Commitment Transparency and Foreign Influence
undefined
C
o
m
m
i
t
m
e
n
t
T
r
a
n
s
p
a
r
e
n
c
y
a
n
d
F
o
r
e
i
g
n
I
n
f
l
u
e
n
c
e
December 11, 2020
Research Operations & Compliance
P
r
e
s
e
n
t
a
t
i
o
n
R
o
a
d
m
a
p
1.
Introduction to Foreign Influence & Commitment
Transparency
2.
National Trend: Enforcement Against Individual
Researchers
3.
Emerging Trend: Focus on Institutions
4.
Identified Risks
5.
BMC Response and Efforts
6.
Investigator Responsibilities and Obligations
7.
Interdepartmental Cooperation & Contacts
A
g
e
n
d
a
I
n
t
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
t
o
F
o
r
e
i
g
n
I
n
f
l
u
e
n
c
e
&
C
o
m
m
i
t
m
e
n
t
T
r
a
n
s
p
a
r
e
n
c
y
The federal government has increased oversight and focus on the threat of foreign influence
As a result there is a greater obligation of commitment transparency imposed on research
institutions
The government is concerned about
: malign foreign actors exerting undue influence, stealing
Intellectual Property (IP), interfering with research efforts, and creating conflicts of
commitment regarding federally funded projects
BMC is concerned about
: malign foreign actors or compromised entities conspiring or acting
to unduly take, use, or exert influence on BMC resources and assets (e.g. data, biological
materials)
W
h
a
t
I
s
T
h
e
G
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
E
x
p
e
c
t
i
n
g
f
r
o
m
I
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
s
a
n
d
R
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
e
r
s
?
̶
New responsive policies, procedures, and guidelines increasing transparent disclosures
▫
Responsive COI disclosure and oversight processes institutionally
̶
Broader, accurate disclosures from investigators applying for federal funding (e.g. Other
Support & Foreign Component) showing fuller research portfolio of support and
commitments
̶
Greater oversight and competent reviews of contracts coming into the institutions
▫
Vet for potential foreign influence or conflicts of commitment
K
e
y
T
r
e
n
d
s
:
̶
Focus has been on individual researchers
- c
ontinuation of enforcing against individuals expected
̶
New focus on institutions contemplated based on emerging trends
R
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
e
r
e
n
f
o
r
c
e
m
e
n
t
̶
Examples
▫
Dr. Charles Lieber, Harvard University, had undisclosed “strategic scientist” position at a Chinese
university for six years
̶
Paid $50K per month, $150K per year for living expenses, awarded $1.5 million to establish a
lab in China. Failed to disclose role as “contractual participant” in Thousand Talents program
̶
Arrested and charged with making “materially false, fictitious and fraudulent statements” in
failure to disclose when applying for $15 million in NIH grants
▫
Yanqing Ye, a BU researcher, lieutenant in the PLA and member of the Chinese Communist Party
̶
Misused login credentials (including sharing VPN credentials with superiors in China), and
spying to produce dossiers on US professors
̶
Returned to China, but still now indicted in federal charges including conspiracy, visa fraud,
making false statements, and acting as foreign government agent
▫
Univ. of Kansas tenured professor Feng Tao
̶
U.S. government grant and contract, funding his salary and research. Meanwhile also had
signed full-time employment contract at Fuzhou Univ., which included a nondisclosure clause
that prevented Univ. of Kansas and government finding out about double dipping
̶
Indicted on two counts of wire fraud and one count of federal program fraud
F
e
d
e
r
a
l
E
n
f
o
r
c
e
m
e
n
t
A
c
t
i
o
n
s
—
F
o
c
u
s
o
n
I
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
R
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
e
r
I
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
e
n
f
o
r
c
e
m
e
n
t
̶
Van Andel Research Institute
▫
Failed to disclose employment and other support that two now-former researchers had
with Chinese entities -- nondisclosures and omissions
▫
Charged under the False Claims Act (FCA), $5.5 million in restitution to DOJ
̶
UCLA
▫
Researcher discarded hard drive with evidence he transferred sensitive US software to
China’s National Univ. of Defense Tech. and falsely denying relationship with Chinese
military
▫
Arrested and charged with destroying evidence to obstruct an FBI investigation
E
m
e
r
g
i
n
g
T
r
e
n
d
,
E
n
f
o
r
c
e
m
e
n
t
A
g
a
i
n
s
t
I
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
s
I
d
e
n
t
i
f
i
e
d
R
i
s
k
s
I
d
e
n
t
i
f
i
e
d
R
i
s
k
s
−
F
u
n
d
i
n
g
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
h
i
p
s
w
i
t
h
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
o
r
g
a
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
s
/
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
(
e
.
g
.
