Imperfect Competition in Markets

 
MIFIRA Framework
Lecture 10
Competition: trader behavior
 
 
Chris Barrett and Erin Lentz
February 2012
 
Linking Back To MIFIRA
 
1d. Do local traders behave competitively?
If traders can exercise market power, they can
extract added profits by boosting prices faster
than costs increase.
2b. Will agency purchases drive up food prices excessively in
source markets?
Same logic as in question 1d, but with the
demand side intervention being local or regional
procurement.
 
2
 
The Basics of Imperfect Competition
 
Firms with market power directly affect prices
through sales quantity decisions.
Because firms seek to maximize profits, choose
quantity where MC=MR.
But because it faces demand that is not perfectly
price elastic, in order to expand output, must
drop prices.  Therefore MR<AR.
Thus MC=MR<AR. This implies higher prices.
The gap can be large for price inelastic demand
food items in small, remote markets.
 
3
 
The Basics of Imperfect
Competition: MC=MR<AR=p*
 
4
 
The Basics of Imperfect Competition
 
Market power arises because of entry barriers
(cannot start business) or mobility barriers
(cannot expand business) that limit competition.
4 sources of barriers:
Technical barriers  (e.g., increasing returns and MES)
Legal barriers (e.g., parastatals, licensing, IPRs)
Informal barriers (e.g., sociocultural obstacles, road
barriers, credit rationing)
Firm-created barriers (e.g., sunk costs, overcapacity,
predatory pricing, contract interlinkage, relationship-
function-specific capital, etc.)
 
5
 
Structure, Conduct & Performance
 
Dominant empirical method of analyzing markets:
Market structure
: Are there increasing returns to
scale or scope? How many firms and size
distribution? Entry and exit patterns?
Firm conduct
: How have firms responded to
shocks in the past?  Is there any sign of collusion
among (especially larger) firms?
Economic performance
: What are profit and
price effects of market structure and firm
conduct?
 
6
 
Market Structure
 
How many firms?  As n increases, market
becomes more competitive.
How concentrated is the market?
 
CR
m
  =  s
1
  +  s
2
  +  s
3
  +  ... ... +  s
m
 
workhorse is CR
4
 … aggreg. share of top 4 firms
CR
4
>90
  
effective oligopoly
40≤ CR
4
≤90 
 
possible imperfect competition
CR
4
<90  
  
workably competitive
 
7
 
Market Structure
 
CR
m
 ignores firm size distribution.
Alternative: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
  HHI  =  s
1
2
  +  s
2
2
  +  s
3
2
  +  ... ... +  s
n
2
HHI>2000  (<1000)
 
oligopoly (competitive)
 
Consider 2 different markets:
1)
Mkt shares: 45,5,5,5 and 20 firms w/2% each
2)
Mkt shares: 15,15,15,15 + 20 firms w/2% each
CR
4
 = 60 for both but HHI = 2180 vs. 980
 
8
 
Market Structure
 
If concentration measures suggest oligopoly, why?
 
What barriers to entry/mobility exist?
-
Are there increasing returns to scale or scope?
 
What is  [Mkt size/Minimum efficient scale]  ?
 
- 
 
If these technical barriers do not explain restricted
competition,  consider alternative sources of entry
or mobility barriers (4 categories earlier).
 
9
 
Firm Conduct
 
The last time there was a demand shock, what
did the largest traders do?  Did they increase
throughput volumes? If not, why not?
Did last shock induce trader entry?  What was
their pricing like, competitive or follower?
Collusive behavior?  How socially similar are
traders?  Gauge trader diversity to get a sense of
how likely it is they can collude on pricing.
 
10
 
Economic Performance
 
What are prices and profits like?
 
- Profit level not always a good indicator
because of X-inefficiency. Empirical IO studies
find a much stronger positive relationship of
concentration measures to prices than profits.
 
Common result is higher prices for consumers
and faster mark-up (slower mark-down) in the
face of demand expansion (contraction)
 
 
11
 
Data Requirements
 
Same as last lecture:
-
Key informant interviews and trader surveys.
 
-
Can be difficult to get precise quantitative data.
Need to try to triangulate to verify estimates.
 
12
 
Interpreting the Analytic
 
 
Punch line
: Markets with a greater number and
variety of traders and with lower concentration
(CR
4
 or HHI) measures are less likely to be
collusive, because it is harder for larger and
disparate groups to organize.
 
 
Analyze by product, function and geographic
market.
 
13
 
Limitations of the Analytic
 
 
Treat data w/healthy skepticism.
 
 
Price change implications for expected price
changes are not immediately clear.
 
 
But when markets noncompetitive, rate of price
increases is typically 50-100% higher than under
perfect competition due to oligopolistic mark-ups.
 
