Kant on Moral Autonomy: Insights on Duty and Inclination

Kant on moral autonomy
1. Kant and Rousseau
 
[M]oral freedom … alone makes man truly the master of
himself; for the impulsion of mere appetite is slavery, and
obedience to the law one has prescribed to oneself is
freedom. (SC, 54)
I myself am a researcher by inclination. I feel the entire thirst
for cognition and the eager restlessness to proceed further in
it, as well as the satisfaction at every acquisition. There was a
time when I believed this alone could constitute the honor of
humankind, and I despised the rabble who knows nothing.
Rousseau
 has set me right. This binding prejudice vanishes, I
learn to honor human beings, and I would feel by far less
useful than the common laborer if I did not believe that this
consideration could impart a value to all others in order to
establish the rights of humanity. (Immanuel Kant, 
Observations
on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime
, 1764)
2. Morality and reason
A good will is absolutely or unconditionally good
Some things (e.g. intelligence, courage) are good in certain
respects but bad in others (think of a criminal who is both
intelligent and courageous)
A good will is not good simply in relation to some end
(instrumental value), or good only under certain conditions
(contingently good)
A good will is good irrespective of its consequences and any
contingent conditions
The word ‘ought’ implies an obligation and hence the
notion of duty – if you have a duty to do something, you are
obliged to do it
A person’s will can, however, be subject to forces (e.g.
desires, inclinations, fears) that prevent him or her from
doing what he or she recognizes to be the morally right
thing to do
Question of motivation
For Kant, doing one’s duty requires acting 
from duty
 alone 
Acting 
from
 duty v. acting
 in conformity with
 duty
Outwardly moral actions can be determined by:
(1) Higher order motives – one acts in conformity with morality
so to realize some other end – e.g. a shopkeeper is honest
because this makes good business sense – having a thriving
business is the real purpose of acting morally
(2) Immediate inclination – e.g. a person simply enjoys helping
others, that is, he or she is naturally disposed to help others 
(3) The motive of duty alone
Only actions whose motive is 3 are truly moral 
(1) and (2) are based on desires that agents happen to have
Is Kant saying
(a) an action has no moral value at all if it is in any way in
accordance with one’s inclinations?
OR
(b) an action motivated by inclination has no moral worth unless
it is 
also
 motivated by a concern for duty?
If (b) he can be taken to mean:
Although one has an inclination to act morally, even without this
inclination one would have acted morally 
The inclination is morally irrelevant
Actual consequences of acting morally are also morally irrelevant
3. The lawfulness of moral agency 
Rational agents act in accordance with the representations of
laws/rules
Two types of rule expressed in the form of a command:
(1) Hypothetical imperatives – instrumental – I ought to do 
x
 in
order to achieve 
y
 (e.g. I ought to revise if I want to pass the
exam).  If 
x
, then 
y
Contingent: if I renounce the end I also renounce the means 
(2) Categorical imperatives – unconditionally valid - I ought to do
x
 simply because I ought to do 
x 
Obligatory regardless of the agent’s circumstances or desires 
Moral rules (laws) are of type (2)
4. The categorical imperative
Since acting from duty requires abstracting from any ends or
inclinations:
[N]othing is left but the conformity of actions as such with
universal law … 
I ought never to act except in such a way
that I could also will that my maxim should become a
universal law
 (GMM, 14-5)
The categorical imperative
act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can
at the same time will that it become a universal law
’ (GMM, 31)
Maxim = general rule or principle governing actions which an
individual consciously or unconsciously adopts – reason for
action
I shall cycle to work every day in order to keep fit (prudential)
I shall never break a promise I have made even if it would be of
benefit to me to do so (moral)
One’s maxim – the principle/rule  according to which one acts –
ought to conform to the 
formal
 conditions of lawfulness as such
(i.e. universal applicability and necessity)
Example of making lying promise: 
Maxim (subjective principle) = ‘when I am in need of money
I shall borrow some and promise to repay it, even though I
know I will not be able to do so’
CI (objective principle) demands that I ‘universalize’ this
maxim: what would happen if 
everyone
 acted on the basis
of such a maxim?
Result: a (practical) contradiction arises which demonstrates
the maxim’s irrationality
Since the principle of non-contradiction governs reason as
such, no rational being can consistently violate it
In obeying this moral principle,  each moral agent, as
rational being, legislates the law to which it is subject
5. Moral autonomy
Autonomy of the will is the property of the will by which
it is a law to itself (independently of any property of the
objects of volition). The principle of autonomy is,
therefore: to choose only in such a way that the maxims
of your choice are also included as universal law in the
same volition. (GMM, 47)
Autonomy of the will =  giving oneself, as a rational being, the
law to which one is subject by applying the categorical
imperative to one’s maxims
Form of self-government
(i) No authority external to ourselves is needed to determine
the demands of morality and to tell us what they are
(ii) We can exercise effective control over ourselves (we are
not at the mercy of each and every passing desire)