C
h
i
n
e
s
e
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
;
P
e
o
p
l
e
’
s
L
i
b
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
A
r
m
y
,
e
v
e
n
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
i
e
s
a
n
d
h
o
s
p
i
t
a
l
s
)
.
−
F
o
r
e
i
g
n
t
a
l
e
n
t
p
r
o
g
r
a
m
s
(
e
.
g
.
T
h
o
u
s
a
n
d
T
a
l
e
n
t
s
R
e
c
r
u
i
t
m
e
n
t
p
r
o
g
r
a
m
)
−
F
a
i
l
u
r
e
t
o
d
i
s
c
l
o
s
e
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
f
u
n
d
i
n
g
a
n
d
o
t
h
e
r
o
u
t
s
i
d
e
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
i
e
s
−
E
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
U
.
S
.
S
h
a
d
o
w
l
a
b
o
r
a
t
o
r
i
e
s
–
t
o
d
u
p
l
i
c
a
t
e
,
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
,
o
r
d
i
v
e
r
t
w
o
r
k
d
o
n
e
a
t
U
.
S
.
i
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
s
−
E
m
b
e
d
d
i
n
g
o
r
r
e
c
r
u
i
t
i
n
g
u
n
w
i
t
t
i
n
g
,
w
i
l
l
i
n
g
,
o
r
m
a
l
i
g
n
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
a
g
e
n
t
s
i
n
t
o
i
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
s
f
o
r
u
n
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
z
e
d
I
P
t
r
a
n
s
f
e
r
o
r
a
s
s
e
t
d
i
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
−
M
i
s
u
s
e
o
f
t
h
e
p
e
e
r
-
r
e
v
i
e
w
s
y
s
t
e
m
(
e
.
g
.
u
n
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
z
e
d
d
i
s
c
l
o
s
u
r
e
o
r
p
a
y
f
o
r
p
l
a
y
r
e
v
i
e
w
)
−
T
h
e
f
t
o
f
C
O
V
I
D
-
1
9
r
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
o
r
m
a
n
i
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
r
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
−
P
r
o
c
u
r
e
m
e
n
t
/
S
u
p
p
l
y
C
h
a
i
n
–
r
e
v
i
e
w
i
n
g
o
u
r
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
h
i
p
s
w
i
t
h
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
s
u
p
p
l
i
e
r
s
a
n
d
e
n
s
u
r
e
p
r
o
p
e
r
v
e
t
t
i
n
g
f
o
r
f
u
t
u
r
e
s
u
p
p
l
i
e
r
s
i
s
k
e
y
−
O
t
h
e
r
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
i
n
t
e
r
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
,
s
u
c
h
a
s
u
n
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
z
e
d
e
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
t
r
a
n
s
f
e
r
o
f
m
a
t
e
r
i
a
l
s
a
n
d
d
a
t
a
I
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
a
l
I
n
i
t
i
a
t
i
v
e
s
a
n
d
S
t
e
p
s
C
r
e
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
R
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
I
n
t
e
g
r
i
t
y
,
S
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
a
n
d
C
o
m
m
i
t
m
e
n
t
T
r
a
n
s
p
a
r
e
n
c
y
(
R
I
S
C
T
)
T
a
s
k
F
o
r
c
e
E
d
u
c
a
t
i
n
g
r
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
c
o
m
m
u
n
i
t
y
o
f
t
h
e
r
i
s
k
s
t
o
p
r
o
m
o
t
e
o
u
r
c
u
l
t
u
r
e
o
f
i
n
t
e
g
r
i
t
y
−
Outside activity engagement
−
Full disclosure
P
r
o
v
i
d
e
r
e
s
o
u
r
c
e
s
f
o
r
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
r
e
v
i
e
w
a
n
d
c
o
n
f
l
i
c
t
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
i
n
c
l
u
d
i
n
g
r
e
d
f
l
a
g
l
a
n
g
u
a
g
e
t
r
i
g
g
e
r
i
n
g
