Investigating Political Discontent Surrounding the EU Referendum

 
Did the EU referendum express
or fuel political discontent?
 
Lawrence McKay
 
Research questions
 
Did political discontent fuel the Leave vote of last year’s referendum?
Inspired by the UK public debate
Or did 
identification
 with the Brexit cause drive people to endorse or
reject ‘anti-politics’ attitudes?
Inspired by American political science – which emphasises how people’s
attitudes adapt to the messages sent out by their political party’s elite
 
Brexit in public discourse
 
Theresa May 2016 Conference speech:
Brexit “
a revolution in which millions of our fellow citizens stood up and said
they were not prepared to be ignored anymore”
Dominic Cummings (2017) blog post:
“There had been strong anti-Westminster feelings growing for over a
decade… SW1… did not appreciate the scale of this growing force even after
the financial crash and expenses scandal”
e. g. widespread discontent is a structural condition that makes a Leave
victory possible?
And many, many more examples…
 
Are the ‘left behind’ the politically
discontent?
 
On the face of it, poli sci research may back up these arguments
Among low education, older, and low income groups that drive Brexit,
there is lower political trust and more agreement that they have ‘no
say in what government does’ (Dunatchik et. al., 2016)
Might not only be down to demographics
Controlling for demographics, evidence that disapproval of EU
membership associated with more negative views of politicians across
a range of attitudes (Stoker 
et. al. 
(2016))
But causal direction unclear
 
Initial analysis
 
In this section I compare the people who eventually voted Remain or
Leave on two fundamental attitudes related to political discontent:
External efficacy – i. e. ‘politicians don’t care what people like me think’
Trust in MPs generally
I take measurements from pre-campaign, and from the height of the
Referendum campaign
Interpretation of process depends on whether differences exist pre-
campaign, and whether they expand during the campaign
 
‘Politicians don’t care what people like me
think’
 
May 2015 (post-election)
 
May-June 2016 (pre-ref)
 
Trust in MPs
 
May 2015 (post-election)
 
May-June 2016 (pre-ref)
 
Implications
 
Some evidence that Remainers are more ‘pro-politics’ than Leavers on
the whole
But campaign polarises views about politicians.
Remainers express higher trust in MPs, while Leavers become more
likely to take the view that politicians don’t care what they think.
Why? One obvious explanation springs to mind: the Leave side’s
heavy use of ‘anti-establishment’ rhetoric
Nonetheless – findings that Leavers express more political discontent
than Remainers implies it’s possible that this influenced their votes
 
Did discontent help ‘Leave’? Three theories
 
Discontent is not monolithic + attitudes can be separated both
conceptually and empirically
‘Dissatisfied democrats’ - unhappy with UK democracy and vote Leave
to shake up the system
Political ‘fatalism’ – party politics doesn’t really change things, so a
more fundamental systemic change is needed (such as leaving EU)
‘Anti-politics’ – more focus on political actors as untrustworthy,
uncaring, out for themselves, etc. Vote Leave to kick back at
politicians ‘ignoring’ people like them/their communities
 
 
 
 
Hypotheses
 
Based on theory of ‘
dissatisfied democrats
’:
H1: 
The 
lower 
an individual’s satisfaction with UK democracy, the 
more
likely they are to vote 
Leave
.
Based on theory of ‘
political fatalism
’:
H2: 
The 
more 
an individual agrees with the idea that it doesn’t matter
who is in power, the 
more 
likely they are to vote 
Leave.
Based on theory of ‘
anti-politics
’:
H3: 
The 
lower
 an individual’s level of external political efficacy is, the
more 
likely they are to vote 
Leave.
H4: 
The 
lower 
an individual’s trust in MPs is, the 
more 
likely they are to
vote Leave
 
 
Model specification – deciding controls
 
Considered 4 early studies of Brexit – Clarke/Goodwin,
Goodwin/Milazzo, Kaufmann, Sobolewska
All of them model:
Demographics and party identification
National identities and views on immigration
But differ on whether to include:
Economic views, authoritarian values, Brexit risks/benefits, Europe/integration
attitudes
Because of lack of real precedent in research we have to go by logic
Point is to know whether people wanted to make ‘expressive’ anti-
system/anti-politics vote, whatever they thought of the instrumental
costs/benefits of Remaining or Leaving.
 