Heteronomy of the will = whenever the rational will is
determined by an ‘object’ external to it (for example, a given
desire, end):
The will in that case does not give itself the law; instead
the object, by means of its relation to the will, gives the
law to it. (GMM, 47)
6. The problem of freedom of the will
Two conceptions of freedom
(1) Negative conception 
Moral freedom requires being able to act independently of
any (external) cause whatsoever (e.g. a given desire):
Will
 is a kind of causality of living beings insofar as they
are rational, and 
freedom
 would be that property of such
causality that it can be efficient independently of alien
causes 
determining
 it, just as 
natural necessity
 is the
property of the causality of all nonrational beings to be
determined to activity by the influence of alien causes.
(GMM, 52)
Special kind of causality
(
2) Positive conception
Causality in accordance with laws: ‘the will’s property of being a
law to itself’ (autonomy) (GMM, 52)
The will when determined in accordance with the categorical
imperative: ‘a free will and a will under moral laws are one and
the same’ (GMM, 53)
Is it possible to be free in sense (1) without also being free in
sense (2) (e.g. when one chooses not to act in accordance
with duty)?
Freedom in sense (1) must be presupposed if freedom in
sense (2) is to be possible at all
Human beings, in virtue of their capacity of free choice, can
choose to obey or not to obey moral laws 
Idea of morality depends on being able to conceive of agents as
responsible for their actions (imputation)
Therefore, the capacity of freedom of choice must be held to be
a condition of moral autonomy
I cannot give myself the law to which I am subject if I have no
choice but to obey this law
Determinism v. freedom of the will
In so far as they belong to the natural world, the actions of
human beings are causally determined
Every event is necessarily determined by a sufficient cause  
Freedom, in contrast, consists in rationality and membership
of a purely intellectual world 
Human beings are not, therefore, merely part of nature
First approach: Kant’s two-world view 
Division between world of appearances (phenomenal) world
and world as it is in itself
Phenomenal world of appearances determined by (1) pure
forms of intuition (space and time) and (2) categories (pure
concepts) of the understanding
(1) and (2) are features of the human mind that organise the
raw data of sensory experience into a single unified experience
Among (2), when applied to conditions of time, belongs the
law of causality (unites causes and effects)
World as it is in itself (a mind-independent world) is not (or is
conceivably not) determined by (1) and (2)
Therefore, in so far as they are members of this world, agents
can be thought not to be subject to the law of causality
(indeterminism)
Agent is an ‘uncaused cause’ – the originator of a causal
series through an act of free choice (transcendental
freedom)
Actions do not belong to a causal series, each member of
which is determined by an antecedent condition, including
such psychological facts as beliefs or desires
If an action were determined by an antecedent condition, I
would not have chosen it and I would not therefore be
responsible for it
Form of incompatibilism – freedom and determinism are not
compatible/are mutually exclusive
Demonstrates 
possibility
 of freedom only
Consciousness of oneself as autonomous agent subject to moral
law provides evidence of membership of a world in which one is
an uncaused cause: 
[T]he idea of freedom makes me a member of an intelligible
world and consequently, if I were only this, all my actions
would
 always be in conformity with the autonomy of the
will; but since at the same time I intuit myself as a member
of the world of sense, they 
ought
 to be in conformity with
it. (GMM, 58)
Only in so far as one belongs to the phenomenal world is one
susceptible to influences that cause one to act contrary to what
the moral law demands
If one were a member of an intelligible world alone - a world in
which one was not susceptible to such influences and not
subject to the law of causality - one would always will in
accordance with the moral law (moral necessity)
Difficulties involved in explaining the relationship between two
worlds and nature of individual moral agent as the member of
both of these worlds 
at the same time
Second approach
Consciousness of ourselves as autonomous beings subject to the
moral law is by itself sufficient evidence that we are free
Ought implies can
We must presuppose that we are free:
[E]very being that cannot act otherwise than 
under the idea
of freedom
 is just because of that really free in a practical
respect, that is, all laws that are inseparably bound up with
freedom hold for him just as if his will had been validly
pronounced free also in itself and in theoretical philosophy.
(GMM, 53)
Thus freedom and unconditional practical law reciprocally
imply each other. (CPrR, 162)
We do not, therefore, begin with knowledge of ourselves as free
This knowledge is instead conditioned by our consciousness of
the moral law
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Immanuel Kant emphasizes the significance of moral freedom and autonomy, highlighting the superiority of acting out of duty over mere inclination. He asserts that a good will is inherently valuable, irrespective of consequences or external motivations. Kant distinguishes between actions driven by duty, inclination, or other motives, suggesting that true moral worth lies in acting solely from duty. This exploration delves into Kant's perspective on morality, duty, and the intrinsic worth of ethical actions.


