Vulnerability of Radiological Materials to Theft by Terrorist Groups in US Civilian Entities
How vulnerable are
radiological materials stored
at U.S. civilian entities to
theft by a terrorist group?
Maciej Lempke
Project on Nuclear Issues Conference
Sandia National Laboratories
Albuquerque, New Mexico
October 2016
Introduction – key points
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has developed
security measures mostly focused on high-activity Category 1
and 2 sources, while neglecting controls over lower activity
sources (including Category 3 sources), which could be equally
useful for a terrorist group
Terrorists would most likely seek unprotected, low activity
Category 3 materials, particularly sealed powders and liquid
sources.
There is a significant amount of open source information, which
could be useful for a terrorist group trying to obtain radiological
materials.
Radiological materials categories
and the NRC radionuclide
screening criteria
Information openness and its
consequences
Information about materials
Information about facilities
Information about people
Conclusion
Despite the existing security architecture, some radiological
materials (particularly low activity sources) stored at U.S.
civilian entities remain highly vulnerable to theft by a terrorist
group.
Policy recommendations
The U.S. government should establish stricter regulations for
the release of NRC licensees’ information into the public
space. This particularly concerns information exposing
security vulnerabilities of radiological materials storage
facilities and revealing personal details of individuals with
access to those sources.
The NRC should establish strict requirements for licensees to
protect sensitive information about materials storage facilities
and employees, regardless of the activity of the used source.
The vulnerability of radiological materials stored at US civilian entities to theft by terrorist groups, particularly low-activity sources, remains a significant concern. Security measures primarily focus on high-activity sources, leaving lower activity sources neglected and highly susceptible to exploitation. Terrorists may target unprotected Category 3 materials, such as sealed powders and liquid sources, leveraging open-source information for acquisition despite the existing security architecture.
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Presentation Transcript
How vulnerable are radiological materials stored at U.S. civilian entities to theft by a terrorist group? Maciej Lempke Project on Nuclear Issues Conference Sandia National Laboratories Albuquerque, New Mexico October 2016
Introduction key points The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has developed security measures mostly focused on high-activity Category 1 and 2 sources, while neglecting controls over lower activity sources (including Category 3 sources), which could be equally useful for a terrorist group Terrorists would most likely seek unprotected, low activity Category 3 materials, particularly sealed powders and liquid sources. There is a significant amount of open source information, which could be useful for a terrorist group trying to obtain radiological materials.
Radiological materials categories and the NRC radionuclide screening criteria
Information openness and its consequences
Conclusion Despite the existing security architecture, some radiological materials (particularly low activity sources) stored at U.S. civilian entities remain highly vulnerable to theft by a terrorist group.
Policy recommendations The U.S. government should establish stricter regulations for the release of NRC licensees information into the public space. This particularly concerns security vulnerabilities of radiological materials storage facilities and revealing personal details of individuals with access to those sources. information exposing The NRC should establish strict requirements for licensees to protect sensitive information about materials storage facilities and employees, regardless of the activity of the used source.