 
 
 
My approach
 
I identify five sets of predictors
1.
The independent variables
2.
Demographic controls (age, gender, education)
3.
EU/leaving EU costs and benefits (effects of leaving EU on:
immigration, terrorism, Britain’s global influence, the economy, the
NHS; plus whether R agreed EU had prevented war and made
Britain more prosperous)
4.
Immigration views (good or bad for economy, ‘enriches’ or
‘undermines’ cultural life, whether you would allow more/fewer
immigrants)
5.
English/British/European identities + perceived effect of EU on
national identity
 
 
My approach (cont.)
 
Independent variables taken from W7 as well as W8 due to low 
n 
on
some IVs from W8.
n = 11,781.
All models use binary logit regression predicting a ‘Leave’ vote against
the base category, a ‘Remain’ vote.
Decided to drop non-voters: turnout is a different question.
 
Model results
 
No effect of satisfaction with UK democracy.
No effect of external efficacy (‘politicians don’t care’)
No effect of trust in MPs.
No effect of ‘it doesn’t matter which party is in power’.
 
Results insensitive to how it was modelled, what was controlled for
None of the hypotheses connecting political discontent with the vote to
Leave were supported.
 
A mixed bag of factors
were found to drive vote-
choice
Supporting
Clarke/Goodwin
statement that ‘
the
narrow Brexit decision
reflected a complex and
cross-cutting mix of
calculations, emotions
and cues’
 
What actually mattered?
 
Conclusion
 
Brexit voters 
were 
more politically discontented both on and prior to 23
June – idea that it was a cause not implausible.
But ultimately levels of discontent do not appear to have moved votes.
The relationship between discontent and voting may be in the opposite
direction: Brexit fuelling rather than expressing political discontent.
But ‘fuelling’ not quite right either – on some measures (e. g. trust) the
referendum is associated with a 
polarisation
 between Remain/Leavers.
Possible that it could have mattered 
indirectly.
But we don’t yet have much evidence of a direct link and could do
more to confront this simplistic 
political
 narrative.
Useful for ‘populists’ but less so for understanding Brexit.
 
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Analyzing the impact of political discontent on the Brexit referendum, this research delves into the relationship between public dissatisfaction with politicians and the decision to either remain or leave the EU. By examining attitudes towards politicians' concern for ordinary citizens and trust in Members of Parliament, the study aims to uncover potential correlations and shifts in sentiment before and during the referendum campaign.

  • Political Discontent
  • EU Referendum
  • Brexit
  • Trust in Politicians
  • Public Dissatisfaction

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  1. Did the EU referendum express or fuel political discontent? Lawrence McKay

  2. Research questions Did political discontent fuel the Leave vote of last year s referendum? Inspired by the UK public debate Or did identification with the Brexit cause drive people to endorse or reject anti-politics attitudes? Inspired by American political science which emphasises how people s attitudes adapt to the messages sent out by their political party s elite

  3. Brexit in public discourse Theresa May 2016 Conference speech: Brexit a revolution in which millions of our fellow citizens stood up and said they were not prepared to be ignored anymore Dominic Cummings (2017) blog post: There had been strong anti-Westminster feelings growing for over a decade SW1 did not appreciate the scale of this growing force even after the financial crash and expenses scandal e. g. widespread discontent is a structural condition that makes a Leave victory possible? And many, many more examples

  4. Are the left behind the politically discontent? On the face of it, poli sci research may back up these arguments Among low education, older, and low income groups that drive Brexit, there is lower political trust and more agreement that they have no say in what government does (Dunatchik et. al., 2016) Might not only be down to demographics Controlling for demographics, evidence that disapproval of EU membership associated with more negative views of politicians across a range of attitudes (Stoker et. al. (2016)) But causal direction unclear

  5. Initial analysis In this section I compare the people who eventually voted Remain or Leave on two fundamental attitudes related to political discontent: External efficacy i. e. politicians don t care what people like me think Trust in MPs generally I take measurements from pre-campaign, and from the height of the Referendum campaign Interpretation of process depends on whether differences exist pre- campaign, and whether they expand during the campaign

