Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Compliance Measures Overview
Detailed overview of the measures implemented for verifying states' compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), including design verification, analysis of declarations, on-site inspections, assay of nuclear materials, and containment/surveillance techniques. The process involves destructive and non-destructive assays, containment monitoring, reactor power monitoring, and adherence to bilateral agreements. Various technologies and methods are utilized to ensure precision, timeliness, and reliability in monitoring activities.
- Nuclear Non-Proliferation
- Verification Measures
- Compliance Monitoring
- Nuclear Material Assay
- Containment Techniques
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Verification of States compliance with NPT Implemented in accordance with bilateral legally binding agreements SG measures: Design verification Analysis of States declarations (e.g. nuclear material accountancy, types of activities, etc.) On-site observations by inspectors Independent assay of nuclear materials (quantities, composition) by NDA and DA Containment and surveillance techniques Process monitoring
Destructive Assay (DA): Analytical chemistry, mass-spectrometry High precision, low timeliness, intrusive Non Gamma-spectrometry, neutrons counting Less precise, timely (up to on-line), site-specific Containment/Surveillance (C/S): Various seals/tags (tamper indicators), cameras Maintaining continuity of knowledge (CoK) Monitoring status/activity, detect anomalies Ranging from post-factum to real-time capabilities Destructive Assay (DA): Non- -Destructive Assay (NDA): Destructive Assay (NDA): Containment/Surveillance (C/S):
Power reactors: On Assay of all fresh fuel (NDA, counting, IDs) Monitoring of fuel flow (qualitative NDA, portal monitors) Monitoring of SF in wet and dry storages (C/S, NDA) LWRs & BWRs: Assay of all fresh fuel (NDA, counting, IDs) Inspectors presence during open core periods (NDA/C/S) Monitoring of SF in wet and dry storages (C/S, NDA) Research Reactors and Critical Assemblies: Assay of all fuel and targets (NDA, counting, IDs, weight) Power monitoring for P>25MW Power reactors: On- -power loaded reactors (CANDU): power loaded reactors (CANDU): LWRs & BWRs: Research Reactors and Critical Assemblies:
SG measures: Design verification Analysis of States declarations (e.g. at facilities level) On-site observations by inspectors Independent assay of nuclear materials (quantities, composition) by NDA and DA Containment and surveillance techniques Process monitoring Reactor power monitoring: Needed only for R&D reactors with power exceeding 25MW Thermo-hydraulic monitoring In-core radiation detectors (n, gamma) Splitting signals from operator s gauges Antineutrino ?? In addition to .....? Instead of ..... ? Better than .....? Precision, timeliness, cost, convenience, usability, reliability non-intrusiveness
Involvement of additional observables: Dynamics Power baseline shall be obtained from another source Spectral information Required statistics are orders of magnitude higher than for power monitoring Stability or perfect knowledge of all influencing reactor parameters (power, neutron profiles, fuel admixtures, etc.) Availability of perfect core simulation codes Directional information Seems inapplicable in classic inverse beta detectors Pessimistic expectations for alternatives .. Involvement of additional observables : Dynamics of antineutrino count rate > prerequisite: Spectral information > prerequisites: Directional information:
Deterrence effectiveness: : Deterrence effectiveness Deterrence 100% Deterrence 100% Subjective factor: Subjective factor: Risk of detection from the proliferator s viewpoint Not exclusively driven by applied SG measures Unmeasurable ! from the proliferator s viewpoint SG measures Unmeasurable ! Evaluated by assigning detection probabilities under SG measures: Numerous diversion scenarios Arbitrary established low medium, and high levels Constrained by definitions of significant quantities , timeliness , etc. Complex, but coherent system of SG criteria probabilities Joining NPT Verification effort/resources Verification effort/resources system of SG criteria
YES guess, suppose or exclude) undeclared A lot of political sensitivities: Either nothing to verify or suspect everything and everywhere Clash with national sovereignty Nondiscrimination Verification vs. intelligence Priorities: Reprocessing/enrichment Mining/conversion Reactors Satellite imaging, open sources, international trade Additional Protocol (AP), YES - ability to detect detect (or discover, come across, undeclared activities . ANTINEUTRINO ??? ANTINEUTRINO ???
Thank you ! Welcome to Q/As and discussion