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  1. Kant on moral autonomy

  2. 1. Kant and Rousseau [M]oral freedom alone makes man truly the master of himself; for the impulsion of mere appetite is slavery, and obedience to the law one has prescribed to oneself is freedom. (SC, 54) I myself am a researcher by inclination. I feel the entire thirst for cognition and the eager restlessness to proceed further in it, as well as the satisfaction at every acquisition. There was a time when I believed this alone could constitute the honor of humankind, and I despised the rabble who knows nothing. Rousseau has set me right. This binding prejudice vanishes, I learn to honor human beings, and I would feel by far less useful than the common laborer if I did not believe that this consideration could impart a value to all others in order to establish the rights of humanity. (Immanuel Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, 1764)

  3. 2. Morality and reason A good will is absolutely or unconditionally good Some things (e.g. intelligence, courage) are good in certain respects but bad in others (think of a criminal who is both intelligent and courageous) A good will is not good simply in relation to some end (instrumental value), or good only under certain conditions (contingently good) A good will is good irrespective of its consequences and any contingent conditions

  4. The word ought implies an obligation and hence the notion of duty if you have a duty to do something, you are obliged to do it A person s will can, however, be subject to forces (e.g. desires, inclinations, fears) that prevent him or her from doing what he or she recognizes to be the morally right thing to do Question of motivation For Kant, doing one s duty requires acting from duty alone Acting from duty v. acting in conformity with duty

  5. Outwardly moral actions can be determined by: (1) Higher order motives one acts in conformity with morality so to realize some other end e.g. a shopkeeper is honest because this makes good business sense having a thriving business is the real purpose of acting morally (2) Immediate inclination e.g. a person simply enjoys helping others, that is, he or she is naturally disposed to help others (3) The motive of duty alone Only actions whose motive is 3 are truly moral (1) and (2) are based on desires that agents happen to have

  6. Is Kant saying (a) an action has no moral value at all if it is in any way in accordance with one s inclinations? OR (b) an action motivated by inclination has no moral worth unless it is also motivated by a concern for duty? If (b) he can be taken to mean: Although one has an inclination to act morally, even without this inclination one would have acted morally The inclination is morally irrelevant Actual consequences of acting morally are also morally irrelevant

  7. 3. The lawfulness of moral agency Rational agents act in accordance with the representations of laws/rules Two types of rule expressed in the form of a command: (1) Hypothetical imperatives instrumental I ought to do x in order to achieve y (e.g. I ought to revise if I want to pass the exam). If x, then y Contingent: if I renounce the end I also renounce the means (2) Categorical imperatives unconditionally valid - I ought to do x simply because I ought to do x Obligatory regardless of the agent s circumstances or desires Moral rules (laws) are of type (2)

  8. 4. The categorical imperative Since acting from duty requires abstracting from any ends or inclinations: [N]othing is left but the conformity of actions as such with universal law I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law (GMM, 14-5) The categorical imperative act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law (GMM, 31)

  9. Maxim = general rule or principle governing actions which an individual consciously or unconsciously adopts reason for action I shall cycle to work every day in order to keep fit (prudential) I shall never break a promise I have made even if it would be of benefit to me to do so (moral) One s maxim the principle/rule according to which one acts ought to conform to the formal conditions of lawfulness as such (i.e. universal applicability and necessity)

  10. Example of making lying promise: Maxim (subjective principle) = when I am in need of money I shall borrow some and promise to repay it, even though I know I will not be able to do so CI (objective principle) demands that I universalize this maxim: what would happen if everyone acted on the basis of such a maxim? Result: a (practical) contradiction arises which demonstrates the maxim s irrationality Since the principle of non-contradiction governs reason as such, no rational being can consistently violate it In obeying this moral principle, each moral agent, as rational being, legislates the law to which it is subject