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
i
n
f
l
u
e
n
c
e
r
e
v
i
e
w
o
r
o
t
h
e
r
e
s
c
a
l
a
t
i
o
n
R
e
v
i
e
w
a
n
d
u
p
d
a
t
e
B
M
C
p
o
l
i
c
i
e
s
a
n
d
p
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
e
s
C
o
m
m
i
t
m
e
n
t
T
r
a
n
s
p
a
r
e
n
c
y
a
n
d
F
o
r
e
i
g
n
I
n
f
l
u
e
n
c
e
g
u
i
d
a
n
c
e
d
o
c
u
m
e
n
t
s
a
n
d
t
r
a
i
n
i
n
g
m
a
t
e
r
i
a
l
s
,
a
n
d
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
i
n
g
f
o
r
s
t
a
y
i
n
g
u
p
t
o
d
a
t
e
o
n
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
s
a
n
d
f
u
t
u
r
e
r
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
p
l
a
n
s
C
o
n
f
l
i
c
t
o
f
I
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
–
r
e
v
i
s
e
d
a
n
n
u
a
l
c
o
n
f
l
i
c
t
o
f
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
d
i
s
c
l
o
s
u
r
e
s
u
r
v
e
y
,
a
n
d
b
r
o
a
d
e
n
e
d
s
c
o
p
e
t
o
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
c
o
n
f
l
i
c
t
s
o
f
c
o
m
m
i
t
m
e
n
t
a
n
d
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
s
C
o
n
f
l
i
c
t
o
f
C
o
m
m
i
t
m
e
n
t
p
o
l
i
c
y
(
c
r
e
a
t
i
o
n
)
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
s
/
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
i
n
f
l
u
e
n
c
e
r
e
v
i
e
w
p
r
o
c
e
s
s
(
c
r
e
a
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
i
m
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
a
t
i
o
n
)
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
s
/
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
i
n
f
l
u
e
n
c
e
m
i
n
i
g
u
i
d
a
n
c
e
f
o
r
C
h
a
i
r
s
–
c
r
e
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
h
i
g
h
-
l
e
v
e
l
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
d
o
c
u
m
e
n
t
B
M
C
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
:
W
h
a
t
I
s
B
M
C
D
o
i
n
g
t
o
S
u
p
p
o
r
t
C
o
m
m
i
t
m
e
n
t
T
r
a
n
s
p
a
r
e
n
c
y
?
E
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
/
T
r
a
i
n
i
n
g
P
l
a
n
f
o
r
R
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
t
y
(
c
r
e
a
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
i
m
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
a
t
i
o
n
)
T
r
a
v
e
l
a
n
d
T
r
a
n
s
f
e
r
r
i
n
g
B
M
C
D
a
t
a
–
c
r
e
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
p
r
o
c
e
s
s
f
o
r
t
r
a
v
e
l
l
i
n
g
w
i
t
h
d
a
t
a
,
i
n
c
l
u
d
i
n
g
i
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
a
l
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
l
e
t
t
e
r
T
r
a
v
e
l
a
n
d
T
r
a
n
s
f
e
r
r
i
n
g
B
i
o
l
o
g
i
c
a
l
M
a
t
e
r
i
a
l
s
–
c
r
e
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
p
r
o
c
e
s
s
f
o
r
t
r
a
v
e
l
a
n
d
w
h
a
t
t
o
d
o
w
h
e
n
y
o
u
w
a
n
t
t
o
t
r
a
n
s
f
e
r
b
i
o
l
o
g
i
c
a
l
m
a
t
e
r
i
a
l
s
c
o
r
r
e
c
t
l
y
O
t
h
e
r
S
u
p
p
o
r
t
a
n
d
F
o
r
e
i
g
n
C
o
m
p
o
n
e
n
t
–
w
o
r
k
i
n
g
c
o
m
m
i
t
t
e
e
i
n
c
l
u
d
i
n
g
R
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
O
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
s
a
n
d
d
e
p
a
r
t
m
e
n
t
l
e
a
d
e
r
s
̶
Guidance documents and resources
̶
Revise and standardize processes for reporting
