New Evil Demon Problem in Philosophy Colloquium
In this presentation, the speaker discusses the transition from the old evil demon problem to a new focus on justified belief, exploring reliabilism and its implications. The shift from skepticism to understanding rational belief is examined in depth.
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Internalists DO Have A New Evil Demon Problem Presented at Dalhousie University Philosophy Colloquium 1/17/2014
Purpose of Powerpoint To give you the big picture dialectic in which my paper takes place.
The Old Evil Demon Problem The old evil demon problem, inspired by Rene Descartes, is as follows:
The Old Evil Demon Problem The old evil demon problem, inspired by Rene Descartes, is as follows: 1) We could be fooled by an evil demon 2) If (2), then we can t really know anything. 3) Therefore, we can t really know anything.
The old evil demon problem was an argument for skepticism.
The old evil demon problem was an argument for skepticism. It claimed that we don t have certain knowledge.
The old evil demon problem was an argument for skepticism. It claimed that we don t have certain knowledge. The new evil demon problem is about justified/rational belief.
Reliabilism In 1979, Goldman published his classic paper What is Justified Belief?
Reliabilism In 1979, Goldman published his classic paper What is Justified Belief? The view: S s belief is justified iff the belief is formed by a reliable process.
Reliabilism In 1979, Goldman published his classic paper What is Justified Belief? The view: S s belief is justified iff the belief is formed by a reliable process. Reliable processes: vision, memory, induction
Reliabilism In 1979, Goldman published his classic paper What is Justified Belief? The view: S s belief is justified iff the belief is formed by a reliable process. Reliable processes: vision, memory, induction Unreliable processes: wishful thinking, magic 8- balls, astrology.
Two Theoretical Benefits of Reliabilism It does not overintellectualize justified belief.
Two Theoretical Benefits of Reliabilism It does not overintellectualize justified belief.
Two Theoretical Benefits of Reliabilism It does not overintellectualize justified belief. It explains the connection between epistemic justification and truth.
The New Evil Demon Problem In 1984, Stewart Cohen published his paper, Justification and Truth .
The New Evil Demon Problem In 1984, Stewart Cohen published his paper, Justification and Truth . Consider your beguiled twin who is fooled by a demon.
The New Evil Demon Problem In 1984, Stewart Cohen published his paper, Justification and Truth . Consider your beguiled twin who is fooled by a demon. - Justified beliefs
The New Evil Demon Problem In 1984, Stewart Cohen published his paper, Justification and Truth . Consider your beguiled twin who is fooled by a demon. - Justified beliefs - Unreliably formed beliefs.
The New Evil Demon Problem In 1984, Stewart Cohen published his paper, Justification and Truth . Consider your beguiled twin who is fooled by a demon. - Justified beliefs - Unreliably formed beliefs. - It seems that all that matters for a belief s justification are internal states.
Internalism and Externalism Internalism justificational properties supervene on internal/mental properties.
Internalism and Externalism Internalism justificational properties supervene on internal/mental properties. Externalism denial of internalism (i.e., some external properties make a difference to whether a belief is justified).
Internalism and Externalism Internalism justificational properties supervene on internal/mental properties. Externalism denial of internalism (i.e., some external properties make a difference to whether a belief is justified). Externalists think that a belief s being formed by a reliable process (Goldman)
Internalism and Externalism Internalism justificational properties supervene on internal/mental properties. Externalism denial of internalism (i.e., some external properties make a difference to whether a belief is justified). Externalists think that a belief s being formed by a reliable process (Goldman), a safe mechanism (Sosa),
Internalism and Externalism Internalism justificational properties supervene on internal/mental properties. Externalism denial of internalism (i.e., some external properties make a difference to whether a belief is justified). Externalists think that a belief s being formed by a reliable process (Goldman), a safe mechanism (Sosa), or properly functioning faculties (Bergmann), is relevant to justification.
For years, since 1984, the new evil demon problem has been considered to be one of the most serious objections to externalism.
For years, since 1984, the new evil demon problem has been considered to be one of the most serious objections to externalism. It has also been one of the main arguments in favour of internalism.
The New Evil Demon Problem for Internalism
The New Evil Demon Problem for Internalism In 2012, I publish a paper called Three Forms of Internalism and the New Evil Demon Problem.
The New Evil Demon Problem for Internalism In 2012, I publish a paper called Three Forms of Internalism and the New Evil Demon Problem. I argue that the NEDP also applies to all presently endorsed versions of internalism.
Reply to Me In his forthcoming paper, A New Evil Demon? No Problem For Moderate Internalists, and in his forthcoming book Evidentialism and Epistemic Justification, Kevin McCain argues that I am wrong.
McCains paper will be published in Acta Analytica and I have been invited to reply to his paper.
McCains paper will be published in Acta Analytica and I have been invited to reply to his paper. I am currently working on that reply, and that is where I am looking for feedback today.