3 40.0 60.0 60.9 39.1 33.4 74.2 S1MA3 100 0 S3MA1 100 0 S2MAD4 100 0 True False True False True False S2MA3 100 0 S2DW15 100 0 S3M8 100 0 True False True False True False S4MD7 75.2 24.8 S2D14 47.0 53.0 S3DW15 100 0 True False True False True False S1MD5 63.3 36.7 S2MD5 58.9 41.1 S2W19 100 0 True False True False True False S2MW10 100 0 S3MW10 100 0 S3MW11 100 0 S4MW11 100 0 True False True False True False True False S3W18 100 0 S1MA2 65.3 34.7 S1MA6 65.5 34.5 S2MA6 60.4 39.6 True False True False True False True False S1W20 100 0 S2W20 100 0 S2MD9 68.3 31.7 S3MD9 62.2 37.8 True False True False True False True False S3MA12 69.7 30.3 S4A13 41.1 58.9 S2DW16 46.7 53.3 True False True False True False Correct hypothesis removed and only positive evidence included S3D17 40.5 59.5 True False
Enemy Intent Main Att Adv Def Wdrw 82.9 10.3 6.82 0
Now we also consider negative evidence alongside the missing correct hypothesis
Withdraw Remover True False 0 100 Enemy Intent Main Att Adv Def Wdrw Fwd Mvt of Logistics True False 71.4 32.9 20.9 46.3 0 28.6 Establishment of en airfi... True False Inc En Air & Gnd Recce True False 24.5 Counter-recce activities True False 6.67 Fwd Mvt of Missiles True False 87.6 Conc towards flanks True False 82.7 Radio Silence True False 31.5 Demos and feints True False 23.3 Fwd units on narrow fron... True False Smoke Ops 89.8 10.2 Jamming 87.6 12.4 74.4 25.6 75.5 93.3 12.4 17.3 68.5 76.7 18.7 81.3 True False True False Change in Command Net True False 81.9 Airborne Activity True False 70.4 Erecting Barbed Wire True False 60.8 Obstacles, minefields, etc True False 10.1 Inc AT assets with fwd u... True False 69.5 Frontage on defensive True False 46.7 Evacuation of non-essent... True False Destruction of various fa... True False Prepn of dummy posns True False 18.1 39.2 89.9 37.2 62.8 53.3 40.0 60.0 60.9 39.1 30.5 29.6 S1MA3 100 0 S3MA1 100 0 S2MAD4 100 0 True False True False True False S2MA3 100 0 S2DW15 100 0 S3M8 100 0 True False True False True False S4MD7 0 100 S2D14 0 100 S3DW15 100 0 True False True False True False S1MD5 0 100 S2MD5 0 100 S2W19 100 0 True False True False True False S2MW10 100 0 S3MW10 100 0 S3MW11 100 0 S4MW11 100 0 True False True False True False True False S3W18 100 0 S1MA2 0 100 S1MA6 0 100 S2MA6 0 100 True False True False True False True False S1W20 100 0 S2W20 100 0 S2MD9 0 100 S3MD9 0 100 True False True False True False True False S3MA12 0 100 S4A13 0 100 S2DW16 0 100 True False True False True False Correct hypothesis removed but negative evidence also included S3D17 0 100 True False
Enemy Intent Main Att Adv Def Wdrw 32.9 20.9 46.3 0 Previously, with only positive evidence, it was: Enemy Intent Main Att Adv Def Wdrw 82.9 10.3 6.82 0
What happens if we replace the correct Withdraw hypothesis with a general alternative, Other ?
Probability of Intent vs Time 'Withdraw' Hypothesis Removed and 'Other' Hypothesis Included 0.7 Variable M A D O 0.6 0.5 P(Enemy Intent) 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Time P(Enemy Intent) vs Time with Correct Hypothesis Removed, General Other Hypothesis Added and Only Pos Evidence
And now we also consider negative evidence alongside the Other hypothesis
Probability of Intent vs Time Correct Hypothesis Removed and 'Other' Hypothesis Added 0.8 Variable M A D O 0.7 0.6 P(Enemy Intent) 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Time P(Enemy Intent) vs Time with Correct Hypothesis Removed, General Other Hypothesis Added and Negative Evidence Included
Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH) This framework for relating evidence and alternative explanations or hypotheses was proposed by Heuer (1999). One of its primary aims is to help analysts overcome confirmation bias A matrix is constructed in which columns represent the competing hypotheses and rows correspond to evidence (positive or negative) and assumptions
The greatest deception men suffer is from their own opinions. Leonardo da Vinci Very relevant for all expert judgment elicitation
ACH Framework Identify the alternative hypotheses to be considered. Identify what evidence and assumptions are relevant to these hypotheses. Construct the ACH matrix where the alternative hypotheses are the columns and each separate piece of evidence and assumption is a row. In the matrix, indicate what evidence (including negative evidence) and assumptions supports or contradicts each of the alternative hypotheses, and by how much, removing that which does not discriminate between hypotheses. Compare the relative likelihoods of all hypotheses, paying particular attention to evidence which contradicts a hypothesis, and identify future milestones when discriminating new evidence might come to light.
Advance Defend Withdraw Main Attack E1: Silence Red Radio ++ + ++ + E2: Red conducts feint attacks ++ + + + E3: Red Evacuation of Various Services - - - ++ E4:No forward movement of logistics observed - - + + E5:No AT assets observed at frontline+ + -- + E6: Red Counter- Recce Operating ++ ++ ++ - Forces
While the column with the most positive signs is the incorrect Main Attack hypothesis, the column with the fewest negative signs is the correct Withdraw hypothesis.
Expert Judgement Considerations An adversary can make good use of our cognitive biases, particularly confirmation bias Need to think widely in identifying which alternative hypotheses to consider Group effects likely to be important. Need to be wary of group-think and encourage dissent. Initial suggestions should be elicited individually and be anonymous.
Expert Judgement Considerations We can expect experts to vary widely in their ability to detect a deception when it is present Similarly, some experts will be more likely to believe that a deception is taking place when in fact it is not. Frameworks such as ACH and BNs help by focusing the experts attention on conditional assessments
Conclusions Deception fundamentally involves uncertain reasoning BNs offer a useful framework for this type of reasoning Importance of negative evidence, particularly when deception might be present. Consider use of a general other hypothesis in highly uncertain situations. Again the inference improved when negative evidence was also included in this case. More work needed with wider set of scenarios to judge whether these findings apply more generally.