  11. 5. Moral autonomy Autonomy of the will is the property of the will by which it is a law to itself (independently of any property of the objects of volition). The principle of autonomy is, therefore: to choose only in such a way that the maxims of your choice are also included as universal law in the same volition. (GMM, 47) Autonomy of the will = giving oneself, as a rational being, the law to which one is subject by applying the categorical imperative to one s maxims

  12. Form of self-government (i) No authority external to ourselves is needed to determine the demands of morality and to tell us what they are (ii) We can exercise effective control over ourselves (we are not at the mercy of each and every passing desire) Heteronomy of the will = whenever the rational will is determined by an object external to it (for example, a given desire, end): The will in that case does not give itself the law; instead the object, by means of its relation to the will, gives the law to it. (GMM, 47)

  13. 6. The problem of freedom of the will Two conceptions of freedom (1) Negative conception Moral freedom requires being able to act independently of any (external) cause whatsoever (e.g. a given desire): Will is a kind of causality of living beings insofar as they are rational, and freedom would be that property of such causality that it can be efficient independently of alien causes determining it, just as natural necessity is the property of the causality of all nonrational beings to be determined to activity by the influence of alien causes. (GMM, 52) Special kind of causality

  14. (2) Positive conception Causality in accordance with laws: the will s property of being a law to itself (autonomy) (GMM, 52) The will when determined in accordance with the categorical imperative: a free will and a will under moral laws are one and the same (GMM, 53) Is it possible to be free in sense (1) without also being free in sense (2) (e.g. when one chooses not to act in accordance with duty)? Freedom in sense (1) must be presupposed if freedom in sense (2) is to be possible at all

  15. Human beings, in virtue of their capacity of free choice, can choose to obey or not to obey moral laws Idea of morality depends on being able to conceive of agents as responsible for their actions (imputation) Therefore, the capacity of freedom of choice must be held to be a condition of moral autonomy I cannot give myself the law to which I am subject if I have no choice but to obey this law

  16. Determinism v. freedom of the will In so far as they belong to the natural world, the actions of human beings are causally determined Every event is necessarily determined by a sufficient cause Freedom, in contrast, consists in rationality and membership of a purely intellectual world Human beings are not, therefore, merely part of nature First approach: Kant s two-world view Division between world of appearances (phenomenal) world and world as it is in itself

  17. Phenomenal world of appearances determined by (1) pure forms of intuition (space and time) and (2) categories (pure concepts) of the understanding (1) and (2) are features of the human mind that organise the raw data of sensory experience into a single unified experience Among (2), when applied to conditions of time, belongs the law of causality (unites causes and effects) World as it is in itself (a mind-independent world) is not (or is conceivably not) determined by (1) and (2) Therefore, in so far as they are members of this world, agents can be thought not to be subject to the law of causality (indeterminism)

  18. Agent is an uncaused cause the originator of a causal series through an act of free choice (transcendental freedom) Actions do not belong to a causal series, each member of which is determined by an antecedent condition, including such psychological facts as beliefs or desires If an action were determined by an antecedent condition, I would not have chosen it and I would not therefore be responsible for it Form of incompatibilism freedom and determinism are not compatible/are mutually exclusive

  19. Demonstrates possibility of freedom only Consciousness of oneself as autonomous agent subject to moral law provides evidence of membership of a world in which one is an uncaused cause: [T]he idea of freedom makes me a member of an intelligible world and consequently, if I were only this, all my actions would always be in conformity with the autonomy of the will; but since at the same time I intuit myself as a member of the world of sense, they ought to be in conformity with it. (GMM, 58)

  20. Only in so far as one belongs to the phenomenal world is one susceptible to influences that cause one to act contrary to what the moral law demands If one were a member of an intelligible world alone - a world in which one was not susceptible to such influences and not subject to the law of causality - one would always will in accordance with the moral law (moral necessity) Difficulties involved in explaining the relationship between two worlds and nature of individual moral agent as the member of both of these worlds at the same time Second approach Consciousness of ourselves as autonomous beings subject to the moral law is by itself sufficient evidence that we are free

  21. Ought implies can We must presuppose that we are free: [E]very being that cannot act otherwise than under the idea of freedom is just because of that really free in a practical respect, that is, all laws that are inseparably bound up with freedom hold for him just as if his will had been validly pronounced free also in itself and in theoretical philosophy. (GMM, 53) Thus freedom and unconditional practical law reciprocally imply each other. (CPrR, 162) We do not, therefore, begin with knowledge of ourselves as free This knowledge is instead conditioned by our consciousness of the moral law

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