  6. Politicians dont care what people like me think May-June 2016 (pre-ref) May 2015 (post-election)

  7. Trust in MPs May 2015 (post-election) May-June 2016 (pre-ref)

  8. Implications Some evidence that Remainers are more pro-politics than Leavers on the whole But campaign polarises views about politicians. Remainers express higher trust in MPs, while Leavers become more likely to take the view that politicians don t care what they think. Why? One obvious explanation springs to mind: the Leave side s heavy use of anti-establishment rhetoric Nonetheless findings that Leavers express more political discontent than Remainers implies it s possible that this influenced their votes

  9. Did discontent help Leave? Three theories Discontent is not monolithic + attitudes can be separated both conceptually and empirically Dissatisfied democrats - unhappy with UK democracy and vote Leave to shake up the system Political fatalism party politics doesn t really change things, so a more fundamental systemic change is needed (such as leaving EU) Anti-politics more focus on political actors as untrustworthy, uncaring, out for themselves, etc. Vote Leave to kick back at politicians ignoring people like them/their communities

  10. Hypotheses Based on theory of dissatisfied democrats : H1: The lower an individual s satisfaction with UK democracy, the more likely they are to vote Leave. Based on theory of political fatalism : H2: The more an individual agrees with the idea that it doesn t matter who is in power, the more likely they are to vote Leave. Based on theory of anti-politics : H3: The loweran individual s level of external political efficacy is, the more likely they are to vote Leave. H4: The lower an individual s trust in MPs is, the more likely they are to vote Leave

  11. Model specification deciding controls Considered 4 early studies of Brexit Clarke/Goodwin, Goodwin/Milazzo, Kaufmann, Sobolewska All of them model: Demographics and party identification National identities and views on immigration But differ on whether to include: Economic views, authoritarian values, Brexit risks/benefits, Europe/integration attitudes Because of lack of real precedent in research we have to go by logic Point is to know whether people wanted to make expressive anti- system/anti-politics vote, whatever they thought of the instrumental costs/benefits of Remaining or Leaving.

  12. My approach I identify five sets of predictors 1. The independent variables 2. Demographic controls (age, gender, education) 3. EU/leaving EU costs and benefits (effects of leaving EU on: immigration, terrorism, Britain s global influence, the economy, the NHS; plus whether R agreed EU had prevented war and made Britain more prosperous) 4. Immigration views (good or bad for economy, enriches or undermines cultural life, whether you would allow more/fewer immigrants) 5. English/British/European identities + perceived effect of EU on national identity

  13. My approach (cont.) Independent variables taken from W7 as well as W8 due to low n on some IVs from W8. n = 11,781. All models use binary logit regression predicting a Leave vote against the base category, a Remain vote. Decided to drop non-voters: turnout is a different question.

  14. Model results No effect of satisfaction with UK democracy. No effect of external efficacy ( politicians don t care ) No effect of trust in MPs. No effect of it doesn t matter which party is in power . Results insensitive to how it was modelled, what was controlled for None of the hypotheses connecting political discontent with the vote to Leave were supported.

  15. What actually mattered? A mixed bag of factors were found to drive vote- choice Supporting Clarke/Goodwin statement that the narrow Brexit decision reflected a complex and cross-cutting mix of calculations, emotions and cues Leaving improves economy EU makes UK more prosperous Economic EU undermines national identity European-ness Identity Leaving enhances influence Leaving good for NHS EU prevents war Other

  16. Conclusion Brexit voters were more politically discontented both on and prior to 23 June idea that it was a cause not implausible. But ultimately levels of discontent do not appear to have moved votes. The relationship between discontent and voting may be in the opposite direction: Brexit fuelling rather than expressing political discontent. But fuelling not quite right either on some measures (e. g. trust) the referendum is associated with a polarisation between Remain/Leavers. Possible that it could have mattered indirectly. But we don t yet have much evidence of a direct link and could do more to confront this simplistic political narrative. Useful for populists but less so for understanding Brexit.

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