̶
Broader education plan
E
m
a
i
l
u
s
a
g
e
a
n
d
d
a
t
a
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
–
c
r
e
a
t
e
g
u
i
d
a
n
c
e
o
n
B
M
C
e
m
a
i
l
u
s
a
g
e
R
i
s
k
I
d
e
n
t
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
A
u
d
i
t
–
P
e
r
i
o
d
i
c
e
f
f
o
r
t
s
t
o
a
s
s
e
s
s
,
u
n
d
e
r
s
t
a
n
d
,
a
n
d
a
d
d
r
e
s
s
o
u
r
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
r
i
s
k
s
B
M
C
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
,
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
…
O
t
h
e
r
S
u
p
p
o
r
t
P
a
g
e
a
n
d
F
o
r
e
i
g
n
C
o
m
p
o
n
e
n
t
R
e
p
o
r
t
i
n
g
̶
P
r
o
v
i
d
e
s
u
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
d
i
s
c
l
o
s
u
r
e
,
t
a
k
i
n
g
a
b
r
o
a
d
a
p
p
r
o
a
c
h
o
n
y
o
u
r
O
t
h
e
r
S
u
p
p
o
r
t
a
n
d
F
o
r
e
i
g
n
C
o
m
p
o
n
e
n
t
d
i
s
c
l
o
s
u
r
e
s
̶
Provide all your research-related affiliations/positions, support, and valuation in your
biosketch, as opposed to only what you deem relevant to the project
C
O
I
S
m
a
r
t
S
u
r
v
e
y
̶
P
r
o
v
i
d
e
c
o
m
p
l
e
t
e
a
n
d
a
c
c
u
r
a
t
e
a
n
s
w
e
r
s
t
o
t
h
e
C
O
I
s
u
r
v
e
y
.
I
f
R
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
O
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
s
o
r
C
o
m
p
l
i
a
n
c
e
f
o
l
l
o
w
u
p
w
i
t
h
a
d
d
i
t
i
o
n
a
l
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
,
u
n
d
e
r
s
t
a
n
d
i
t
i
s
r
o
u
t
i
n
e
t
o
g
e
t
c
l
a
r
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
w
h
e
r
e
n
e
e
d
e
d
t
o
c
o
m
p
l
y
w
i
t
h
o
u
r
f
e
d
e
r
a
l
o
b
l
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
s
̶
N
e
w
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
w
e
r
e
a
d
d
e
d
i
n
2
0
2
0
t
o
r
e
s
p
o
n
d
t
o
o
u
r
f
e
d
e
r
a
l
o
b
l
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
s
f
o
r
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
t
r
a
n
s
p
a
r
e
n
c
y
o
n
t
h
e
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
i
e
s
,
c
o
m
m
i
t
m
e
n
t
s
,
a
n
d
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
s
o
f
o
u
r
r
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
e
r
s
.
E
x
p
e
c
t
n
e
w
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
t
o
a
p
p
e
a
r
a
s
f
e
d
e
r
a
l
o
b
l
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
s
a
n
d
i
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
a
l
n
e
e
d
s
e
v
o
l
v
e
̶
U
p
d
a
t
e
y
o
u
r
d
i
s
c
l
o
s
u
r
e
s
r
e
g
u
l
a
r
l
y
t
o
d
i
s
c
l
o
s
e
a
n
y
c
o
m
m
i
t
m
e
n
t
s
o
r
s
u
p
p
o
r
t
t
h
a
t
c
o
m
e
u
p
a
f
t
e
r
y
o
u
c
o
m
p
l
e
t
e
t
h
e
C
O
I
s
u
r
v
e
y
I
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
o
r
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
i
b
i
l
i
t
i
e
s
a
n
d
O
b
l
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
s
Addressing Commitment Transparency requires sustained, coordinated cooperation between
many BMC and BU departments.
BMC leadership has been key in architecting new initiatives and reinforcing strong relationships
to leverage all resources available to combat the threats against Commitment Transparency.