14
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Explore the dynamics of imperfect competition in markets focusing on the behavior of traders, market power, pricing strategies, barriers to entry, and market structure analysis. Learn how firms with market power influence prices, the impact of agency purchases on food prices, and the factors contributing to market power such as entry and mobility barriers. Dive into the examination of market structure, firm conduct, and economic performance in the context of imperfect competition.

  • Imperfect Competition
  • Market Power
  • Pricing Strategies
  • Market Structure Analysis
  • Traders

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  1. MIFIRA Framework Lecture 10 Competition: trader behavior Chris Barrett and Erin Lentz February 2012

  2. Linking Back To MIFIRA 1d. Do local traders behave competitively? If traders can exercise market power, they can extract added profits by boosting prices faster than costs increase. 2b. Will agency purchases drive up food prices excessively in source markets? Same logic as in question 1d, but with the demand side intervention being local or regional procurement. 2

  3. The Basics of Imperfect Competition Firms with market power directly affect prices through sales quantity decisions. Because firms seek to maximize profits, choose quantity where MC=MR. But because it faces demand that is not perfectly price elastic, in order to expand output, must drop prices. Therefore MR<AR. Thus MC=MR<AR. This implies higher prices. The gap can be large for price inelastic demand food items in small, remote markets. 3

  4. The Basics of Imperfect Competition: MC=MR<AR=p* Price Marginal costs p* Aggregate demand =Average revenue Marginal revenue q* Quantity 4

  5. The Basics of Imperfect Competition Market power arises because of entry barriers (cannot start business) or mobility barriers (cannot expand business) that limit competition. 4 sources of barriers: Technical barriers (e.g., increasing returns and MES) Legal barriers (e.g., parastatals, licensing, IPRs) Informal barriers (e.g., sociocultural obstacles, road barriers, credit rationing) Firm-created barriers (e.g., sunk costs, overcapacity, predatory pricing, contract interlinkage, relationship- function-specific capital, etc.) 5

  6. Structure, Conduct & Performance Dominant empirical method of analyzing markets: Market structure: Are there increasing returns to scale or scope? How many firms and size distribution? Entry and exit patterns? Firm conduct: How have firms responded to shocks in the past? Is there any sign of collusion among (especially larger) firms? Economic performance: What are profit and price effects of market structure and firm conduct? 6

  7. Market Structure How many firms? As n increases, market becomes more competitive. How concentrated is the market? CRm= s1+ s2+ s3+ ... ... + sm workhorse is CR4 aggreg. share of top 4 firms CR4>90 effective oligopoly 40 CR4 90 possible imperfect competition CR4<90 workably competitive 7

  8. Market Structure CRmignores firm size distribution. Alternative: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) HHI = s12+ s22+ s32+ ... ... + sn2 HHI>2000 (<1000) oligopoly (competitive) Consider 2 different markets: 1) Mkt shares: 45,5,5,5 and 20 firms w/2% each 2) Mkt shares: 15,15,15,15 + 20 firms w/2% each CR4= 60 for both but HHI = 2180 vs. 980 8

  9. Market Structure If concentration measures suggest oligopoly, why? What barriers to entry/mobility exist? - Are there increasing returns to scale or scope? What is [Mkt size/Minimum efficient scale] ? - If these technical barriers do not explain restricted competition, consider alternative sources of entry or mobility barriers (4 categories earlier). 9

  10. Firm Conduct The last time there was a demand shock, what did the largest traders do? Did they increase throughput volumes? If not, why not? Did last shock induce trader entry? What was their pricing like, competitive or follower? Collusive behavior? How socially similar are traders? Gauge trader diversity to get a sense of how likely it is they can collude on pricing. 10

  11. Economic Performance What are prices and profits like? - Profit level not always a good indicator because of X-inefficiency. Empirical IO studies find a much stronger positive relationship of concentration measures to prices than profits. Common result is higher prices for consumers and faster mark-up (slower mark-down) in the face of demand expansion (contraction) 11

  12. Data Requirements Same as last lecture: - Key informant interviews and trader surveys. - Can be difficult to get precise quantitative data. Need to try to triangulate to verify estimates. 12

  13. Interpreting the Analytic Punch line: Markets with a greater number and variety of traders and with lower concentration (CR4 or HHI) measures are less likely to be collusive, because it is harder for larger and disparate groups to organize. Analyze by product, function and geographic market. 13

  14. Limitations of the Analytic Treat data w/healthy skepticism. Price change implications for expected price changes are not immediately clear. But when markets noncompetitive, rate of price increases is typically 50-100% higher than under perfect competition due to oligopolistic mark-ups. 14

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