Reflections on Values and Identity in Research by David Hildebrand: A Critical Analysis
Comments on
David Hildebrand’s paper
Sami Pihlström
University of Helsinki, Finland
I have five questions/comments to make:
•
(1) Do we remain ”us” if our fundamental values change?
•
(2) Reflective equilibrium: theories, methods, aims?
•
(3) Core values at the background?
•
(4) Epistemic vs. moral – constitutive vs. contextual?
•
(5) Empathy?
1. ”Who are we?”
•
David emphasizes the constitutive sense in which our being who we
are depends on our ”values”.
•
The tools we use (social, machine, linguistic) change our relationships,
environment, habits, and values.
•
However, as our values change,
we
change.
•
But how much – or how deeply – can we change while still remaining
who we are (”us”)?
•
Compare: Jonathan Lear (1998) on ”the disappearing ’we’”.
2. Reflective equilibrium
•
Reflection on how we do research and the goals of our research:
methods & aims.
•
This sounds like what many philosophers have called ”reflective
equilibrium” – constantly seeking and maintaining ”balance” between
values and method (of inquiry).
•
In philosophy of science specifically, cf., e.g., Larry Laudan: mutual
dependence between theories, methods, and aims/values.
•
Compare, perhaps, Morton White’s ”holistic pragmatism”?
3. Core values at the background
•
I’m (of course) tempted to reinterpret the ”background” in Kantian-
like (quasi-)transcendental terms: core values as necessary conditions
for the possibility of ”us” (or for remaining who we are)?
•
Is it, then, necessarily a
problem
that value talk is (often) pushed to
the background? (The background enables everything else.)
•
It might also be good not to always talk about values, because value talk can
be easily inflated. (Strategic lists of values, e.g., universities’ values.)
•
”All inquiries are rooted in a wider normative world.” Yes – but can
this rootedness be given a quasi-Kantian transcendental
characterization?
4. Moral vs. epistemic
•
This brings me to the relation between moral and epistemic values.
•
David says that research is ”permeated by values, both epistemic and
moral” – yes, exactly.
•
But he also says that epistemic values are constitutive while non-epistemic,
or moral, values are (merely) contextual.
•
Couldn’t there be moral values that are constitutive of research? Aren’t,
e.g., patience and impartiality also moral, not merely epistemic, values?
•
Moreover, could, e.g., democracy (in the Deweyan sense) be a constitutive
value of inquiry transgressing the boundary between the moral and the
epistemic? (Moral vs. epistemic: an unpragmatic dichotomy?)
5. Empathy
•
We need empathy in order to inquire into moral issues – yes.
•
But we also need to be able to appreciate moral concerns that are
independent of, and more fundamental than, what empathy can
deliver.
•
Moral duty cannot be reduced to relations of empathy. (Kant again.)
•
Empathy may also lead us seriously astray in moral inquiry due to its
partiality and contingency.
•
Developing ”attentional habits” in moral inquiry also requires that we
are able to take seriously our moral obligations toward those with
whom we cannot empathize at all.
Conclusion
•
These are of course just suggestions, raising a few selected issues
from the immensely rich paper David presented.
•
Possibly, the fact that I’m raising these particular issues rather than
some others reflects our somewhat different emphases in
pragmatism scholarship (and applications of pragmatism to our real-
world problems today): should we go ”round” Kant or ”through” Kant
(cf. William James)?
•
But these differences are visible only against the ”background” of
profound and comprehensive pragmatist agreement.
Delve into thought-provoking questions raised by Sami Pihlström on David Hildebrand's paper, exploring themes such as the impact of changing fundamental values on personal identity, the concept of reflective equilibrium in research methodologies, the significance of core values, the interplay between moral and epistemic values in research, and the role of empathy in shaping inquiry.
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Comments on David Hildebrand s paper Sami Pihlstr m University of Helsinki, Finland sami.pihlstrom@helsinki.fi
I have five questions/comments to make: (1) Do we remain us if our fundamental values change? (2) Reflective equilibrium: theories, methods, aims? (3) Core values at the background? (4) Epistemic vs. moral constitutive vs. contextual? (5) Empathy?
1. Who are we? David emphasizes the constitutive sense in which our being who we are depends on our values . The tools we use (social, machine, linguistic) change our relationships, environment, habits, and values. However, as our values change, we change. But how much or how deeply can we change while still remaining who we are ( us )? Compare: Jonathan Lear (1998) on the disappearing we .
2. Reflective equilibrium Reflection on how we do research and the goals of our research: methods & aims. This sounds like what many philosophers have called reflective equilibrium constantly seeking and maintaining balance between values and method (of inquiry). In philosophy of science specifically, cf., e.g., Larry Laudan: mutual dependence between theories, methods, and aims/values. Compare, perhaps, Morton White s holistic pragmatism ?
3. Core values at the background I m (of course) tempted to reinterpret the background in Kantian- like (quasi-)transcendental terms: core values as necessary conditions for the possibility of us (or for remaining who we are)? Is it, then, necessarily a problem that value talk is (often) pushed to the background? (The background enables everything else.) It might also be good not to always talk about values, because value talk can be easily inflated. (Strategic lists of values, e.g., universities values.) All inquiries are rooted in a wider normative world. Yes but can this rootedness be given a quasi-Kantian transcendental characterization?
4. Moral vs. epistemic This brings me to the relation between moral and epistemic values. David says that research is permeated by values, both epistemic and moral yes, exactly. But he also says that epistemic values are constitutive while non-epistemic, or moral, values are (merely) contextual. Couldn t there be moral values that are constitutive of research? Aren t, e.g., patience and impartiality also moral, not merely epistemic, values? Moreover, could, e.g., democracy (in the Deweyan sense) be a constitutive value of inquiry transgressing the boundary between the moral and the epistemic? (Moral vs. epistemic: an unpragmatic dichotomy?)
5. Empathy We need empathy in order to inquire into moral issues yes. But we also need to be able to appreciate moral concerns that are independent of, and more fundamental than, what empathy can deliver. Moral duty cannot be reduced to relations of empathy. (Kant again.) Empathy may also lead us seriously astray in moral inquiry due to its partiality and contingency. Developing attentional habits in moral inquiry also requires that we are able to take seriously our moral obligations toward those with whom we cannot empathize at all.
Conclusion These are of course just suggestions, raising a few selected issues from the immensely rich paper David presented. Possibly, the fact that I m raising these particular issues rather than some others reflects our somewhat different emphases in pragmatism scholarship (and applications of pragmatism to our real- world problems today): should we go round Kant or through Kant (cf. William James)? But these differences are visible only against the background of profound and comprehensive pragmatist agreement.