Thank you to the departments and groups who are part of this complex, multi-pronged effort:
o
Compliance: Craig Bennett, Jami Wood, Erika Barber
o
Research Operations: Grace Cashman, Michelle Irick, Stephanie Wasserman
o
Office of General Counsel: Jamie Flaherty, Will McIntire
o
Information Technology: Caitlin Gaudreau, Lee Cullivan, Chris Sullivan
o
IRB and IBC: Matt Ogrodnik
o
COI Committee
o
Research Integrity, Security, and Commitment Transparency (RISCT) Task Force
o
BU Export Control: Heather Skinner, Kate Mellouk
o
Principal investigators and research staff
o
Department administrators and support staff
B
M
C
I
n
t
e
r
d
e
p
a
r
t
m
e
n
t
a
l
C
o
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
&
C
o
n
t
a
c
t
s
The federal government's focus on foreign influence in research has led to increased obligations for commitment transparency in institutions. This includes new policies, oversight processes, and broader disclosures expected from researchers applying for federal funding. Recent enforcement actions have targeted individual researchers for undisclosed foreign collaborations, emphasizing the need for vigilance and compliance within the research community.
Download Presentation
Please find below an Image/Link to download the presentation.
The content on the website is provided AS IS for your information and personal use only. It may not be sold, licensed, or shared on other websites without obtaining consent from the author.If you encounter any issues during the download, it is possible that the publisher has removed the file from their server.
You are allowed to download the files provided on this website for personal or commercial use, subject to the condition that they are used lawfully. All files are the property of their respective owners.
The content on the website is provided AS IS for your information and personal use only. It may not be sold, licensed, or shared on other websites without obtaining consent from the author.
E N D
Presentation Transcript
Commitment Transparency and Foreign Influence December 11, 2020 Research Operations & Compliance
Agenda Presentation Roadmap 1. Introduction to Foreign Influence & Commitment Transparency 2. National Trend: Enforcement Against Individual Researchers 3. Emerging Trend: Focus on Institutions 4. Identified Risks 5. BMC Response and Efforts 6. Investigator Responsibilities and Obligations 7. Interdepartmental Cooperation & Contacts 2
Introduction to Foreign Influence & Commitment Transparency The federal government has increased oversight and focus on the threat of foreign influence As a result there is a greater obligation of commitment transparency imposed on research institutions The government is concerned about: malign foreign actors exerting undue influence, stealing Intellectual Property (IP), interfering with research efforts, and creating conflicts of commitment regarding federally funded projects BMC is concerned about: malign foreign actors or compromised entities conspiring or acting to unduly take, use, or exert influence on BMC resources and assets (e.g. data, biological materials) What Is The Government Expecting from Institutions and Researchers? New responsive policies, procedures, and guidelines increasing transparent disclosures Responsive COI disclosure and oversight processes institutionally Broader, accurate disclosures from investigators applying for federal funding (e.g. Other Support & Foreign Component) showing fuller research portfolio of support and commitments Greater oversight and competent reviews of contracts coming into the institutions Vet for potential foreign influence or conflicts of commitment 3
Federal Enforcement Actions Focus on Individual Researcher Key Trends: Focus has been on individual researchers - continuation of enforcing against individuals expected New focus on institutions contemplated based on emerging trends Researcher enforcement Examples Dr. Charles Lieber, Harvard University, had undisclosed strategic scientist position at a Chinese university for six years Paid $50K per month, $150K per year for living expenses, awarded $1.5 million to establish a lab in China. Failed to disclose role as contractual participant in Thousand Talents program Arrested and charged with making materially false, fictitious and fraudulent statements in failure to disclose when applying for $15 million in NIH grants Yanqing Ye, a BU researcher, lieutenant in the PLA and member of the Chinese Communist Party Misused login credentials (including sharing VPN credentials with superiors in China), and spying to produce dossiers on US professors Returned to China, but still now indicted in federal charges including conspiracy, visa fraud, making false statements, and acting as foreign government agent Univ. of Kansas tenured professor Feng Tao U.S. government grant and contract, funding his salary and research. Meanwhile also had signed full-time employment contract at Fuzhou Univ., which included a nondisclosure clause that prevented Univ. of Kansas and government finding out about double dipping Indicted on two counts of wire fraud and one count of federal program fraud 4
Emerging Trend, Enforcement Against Institutions Institution enforcement Van Andel Research Institute Failed to disclose employment and other support that two now-former researchers had with Chinese entities -- nondisclosures and omissions Charged under the False Claims Act (FCA), $5.5 million in restitution to DOJ UCLA Researcher discarded hard drive with evidence he transferred sensitive US software to China s National Univ. of Defense Tech. and falsely denying relationship with Chinese military Arrested and charged with destroying evidence to obstruct an FBI investigation 5
Identified Risks Identified Risks Funding relationships with foreign organizations/government (e.g. Chinese government; People s Liberation Army, even Universities and hospitals). Foreign talent programs (e.g. Thousand Talents Recruitment program) Failure to disclose foreign funding and other outside activities External U.S. Shadow laboratories to duplicate, develop, or divert work done at U.S. institutions Embedding or recruiting unwitting, willing, or malign foreign agents into institutions for unauthorized IP transfer or asset diversion Misuse of the peer-review system (e.g. unauthorized disclosure or pay for play review) Theft of COVID-19 research or manipulation of research results Procurement/Supply Chain reviewing our relationships with foreign suppliers and ensure proper vetting for future suppliers is key Other foreign interference, such as unauthorized external transfer of materials and data 6
BMC Response: What Is BMC Doing to Support Commitment Transparency? Institutional Initiatives and Steps Creation of Research Integrity, Security and Commitment Transparency (RISCT) Task Force Educating research community of the risks to promote our culture of integrity Outside activity engagement Full disclosure Provide resources for contract review and conflict management including red flag language triggering foreign influence review or other escalation Review and update BMC policies and procedures Commitment Transparency and Foreign Influence guidance documents and training materials, and positioning for staying up to date on regulatory developments and future response plans Conflict of Interest revised annual conflict of interest disclosure survey, and broadened scope to include conflicts of commitment and international interests Conflict of Commitment policy (creation) International interests/foreign influence review process (creation and implementation) International interests/foreign influence mini guidance for Chairs creation of high- level information document 7
BMC Response, continued Education/Training Plan for Research Community (creation and implementation) Travel and Transferring BMC Data creation of process for travelling with data, including institutional authorization letter Travel and Transferring Biological Materials creation of process for travel and what to do when you want to transfer biological materials correctly Other Support and Foreign Component working committee including Research Operations and department leaders Guidance documents and resources Revise and standardize processes for reporting Broader education plan Email usage and data security create guidance on BMC email usage Risk Identification Audit Periodic efforts to assess, understand, and address our specific risks 8
Investigator Responsibilities and Obligations Other Support Page and Foreign Component Reporting Provide sufficient disclosure, taking a broad approach on your Other Support and Foreign Component disclosures Provide all your research-related affiliations/positions, support, and valuation in your biosketch, as opposed to only what you deem relevant to the project COI Smart Survey Provide complete and accurate answers to the COI survey. If Research Operations or Compliance follow up with additional questions, understand it is routine to get clarification where needed to comply with our federal obligations New questions were added in 2020 to respond to our federal obligations for greater transparency on the activities, commitments, and interests of our researchers. Expect new questions to appear as federal obligations and institutional needs evolve Update your disclosures regularly to disclose any commitments or support that come up after you complete the COI survey 9
BMC Interdepartmental Cooperation & Contacts Addressing Commitment Transparency requires sustained, coordinated cooperation between many BMC and BU departments. BMC leadership has been key in architecting new initiatives and reinforcing strong relationships to leverage all resources available to combat the threats against Commitment Transparency. Thank you to the departments and groups who are part of this complex, multi-pronged effort: o Compliance: Craig Bennett, Jami Wood, Erika Barber o Research Operations: Grace Cashman, Michelle Irick, Stephanie Wasserman o Office of General Counsel: Jamie Flaherty, Will McIntire o Information Technology: Caitlin Gaudreau, Lee Cullivan, Chris Sullivan o IRB and IBC: Matt Ogrodnik o COI Committee o Research Integrity, Security, and Commitment Transparency (RISCT) Task Force o BU Export Control: Heather Skinner, Kate Mellouk o Principal investigators and research staff o Department administrators and support staff 10
